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Abstract of a thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of 
 Master of Natual Resource Management and Ecological Engineering 
 
 
 
 
 Strategies to manage common-pool resources vary and despite substantial scholarly and 
practical  literature very little has been written on how communities and co-governance 
interact with a nested system, especially as they apply to a Treaty arrangement as is the case 
in New Zealand.  This research compares the institutional design for managing Lake 
Ellesmere/Te Waihora to Ostrom’s Design principles for long-enduring CPR institutions.  The 
results reveal that several of Ostrom’s principles are not met.  Co-governance, co-
management and Treaty relationships are also shown to impact the relationship between 
communities and nested systems through the lens of Ostrom’s principles. 
 
Keywords: Lake Ellesmere/Te Waihora, common-pool resources, co-governance, co-
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Water governance in New Zealand has changed over the last twenty-plus years due in part 
to the national level adoption of relevant non-binding United Nations agreements (e.g. 
Agenda 21) that have led to attempts to integrate water management strategies.  New 
Zealand is morally obligated to enact sustainable principles of Agenda 21 as a signatory, 
though not statutorily bound (United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED), 1992). Specifically on the topic of this thesis, Chapter 18.5 (U.N., 1993) states, “The 
following programme areas are proposed for the freshwater sector: (a) integrated water 
resources and development.” Additionally, and relevant to New Zealand are other signed 
agreements dealing with rights of indigenous peoples such as the United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2008) to which New Zealand is a signatory.  Article 19 
(U.N., p.8 2008) touches on potential co-governance issues (discussed below), “States shall 
consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their 
own representative institutions in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent 
before adopting and implementing legislative or administrative measures.” Both such 
agreements lend themselves to New Zealand’s evolving growth and change surrounding 
both water resource management and relationships with their indigenous peoples (i.e. 
Maori.) It was outside the scope of this thesis to determine whether New Zealand has 
implemented new water management strategies in regards only to the U.N. agreements. 
These international agreements indicate the international community is concerned about 
sustainable development of water resources and by signing these agreements New Zealand 
has indicated it will play a role to address water management and has implemented policies 
(discussed in Chapter 4) to that effect. 
In the 1940s, catchment boards were established throughout New Zealand and then given 
more functions, including responsibilities pertaining to water in the 1960s (Fenemor, Neilan, 
Allen, & Russell, 2011).  These catchment boards were eventually replaced by regional and 
unitary councils in 1989.  Boundaries defined by catchments still exist today, but not in the 
exact form they did previously, as slightly different political regions were set up.  Moreover, 
in New Zealand, “The territorial jurisdiction of regional councils, established in 1988, was 
purposely defined on the basis of groups of large water catchments” (Memon, Painter, & 
Weber, 2012, p. 35), so the integrative approach to catchment management is still followed.    
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 Along those same lines, Integrated Catchment Management (ICM), more in line with the 
aforementioned ‘integrated water resources’ from Agenda 21, is an attempt to manage an 
area within a defined geographical context (Memon et al., 2012).  ICM has been 
implemented in the Tasman Region of the South Island of New Zealand, and is an example of 
common-pool resources (CPR) management, but in a less complex biophysical context and 
without the same layering of local government and Treaty settlements. It is therefore 
somewhat different from this thesis’ focus on Canterbury and the Selwyn/Waihora Zone (see 
Chapter 4). 
 The recognition of the significance of a catchment has allowed scientists to study nutrient 
flows and discharges throughout the defined area and allows for the study of downstream 
effects of different activities (Bowden, 1999).  This is especially important in an area like 
Canterbury, where most catchments drain mainly agricultural land, the most-often blamed 
culprit for diffuse source pollution.  On the regional level, however, it is more likely that a 
catchment plan be considered because it could include either the majority of a catchment, 
or contain several catchments depending on the scale. 
By defining governing regions by catchment shape, it allows those people involved with and 
responsible for the quality and content of its water and associated ecosystem and services to 
make decisions that will affect their area of use.  ICM in New Zealand, although 
implemented early on and although it is the basis for many of the regional councils, does not 
play as large a role as it could.  Memon et al. (2012, p. 37) write that their “assessment is 
that ICM has not featured strongly in the way that regional councils have interpreted and 
implemented their devolved RMA mandate relating to water management”.  For ICM at the 
regional level, rules and regulations may fit well, but at smaller catchment levels it could 
prove to be more difficult.  For Lake Ellesmere/Te Waihora (henceforth “Lake Ellesmere”), 
this is especially important, as it needs to have a plan to manage even the furthest reaches 
of the catchment.  Managing the Lake is only half of the job, as determining the inputs from 
further up the catchment has become a major issue, if not the major issue involving the 
health of the Lake.  Managing strictly by catchment, although not purely implemented in 
New Zealand, is still included, only, “the emphasis on integrated and catchment-based 
planning has been weakened by the broader RMA mandates and more regional focus of 
regional and unitary council planning than in earlier catchment-based water and soil plans” 
(Fenemor et al., 2011, p. 13).  Water is often seen as a common pool resource (CPR), but 
although the catchment is an important organising concept to governing such a CPR, it may 
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not be the only determinant of political boundaries and, as is discussed in this thesis, is not 
the sole determinant for the water management zones in the Canterbury Region that have 
been   adopted since 2010. 
Lake Ellesmere, dually named Te Waihora, is located on the South Island of New Zealand, 
west of Banks Peninsula in Canterbury.  New Zealand’s fifth largest lake by area at 
approximately 20,000 hectares, Ellesmere has been the subject of several attempts at 
effective management and is a significant site not only for the local land owners and 
residents in the area, but also for the local Maori iwi (tribe), Ngai Tahu, who see the lake as 
an important part of their culture, livelihood, and spirituality.   
Lake Ellesmere and its catchment is also a significant biophysical feature in the region.  
Among the significant management issues for the people affected and affecting the Lake is 
the water level the Lake is allowed to reach before it is artificially opened to the sea through 
a shingle barrier (Kaitorete).  This channel is subsequently filled and closed by natural wave 
action and sediment deposition, particularly during southerly storm events.  Consequently, 
the Lake may need to be opened several times a year, and since the 1940s has been opened 
at least once per year.  The timings of such openings and the height at which they occur has 
been a source of conflict as different segments of the community are affected differently 
and have different needs and values for the Lake.  The shallow, less than 2m deep, slightly 
brackish lake (Soons, Shulmeister, & Holt, 1997) has seen its nutrient levels fluctuate, a 
damaging large storm, and anthropological drainage throughout its management (or lack 
thereof) history.  Specific issues surrounding the physical environment of the Lake include 
the flooding of local farmland, poor water quality, fisheries management, other wildlife 
management, recreational uses and spiritual/cultural considerations. Among these issues, 
the Lake is noted as “a wildlife habitat of national and international importance with the 
highest recorded bird diversity of any location in New Zealand”(Hughey & Taylor, 2008, p. 
57) which means the, “management of lake levels is a key issue for the maintenance or 
enhancement of wildlife values” (Taylor, 1996, p. 201).  These interests combine to form an 
array of interested stakeholders with divergent goals, ranging from local farmers and Ngai 
Tahu members to commercial fishermen, duck hunters, bird watchers and elected officials.  
With so many different interests surrounding one environmentally degraded, yet highly 
utilized area, the strategies taken to improve the Lake can cause disagreements and often 
slow down the necessary process for improvement. 
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Currently, the Lake falls under several direct management arrangements stemming from 
different entities.  There is a National Water Conservation Order for the Lake reflecting its 
role as a nationally significant habitat for flora and fauna, among other reasons.  Made 
originally by central government, this specifically constrains local government options for 
managing the Lake’s water levels.  The Canterbury Water Management Strategy (CWMS) 
sets the stage for smaller, more local efforts like the Regional Implementation Programme 
(RIP) and the Selwyn/Waihora Zone Committee’s Zone Implementation Programme (ZIP)1.  
These are separate from, although relate to, an agreement between the New Zealand 
Department of Conservation (DoC) and Ngai Tahu called the Joint Management Plan (JMP)2, 
which allows Ngai Tahu to have a say in the management of the lake bed.  A more recent 
agreement3 also exists between Ngai Tahu and Environment Canterbury (ECan), the regional 
council, which denotes a co-governance agreement between the two decision-making 
entities.  Several other statutory instruments govern the Lake indirectly, including the Land 
and Water Regional Plan (LWRP), Resource Management Act (RMA), the Local Government 
Act (LGA), the Natural Resources Regional Plan (NRRP) and the Treaty of Waitangi (The 
Treaty). Another significant governance and management impact stems from the Ngai Tahu 
Claims Settlement Act 1998 (the Settlement Act) that awarded the tribe associated most 
with Lake Ellesmere, among other things, ownership of much of the lake bed. Though there 
were other parts to the Settlement Act (e.g. $170 million dollar settlement) the ownership of 
the lake bed is impactful on the subject of this thesis. 
This thesis will focus on the former, more direct and local plans within the region and 
catchment that apply more directly to the governance of Lake Ellesmere.  Considering the 
amount of policy and planning involved with the Lake at present, it is important to 
implement an effective strategy moving forward that includes effective integration of the 
current non-statutory localized agreements, especially in those areas where overlap is 
present or the hierarchy can be confusing.   
An unusual aspect to the management of Lake Ellesmere in relation to other case studies in 
the literature and examples from abroad is the inclusion of the tangata whenua in the 
decision-making process.  Tangata whenua is the Maori term used to describe those Maori 
                                                     
 
1
 Can be found at: http://ecan.govt.nz/get-involved/canterburywater/committees/selwyn-
waihora/Pages/selwyn-waihora-zip.aspx 
2
 Can be found at: http://www.doc.govt.nz/documents/about-doc/role/policies-and-plans/te-waihora/te-
waihora-full.pdf 
3
 Can be found at: http://tewaihora.org/ 
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with traditional rights, status and responsibilities in a specific area, usually pertaining to their 
tribal history and genealogy.  Not only does the study of Lake Ellesmere management give us 
insight into CPRs and the concept of co-governance, but also an opportunity to explore the 
role of Maori in how their ancestral environment is managed in a democratic society.  This 
particular situation allows a window into Maori relations with the local or national 
government and the environment and how co-governance or co-management is 
implemented between Treaty partners.  The relationship between the Treaty partners, 
although different, does not exclude the participation of other stakeholders elsewhere in the 
process.  For the purposes of this thesis, the concept of ‘stakeholders’ and someone with ‘an 
interest’ in the Lake are interchangeable.  For example, someone with a statutory interest, 
financial, or recreational may all be referred to as stakeholders.  This is a large and diverse 
group of people, all of whom may want input in Lake management.  
This thesis is an attempt to follow and assess the transition between community-based 
agreements into newly designed nested, statutory plans because “Institutional infrastructure 
is also important, including research, social capital, and multilevel rules, to coordinate 
between local and larger levels of government” (Dietz, Ostrom, & Stern, 2003, p. 1909).  
Despite the adoption in 2013 of the Selwyn/Waihora Zone Implementation Programme (ZIP) 
recommendations and continued efforts at co-management, the Lake continues to fall under 
several different management plans and institutional stewardship arrangements.  As will be 
discussed in Chapter 2, these different plans also reveal the variety of governance theories 
surrounding the management of this one location. In her book, Governing the Commons, 
Elinor Ostrom (1990, p. 23) asserts that, “a set of rules used in one physical environment 
may have vastly different consequences if used in a different physical environment”.  There 
have been a number of restoration programmes concerning the Lake (e.g., Whakaora Te 
Waihora), but the degree to which these are integrated with the various governance 
arrangements and frameworks of the Lake is unclear. 
The newer frameworks surrounding the Lake such as the CWMS and the local ZIP attempt to 
guide the management of the Lake in a way previously not attempted.  Due to the diverse 
range of interests, shared ownership, and often complicated responsibilities surrounding the 
Lake, Elinor Ostrom’s (1990) Design principles illustrated by long-enduring CPR institutions 
has been selected as a model against which to assess the newer efforts at managing the 
Lake.  Ostrom’s design principles were developed through observation and research into 
CPRs that have endured for long periods of time.  By comparing the frameworks surrounding 
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Lake Ellesmere to other resources with shared interests and ownership that have endured 
for long periods of time, we can work to understand the future of the Lake and also critique 
the work of Ostrom as her framework is either shown to be effective or ineffective.  
Internationally, Pinkerton & John (2008) have led research on the processes of transition 
from open access type arrangements to shared or co-management of natural resources.  
However, the mechanics of the process of transition from one, or multiple overlapping and 
conflicting, management frameworks to new governance arrangements for commons has 
been little studied in the New Zealand context.  
In order to best assess this management transition and identify key principles of the process, 
this thesis reviews the literature surrounding the governance of CPRs, identifying the 
benefits and drawbacks to co-governance, and seeks to explain impacts of community 
involvement on CPR management, especially the implications for Ngai Tahu and Lake 
Ellesmere.  Interviews with stakeholders and decision makers engaged with Lake Ellesmere 
(and its catchment) from different parts of the governance framework help to locate the 
areas where the transitions are more difficult and provide a base for explaining how the 
process has evolved.  Interviews also enable a better understanding of the cultural aspects 
involved in the Canterbury region, as they apply to the thesis.  At a practical level this thesis 
is an attempt to add to the years of work and input on streamlining effective management 
arrangements for the Lake in the form of an effective assessment of the transition period 
from local community and co-management agreements to nested, multi-level statutory 
management, through analyses of documents, observation, and interviews. Programmes 
and policies concerning the Zone Committee (ZC) will be the main focus due to their 
potential for major impacts on the Lake, with other issues pertinent to the catchment 
included where appropriate.   
Lake Ellesmere is used as a focal point because of the characteristics that identify it as a CPR 
and because there are a number of mechanisms that intersect and overlap throughout the 
management of the Lake. These include, for instance, an existing Joint Management Plan 
(JMP) between the Crown’s Department of Conservation (DoC) and the tangata whenua 
represented by Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu (TRONT).   
The decision-making processes and frameworks through which such decisions are made are 
part of the institutional regime examined in Chapter 4.  It is this grouping of regimes that 
manage the Lake that the thesis seeks to compare to Ostrom’s design principles. If the new 
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frameworks (e.g. ZIP) are found to be similar then a case can be made that the new 
governing framework will result in an effective and enduring management scheme for Lake 
Ellesmere.  If the opposite is true, then it will take time to reflect on the outcomes that may 
occur due to the deviations from Ostrom’s design principles.  A future further critique of the 
Lake after the implementation or lack of inclusion of Ostrom’s principles will be necessary, 
though that is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
The result of this research seeks to answer three main questions:  
- How does co-governance and community involvement affect CPR management? 
- Is the new framework surrounding the management of Lake Ellesmere designed in a 
way that is consistent with relevant literature on long-enduring CPRs? 
- To what extent does the origin of government rules affect the level of community 
involvement? 
The questions will focus on the local case of the governance of the catchment of Lake 
Ellesmere and will be discussed in relation to the international literature on CPR 
management and what this specific case can add to the discussion.   
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Chapter 2 – Theoretical Context 
2.1 Management of CPRs 
What is referred to as a common pool resource (CPR), has been defined similarly by several 
authors.  Ostrom defines a key characteristic of a CPR as being “sufficiently (large enough) 
that excluding potential beneficiaries from using them for consumptive or non-consumptive 
purposes is non-trivial” (Ostrom, 2008, p. 24), and notes that, “benefits are sometimes 
distributed in an unequal fashion among community members” (Ostrom, 2008, p. 27).  
Edella Schlager uses examples in her interpretation where, “Natural resources such as 
forests, groundwater basins, grazing lands, and fisheries are common pool resources. But so 
too are human constructed systems, such as irrigation…” (2002, p. 803).  Broadly, however, 
CPRs have two main defining features. First, the difficulty of exclusion, and second, the 
subtractability of resources (Pomeroy & Berkes, 1997). Lake Ellesmere is of a large enough 
size that excluding resource users is difficult, and many of the resources it provides cannot 
be returned for others to use again.  These qualities allow us to identify the Lake as a CPR 
and hence, apply Ostrom’s Principles as a guide to the future management of the Lake.   
A major issue surrounding the management of larger CPRs is the complexity associated with 
their size.  Lake Ellesmere includes several smaller CPRs within its boundaries and some, 
such as fisheries, extend beyond those same boundaries.  In contrast to an open-access 
resource, such as an ocean, where anyone can benefit and where boundaries are more 
difficult to define, CPRs have defined boundaries within which to operate, even if those 
boundaries delineate a considerably large and difficult to monitor area.  Often, defining 
boundaries can prove a difficult task especially when applied to hydrological catchments.  In 
the case of Lake Ellesmere, its catchment and political boundaries, it is affected by inputs 
from approximately fifty kilometres away from the Lake edge.  These inputs make defining 
the physical boundaries for the management of the CPR beyond the edge of the Lake 
essential, especially as many stakeholders who benefit from access to the Lake are 
dependent on the control of the Lake opening, the quality and quantity of inputs into the 
Lake and corresponding nutrients or contaminants from elsewhere.  Simply defining the 
boundaries of the Lake CPR as its shoreline is not sufficient; it must include the entire 
catchment. 
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In order to involve essential resource users, a more impactful group of stakeholders who 
interact with the Lake beyond just having a casual interest and who play a role in the 
consequences of a CPR such as Lake Ellesmere, some links must be established.  An essential 
resource user, for the purposes of this thesis, does not exclude stakeholders, rather, it 
represents those stakeholders who may have the biggest impact on the Lake.  Those impacts 
vary depending on the stakeholder.  The first link, and one of the defining characteristics of a 
CPR, is the defined boundary by which it can or will be governed.  Since these boundaries are 
a key factor in separating a CPR from an open-access resource, they need to be defined in a 
way that makes them manageable, with rules attached that are enforceable and attainable.  
If there are no boundaries and a management group or institution wants to monitor or 
regulate entitlements or access to a resource, they have no way to enforce their wishes 
(Ostrom, 1990).  These boundaries provide not only physical areas where exclusion can 
occur, but also political areas where specific groups may have an impact. 
Beyond the specific use of Lake Ellesmere, CPRs and their management have been the 
subject of much research and debate, especially since Garrett Hardin’s “Tragedy of the 
Commons”, where he made famous the idea that, “Ruin is the destination to which all men 
rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the 
commons” (Hardin, 1968, p. 1244).  Hardin’s article highlighted a serious issue in the late 
1960s and asked questions about our management motives and our nature as human beings 
that we are still trying to answer today, over fifty years later.  The issue of the commons, and 
how we as people decide to govern them, has become more and more pronounced as the 
environmental, social and economic impacts on and of commons have increased throughout 
the decades following Hardin’s article.   
In order to examine the governance surrounding Lake Ellesmere and the unique agreements 
involved with it, we must first understand the broader literature surrounding the 
governance of CPRs throughout the world and what strategies have been successful or 
ineffective in solving Hardin’s “Tragedy”.  
2.1.1 Entitlement and Resource Rights 
As CPRs differ, so too do their entitlement schemes.  The very defining quality of a CPR, the 
difficulty of excludability, deals directly with the rights of users (Schlager and Ostrom, 1992).  
This variability provides an important aspect for CPR management because deciding who is 
entitled to what can be the start of user rights and appropriator participation.  Entitlements 
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are considered to be the rights a user could have, not necessarily what they should have 
(Leach, Mearns, & Scoones, 1999).  Entitlements are also a way of legitimizing ownership 
and represent, “a set of alternative commodity bundles that  a person can command in a 
society” (Sen, 1984, p. 497).  These rights can be considered either legal or moral. Some 
types of entitlements exclude certain management strategies.  For the case of Hardin’s 
pasture, the entitlement to the resource is not well defined and so each individual user seeks 
to maximize their personal benefit to the detriment of other users.  This detriment also 
works against the individual. For the purposes of this thesis, the concepts of rights and 
entitlements are used interchangeably and relate to the broad set of explicit or implicit 
claims, recognized or not, to access, use, manage, control, appropriate or transfer common 
pool resources. 
A resource user of a CPR, known as an appropriator, is anyone who ‘removes’ units from the 
resource or subtracts from the resource by adding something.  For example, an appropriator 
may remove fish stocks or water but can also benefit from adding to the resource.  A 
resource user who adds to the care of the resource, like planting native trees or improving 
irrigation, is called a producer.  Much of the literature focuses on the types of CPRs that have 
local producers who manage and improve their resource for their personal benefit but also 
for other appropriators.  This is no coincidence, and the literature shows that producers play 
an important role in CPR management.  Ideally, and most effectively, the users would be 
both producers and appropriators.  Who is entitled to the resource and who will take 
responsibility for being a producer often differs and how entitlements are determined 
becomes problematic. 
For Hardin’s pasture and many other CPRs, the resource rights or entitlements are not 
defined well enough, or at the least, not effectively.  If some rules do exist they are very 
difficult or impossible to enforce amongst the many appropriators involved.  Producers and 
CPRs also fall prey to free-riding, when an appropriator benefits from the resource and 
improvements from the producer because they cannot be excluded from the resource.  As 
Ostrom puts it, “whenever one person (appropriator) cannot be excluded from the benefits 
that others provide, each person is motivated not to contribute to the joint effort” (1990, p. 
6).  This is a major issue whenever confronted with a CPR.  The ways to handle free-riding 
vary depending on the relatively unique nature of the situation.   
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For some CPRs, entitlement is spread across many stakeholders including recreational users, 
visitors, and commercial interests (e.g. commercial fisheries).  Some of these entitlements 
are legal, some are assumed, and some are inherited.  These entitlements have been handed 
down through families, economic transactions and even court settlements.  Determining the 
owner of the resources is only one step to understanding entitlements. This question is more 
accurately answered through determining who is entitled to what and when. There is a 
distinct group of appropriators who make decisions on certain CPRs that choose to exclude 
stakeholders or interest-based communities for different times or reasons.  However, it is 
important to discern who those appropriators are, what they are entitled to, and whether or 
not they are or will become producers.  It is apparent that in most cases all of the 
appropriators are not involved with the government or else they would not require the 
recognition of the government to operate as Ostrom (1990) discusses in her book Governing 
the Commons and as will be discussed later in Chapter 3.  In a representative democracy, 
one or several representatives are supposed to speak for their constituents, but this does 
not mean the constituents are all involved directly.  It has been the design in the past, 
though, for governments to implement top-down management approaches (Prystupa, 1998) 
and where there are systems of legal appeal available in the planning process, government 
approaches may be challenged in the courts.   
Simple set-the-limit plans and adjudication management strategies, though, have not proven 
to be the best way forward for complex resources.  Even as far back as 1986, Robert Sugden, 
based on the economies and situations of the times, wrote, 
“Most modern economic theory describes a world presided over by a government 
(not, significantly by governments), and sees this world through the government’s 
eyes. The government is supposed to have the responsibility, the will, and the power 
to restructure society in whatever way maximizes the social welfare; like the US 
Cavalry in a good Western, the government stands ready to rush to the rescue 
whenever the market “fails,” and the economist’s job is to advise it on when and how 
to do so.  Private individuals, in contrast, are credited with little or no ability to solve 
collective problems among themselves” (Sugden, 1986, p. 3). 
By focusing on only the governmental top-down and/or regulatory approach, there is an 
absence of more community-oriented inputs and the local communities and involvement of 
other stakeholders is often overlooked or ignored.   As Ostrom states on the opening page of 
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her book, “neither the state nor the market is uniformly successful in enabling individuals to 
sustain long-term, productive use of natural resource systems” (1990, p. 1).  Ostrom 
highlights that the two extremes portrayed most often in Western political democracies; 
total public control on one hand and full private control in the other, are not on their own a 
successful solution to CPR management.  And yet, we do need some governing body to be 
involved and we do need land owners and other stakeholders within the area to play a role 
in developing policy, transitioning from mere appropriators to producers and finding ways to 
police their plans, all while realizing it is close to impossible for everyone to be a member of 
all the decision making groups all at once.   
It is evident however, that the answer to our resource management issues does not rest in 
the poles of full exclusivity or total public entitlement rights.  As Thomas Dietz puts it, “no 
single broad type of ownership – government, private, or community – uniformly succeeds 
or fails to halt major resource deterioration” (Dietz et al., 2003, p. 1908).  In his case, he is 
referring to forest management in several different countries, but his findings still align with 
Ostrom and Agrawal, in that entitlement plays a major role in the solving of CPR 
management and that full ownership by either private or public factions as a result of that 
entitlement is not the best way forward.  Ostrom points out that there are two major risks 
involved when a community is entitled to the full ownership of a resource: the resource is 
destroyed due to a lack of exclusion, or the costs of setting allocation limits will be too high 
(Ostrom, 1990).  The aforementioned authors identify an aspect not previously mentioned; 
that a community cannot often fully own a resource and prevent its deterioration.  This is a 
subtle call for monitoring oversight and also is a basic form of evidence that some 
communities may be able to handle larger responsibilities more sustainably than others. 
2.1.2 Institutions 
The setting aside of public and private extremes within the research literature has 
established what Agrawal refers to as the “New Commons”, where, “the increase in the 
stakes of communities has meant a resurgence of interest in community and communal 
management” (2003, p. 245).  This resurgence could not have been possible if one person 
were to own a large resource via some entitlement, or if the government were to make all 
the decisions about a publicly owned CPR that did not involve the local knowledge.   
To help with the integration of communities and other stakeholders into the decision making 
process, “Institutions come into being as consequences of actions of humans and allow 
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specific individuals and groups to reap advantages from altered social circumstances…” 
(Agrawal, 2003, p. 245).  These institutions play a major role in the governance of CPRs 
because they create forums for coordination and conflict management and are often 
capable of providing funding, spreading awareness, and contributing knowledge to the 
overall debate over resource management.  Institutions with more support are often able to 
negotiate and make claims much more effectively than an individual stakeholder or loosely 
gathered groups of individuals.  Often, some institutions will contribute knowledge and work 
outside of the traditional governing framework.  More importantly, though, institutions have 
the capability to develop non-statutory rules, plans, and agreements that can help to 
manage certain resources when the government does not have a specific plan, or even 
during the transition period between the development and implementation of a government 
document.  
It is important to define institutions in the context of the current research.  Although in some 
cases the term institution may apply to societal norms or values, in the case of this thesis, an 
institution is considered to be an organization (that may or may not include societal norms 
or values) of which resource-users are a part. Some such institutions may foster discussions 
with and between Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and private land owners before 
the government is involved. Their plans can tend to be non-statutory in nature, although 
they can play a role in forming statutory policy. 
As much of a role that institutions could possibly play, they do pose some possible negative 
qualities.  Their written plans are often not legally binding and require some backing from 
the government and, “the proliferation of institutions has sometimes led to conflict and 
competition rather than cooperation” (Larson & Soto, 2008, p. 225).  Institutions also can, by 
nature, act to remove smaller interests and “disadvantage marginal and less powerful 
groups” (Agrawal, 2003, p. 257).  This possibility suggests that even institutions, like 
governments, often need a check on their power or influence.  For resource management, 
checks and balances of institutions, stakeholders, and appropriators can often come in the 
form of monitoring.    
2.1.3 Monitoring 
In order for an institutional, local, or government plan to be successful an effective 
monitoring system is essential (Ostrom, 2008).  The same is true for any resource 
management plan.  If a plan or programme is implemented and there is no way to tell if 
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appropriators are following the rules or if there is improvement during the course of the 
implementation, all the work done on the policies could be for naught.  One way to monitor 
is for the appropriators to monitor their activities amongst themselves, and it is argued that, 
“commitment and monitoring are strategically linked and that monitoring produces private 
benefits for the monitor as well as joint benefits for others” (Ostrom, 1990, p. 59).  No 
matter the strategy taken, any rules without monitoring cannot be enforced, nor could there 
be knowledge generated for further deliberations.   
It is easier to determine the best way to monitor a resource if money were not an issue 
because any path could be chosen on an unlimited budget.  But as is always the case, there 
are limited funds for projects and limited time, resources and people to take care of all the 
monitoring.  Gibson (1999) asserts that perfect monitoring would be so expensive that it 
would not be able to be completed.  This means there must be an effective strategy 
developed during and after the planning process to observe and enforce the rules in a cost 
effective, legitimate way.   
How is an institution or government to keep monitoring costs down?  One answer is to 
monitor size, as the larger the resource, the larger the group of people who probably need 
monitoring and the more area of resource that needs management (Agrawal & Goyal, 2001).  
When an area is large it is logically more likely to be difficult to exclude all appropriators or 
free-riders and (like many CPRs), it causes unreported usage to increase and resources to be 
lost (assuming free-riding is occurring).  To keep costs down, larger groups could be split up, 
or they could try to keep the users to as small a number of people as possible in order to 
make it manageable, say, in the form of small resource user groups.  That would, however, 
not work or be highly difficult to enact for larger resources where there are higher numbers 
of users who put managers in the situations that would require a cutting-down of resource 
users anyway.  This could then lead to a divvying up of the resource itself into smaller 
sections for monitoring, but this would likely not result in lower costs although it could help 
with monitoring accuracy.   
No matter the size, though, it is important that those who are entitled to the resource play a 
role in its monitoring.  This inclusion of locals and/or stakeholders and users facilitates 
ensuring the monitoring programme is perceived as fair, active and adjustable if necessary 
(Ostrom, 1990).  When done in this way, amongst local appropriators, it adds a moral 
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legitimacy to the process, one that is consistent with the CPR and community in question 
(Pinkerton & John, 2008).   
2.1.4 Community Involvement 
As Ostrom (1990, p. 21) asserts, “As long as analysts presume that individuals cannot change 
such situations themselves, they do not ask what internal or external variables can enhance 
or impede the efforts of communities of individuals to deal creatively and constructively 
with perverse problems such as the tragedy of the commons”.  For this thesis, a community 
is considered to be the appropriators of the CPR. Communities, when desirably and 
financially equipped, can deal creatively and constructively with resource management at 
least on some levels, and beyond that, they have a major role to play in the governing of the 
commons.  A community of one person dealing with a resource the size of the ocean could 
not be expected to be effective as that person, barring unlimited personal wealth, would 
need to cede much of their managing of the resource to another entity (e.g. a government 
or international partnership of governments).  The presumption toward effective community 
involvement stems from the idea that,  “markets or private property arrangements and 
public ownership or state management do not exhaust the range of plausible institutional 
mechanisms to govern natural resource use” (Agrawal, 2003, p. 244).  Specifically for the 
purposes of this thesis, the focus will be on the transition from these community and local 
groups into the written, statutory documents of larger governing bodies.  If communities are 
to play a role in a system where neither the state nor private industry dominates, there must 
be a period and process during which the community transitions their ideas, rights, 
monitoring, or management into the larger plan.  It is important to explore the point where 
the community involvement becomes the government in and of itself, and if it is the origin of 
the government rules that matter to community involvement, and for example, whether 
those rules come from the top or the bottom. 
Communities do vary, however, and there are some cases where small, local groups do a 
poor job of maintaining a resource and larger nomadic groups are more effective, and as 
discussed previously we cannot rely on location as the only definition of a community 
(Agrawal, 1999).  By falling into this locational trap, false conclusions may be reached about 
how communities work and interact.  The same is true for looking at communities that are 
only based on a homogenous social structure.  Today, there are online communities, 
communities of religious believers or non-believers and even tribal communities that share 
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social norms; all members of which may be located in several different places some distance 
apart.  More commonly, there are communities in one location made up of people with 
many beliefs or lifestyles.  For the sake of this thesis, the focus remains on the relationships 
of individuals to the resource.  This relationship forms its own sort of community, and one 
that is important in the process that may  mold a community to its resource at least on some 
level, instead of the community existing in other forms (as previously discussed above and 
further discussed below); like location, interest, or belief systems.  Looking at all aspects of a 
community may reveal some large differences. 
However, “highly differentiated communities may be able to take steps to use local 
resources sustainably” (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999).  It is possible for people with shared norms 
(e.g. eating healthily or treating the environment with care) to have an overall positive 
impact on resource management by prohibiting certain actions and having better 
communication amongst themselves (Agrawal & Gibson, 1999).    
Communities, which often vary in their spatial, social, and behavioural constitution, must be 
included in the resource management process if they share in the appropriations of the CPR.  
Each community is often as unique as the resource it is attached to.  Communities are 
important to involve in the process because they are often the appropriators and producers 
of the CPR in question, they have a stake in its success and they bring a local knowledge set 
to the policy discussions.  The relationship between a top-down policy written by outsiders, 
that perhaps must be challenged in court if it is to be changed, is much different from a local 
policy built in part by the local factions and community members who are most involved 
with the CPR.  When and if resource appropriators design their own rules and take part in 
monitoring, Ostrom (1990) believes that the experience of such deliberations and activity 
can allow future rules to be more effective and realistic.   
It may seem that community management could result in more effective management of a 
CPR, but avoiding pure private or pure public ownership and monitoring is only part of the 
problem - there are some weaknesses and possible failures to a community managing an 
entire CPR on its own.  Two major downsides exist to full community management.  First, 
the resource may be destroyed because no one can be excluded (possibly due to lack of 
funding or participants) and second, the costs of monitoring and allocating will be too high 
to manage (Ostrom, 1990).  Berkes (2006) also adds that there are existing competing 
groups within communities, the resource may not fit the spatial area of the community and 
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that by defining the resource management at the community level it leaves many other 
institutions and people out. In other words, if a community were to handle all of its own 
resource management, our aforementioned nesting of vertical and horizontal levels would 
not be fulfilled.  More directly, “research has shown that community-based resource 
management is vulnerable to external drivers and is often insufficient by itself to deal” 
(Berkes, 2006, p. 1702) with all the issues surrounding a CPR.   
All these negatives of community involvement now call into question the three main ways 
we have discussed managing a CPR: with public, private, and communal management.  
Individually, each pose their own problems in management, but with the right links between 
the vertical and horizontal relationships and between the public and private sectors, they 
may begin to form a much more supportive network that enables a more effective 
management strategy.  The community may be a great place to start for managing CPRs, but 
it also must include higher levels of governance and institutional or horizontal support that 
can help to bolster the local aspects (Berkes, 2006).  Defining those communities that have a 
role to play in managing the CPR is important, as location, interest, and function may involve 
different groups entirely.  However, developing an effective management arrangement that 
facilitates people’s interactions is also extremely important. 
For local communities to play a role, it appears it must be within some governing framework.  
For the government to be effective, it similarly appears it must include some private 
stakeholders, community members and local knowledge of the resource and social 
networks.  This nesting of relationships both vertical (between levels of government) and 
horizontal (amongst stakeholders) must be intertwined in the right way, or the nest will not 
support the necessary weight (Ostrom 1990).   
2.1.5 Co-Management and Co-Governance 
One of the more prominent approaches to the issues surrounding resource management in 
recent years has been to develop a co-management strategy between private, public and/or 
communal factions involved with a specific CPR.  Berkes (2008, p. 1692) describes co-
management as, “the sharing of power and responsibility between the government and local 
resource users”.  Co-management is a strategy of resource management different from what 
we have previously discussed, as neither the government, nor private companies or 
individual communities take full authority for a resource, but those responsibilities are 
shared amongst the different entities.  Co-management may be between a government and 
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any other combination of two or more of the parties, or a private company and a 
community. The strength of a co-management arrangement is that local, public, and 
scientific knowledge could, theoretically, all be used in one management situation.   
In theory, co-management parties work together to create a management approach or plan, 
to monitor and enforce the plan, and to follow up in coming years.  Co-management plans 
also often allow for a collaborative learning process over time, yet they may or may not 
require it.  Berkes (2008) believes that if those involved in co-management are not learning 
along the way, either through monitoring or adjustments, then it is a failed experiment.  This 
‘learning-by-doing’ process is sometimes referred to as adaptive co-management, which is a 
“flexible community-based system(s) of resource management tailored to specific places and 
situations, and they are supported by and work with various organizations at different 
levels” (Folke, Hahn, Olsson, & Norberg, 2005, p. 448).   
There is some variation in the amount of power and authority that governments are willing 
or able to share with local communities and other stakeholders.  Pomeroy and Berkes (1997) 
developed a simple figure to highlight key terms and show where those strategies fit on a 
graph of high to low government involvement, inversely related to high and low community 
involvement. As the exchange of information between entities improves, the role and 
empowerment of the community rises.  The hierarchy in Figure 1 does not advocate for a 
certain level of involvement, but shows that there is a large range of options ranging from 
just informational exchange to joint action and partnership.  
 
 Figure 1: A hierarchy of co-management arrangements (Berkes, 1994) 
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As several authors have highlighted (Ostrom, 1990; Pomeroy & Berkes, 1997), there is no 
specific management plan for every resource, each one is unique in its strategy and some 
may share certain characteristics with other solutions. This is also true for the amount of 
government involvement and how much power and responsibility is to be shared amongst 
different factions in a co-management situation.  For some locations, where the community 
infrastructure, funding, and participation is weak,  it may be beneficial for the local 
government to retain most of its governing power and responsibility, whereas on the 
contrary, a strong, knowledgeable, and well-funded community may be able to take on more 
of a management burden.  Some communities already have institutions and networks set up 
for this type of co-management, where others may need several years to develop the proper 
setting.  Pomeroy (1997) offers several examples of time scales for establishing the 
necessary networks for co-management on a localized level ranging from three to fifteen 
years.   With this amount of time necessary for a community to organize itself accordingly, 
co-management must be a process rather than a single one-time decision.  So, a major factor 
in the ability of a community to have sway in a co-management arrangement is whether or 
not that community can actually play a role in controlling the resource. 
Co-management has evolved as an alternative to regulatory approaches towards 
unsustainable resource management, allowing public institutions to seek out collaboration 
to manage conflict and form partnerships amongst local members.  A community with an 
abundant resource may not need this strategy, but those that have dwindling resources may 
seek a solution.  This is a much different approach from older policies where the government 
sets the environmental loads or limits, and locals confront them in a court of law. Co-
management also alludes to the growing amount of people involved with resource decision 
making and the larger shift in resource management for example, from easy to handle point-
source pollution to much more complex and difficult to manage diffuse-source issues 
(Parker, Margerum, Dedrick, & Dedrick, 2012).  It is easy and effective to shut down a point-
source with one government law or load limit, but managing sources that cover entire 
watersheds and span generations is a much more complicated task.   In many situations, 
some of the problems date back through generations of nutrient or pollutant input into 
catchments, and many of these will take several generations into the future to correct.  This 
is an example of diffuse-sources on a large scale that must be managed through a number of 
strategies.   The strategies taken, however, may differ in their community involvement 
and/or success rates.   
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Co-management also acts to fill in weaknesses discussed previously with the different rights 
and management strategies.  It allows local communities to use the government to better 
exclude and regulate access to a CPR (Pinkerton & John, 2008) and allows larger 
governments to gain some local knowledge and input that is often lacking in their policy.  It 
also allows for the development of legitimacy, which is an integral part of resource 
management, especially when different levels begin to mix. 
Legitimacy is the social, scientific, and regulatory acceptance of a set goal, plan, or policy by 
those who must abide by the rules.  Co-management is an excellent way to achieve 
legitimacy because, “to be considered legitimate, regulations must be perceived to be 
effectively and fairly enforced, and that the results of regulations are also perceived to be 
effective and fair” (Pinkerton & John, 2008, p. 681).  If co-management is included, and used 
properly, it gives legitimacy to the policies developed because of the collaboration between 
private, local, and government authorities.  If a statutory document is written that lacks 
credibility, either scientific or social, it can signal a poor future for compliance with the plan.  
With co-management, legitimacy can be obtained because local communities can publicly 
declare that their ideas and desires be included in the formation of documents consistent 
with the science and public discourse (Pinkerton & John, 2008).   
Another term similar to co-management, yet whose definition is often blurred with it, is co-
governance.  For this thesis, the definition used is a combination of several authors, and 
most importantly, it is a definition that can provide a contrast to co-management.  Co-
governance is an agreement between parties to mutually accept responsibility to govern a 
resource or CPR.  Co-governance relies more on power sharing amongst entities, where co-
management can occur between those who have more or less power.  The term 
“governance” has a meaning associated with the implementation of something other than 
top-down control (Folke et al., 2005), where the actual power to make decisions is shared.  
Co-governance consists of the collaboration between different actors (Berkes, 2008).  
Although co-management may appear in some situations, it does not necessarily mean that 
the government is power sharing, or identifying a stakeholder as an equal in regards to the 
CPR decision making process.  There is also doubt over whether or not governments, which 
exist for the sake of gathering power and resources, would “be willing to devolve some of 
their own powers to local governments” (Lele, 2000, p. 2) in co-management.  But, if co-
governance is established, then that power is already willingly shared, if not fully ceded in 
some areas to another entity, and co-management can occur on a platform where the 
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question of power has already been addressed, considering an agreement has already been 
put in place.   Co-management is best summed up as, “a problem solving process (rather 
than a static arrangement)” (Berkes, 2008) where co-governance is more of a static, written 
agreement formulated out of a slightly different theoretical sphere.  The interaction 
between the two is as important as their differences.  Co-governance is more broad, seen as 
a way beyond the traditional state-centred model and co-management is often more local, 
seen as an applicable solution.  Co-governance may set up the framework for policy or 
action, but management is the carrying out and implementation within that framework. 
Both play a role in the literature and as we shall see, both of the ideas are used in the 
management of Lake Ellesmere.   
For all of these co-management and co-governance variations and subtle differences, none 
would be effective without, “flexible, multi-level governance systems designed to enhance 
institutional interaction and experimentation to generate learning” (Berkes, 2008, p. 1699).  
For either agreement to be effective they must involve several stakeholders, interaction 
between various levels of government both horizontally and vertically and be designed in a 
way that allows for learning and adaptive decisions to be made in the future. 
The weaknesses of co-management and/or co-governance are that they often enforce the 
status and control of the local elite, reinforcing their hold on certain resources (Berkes, 
2008), and the amount of power sharing can have a large range (See Figure 1).  If a 
stakeholder, for example, a large publicly owned company or influential interest group, were 
to use its local power and pull to influence decisions more than other stakeholders involved, 
it may still leave out some members who had trouble with their input before the co-
management agreement was even decided.  There may even be specific people within 
communities that benefit from the co-management design by trying to grab the newly 
available power away from the government, and in turn, the public.  This local social 
network within communities is important to discuss and evaluate.  Within New Zealand, this 
is especially important, because the debate over inclusion, especially in regards to Maori 
and/or tangata whenua is still an often contested issue. 
2.2 Nested Governance Systems 
A nested governance system is another strategy taken to deal with resource management 
issues.  Nesting allows for subsidiary decision making and allows different levels of 
government governing different parts of the country to collaborate (Ostrom, 1990).  The 
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actual “size” of government does not necessarily have to change.  The effectiveness of a 
nested system depends on its subsidiarity and whether or not problems can be dealt with at 
the smallest possible level that can deal with them.  For example, a community can make 
decisions about a small stream fully enclosed in their town so that a regional council or 
central government group does not have to.  Without this concept, the nested system 
becomes much less effective.  Although it can occur, and some may lobby for it, nested 
governance is not the growth or multiplicity of government power, it is merely the 
rearranging of that government structure or power.  This is the key concept of a nested 
system, and one that must be re-evaluated throughout the process of implementation, 
much like adaptive governance, if there is to be long term success. 
Nested governance allows for broader plans to solve problems through local knowledge and 
input, and it allows local communities to play a role in the decisions on larger catchments or 
areas.  Today, “the emerging role for the state in regional governance is to put in place 
coordinative frameworks and set standards that specify a range of expected or required 
policy outcomes” (Lockwood, Davidson, Curtis, Stratford, & Griffith, 2009, p. 170).  
Lockwood et al.’s identification of the role of government in this situation could be fulfilled 
through a nested governance system.  
Nesting smaller, lower-level governance groups is beneficial because it is more likely for 
those groups to develop a trust amongst one another as often there are pre-existing 
relationships already involved (Marshall, 2008).  As a group gets smaller, its ability to 
perform collectively increases (Baland & Platteau, 1999).  When trust is established on lower 
levels, it can continue out both horizontally and vertically.   As smaller groups establish goals 
and agreements, higher level groups can support those ideas.  If a small group knows it has 
the backing of a larger plan or council, then it can act to spread horizontally amongst the 
extended community and stakeholders.  For example, this is possible because a local council 
could not assure the local level monitoring of a CPR without some monetary funding or 
physical support from higher up.  When this support is present, it allows others on lower 
nested levels to buy into the plan because they know it is backed either through statutory 
policy, funding, or both.  Without vertical support, a nested system cannot spread nor 
continue to work effectively.  In this way, nesting is beneficial throughout the hierarchical 
scheme of the system.   
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Critiques of nested governance often cite the growth of too much government, and wasted, 
often repeating plans, policies, and efforts towards the same thing (Marshall, 2008).  This 
may be true in some circumstances, but the design of the nested system must be taken into 
account when discussing the failures of the theoretical.  Nesting, when designed poorly can 
add overlap and excess to a governance system, but when done correctly, can streamline 
governance and allow decisions to be made on more local levels. There is potential that local 
co-governance can become confused with co-management as the tools for delivering co-
governance may be plans that are effectively a form of implementing co-management. As 
will become apparent, the nature and relationship between local co-governance and co-
management may be significant in the transition from a single dominant governance body to 
a co-governance and co-management situation.  
The challenges associated with this transition are especially evident in New Zealand, where, 
“the failure of successive New Zealand governments to recognize the rights and interests of 
the Maori as acknowledged in the Treaty, and to ignore and dispute Maori interpretation of 
those rights, has been the source of ongoing political tension…” (Lane and Hibbard, 1990, p. 
178). The tension associated with this relationship makes the design of a nested system in a 
traditionally western-dominated decision making system that includes indigenous peoples 
particularly difficult due to the varying rights associated with those peoples (e.g. the Treaty). 
As discussed in Chapter 4, varying arrangements between resource users both indigenous 
and otherwise provide conflicting authority and responsibility around one CPR, in the case of 
this thesis, Lake Ellesmere. It is outside the scope of this thesis to delve into the indigenous 
structures (beyond the nested systems of study) due to the necessity of understanding 
indigenous language and acceptance by indigenous people, both of which, given the time 
frame of this thesis, would have been difficult and likely inappropriate to attempt to gain a 
full understanding. The research has therefore followed a more traditional western 
analytical framework while focusing on how indigenous relationships may impact on that 
framework. 
2.3 Conclusion 
Given the complex nature of CPR management and the varying definitions of associated 
concepts (e.g. entitlement) the thesis will not attempt to develop new specific definitions, 
rather, the focus will remain on the relationships of communities to co-governance and co-
management of a CPR. Due to the unique nature of New Zealand’s natural resource history 
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and the case of Lake Ellesmere (see Chapter 4) the thesis can observe and analyse a new CPR 
management strategy that has not been used before. Comparing the common themes and 
designs from the literature (e.g. Ostrom, 1990) to the actual implementation of those 
designs provides a basis on which to answer the primary research questions. 
The questions that drove this research are, generally: 
- How does co-governance and community involvement affect CPR management; 
- Is the new framework surrounding the management of Lake Ellesmere designed in a 
way that is consistent with relevant literature on long-enduring CPRs; and 
- To what extent does the origin of government rules affect the level of community 
involvement? 
In examining these questions it was decided to focus specifically on the process of decision-
making transition from engaging community and local groups into the written, statutory 
documents of larger governing bodies. Additionally, the theoretical literature provided a 
comparison to the case study and a standard against which to compare the new co-
governance and co-management policies being sought by local communities and their 
respective governments. 
The next chapter sets out the methodology used to address these questions.  
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Chapter 3 - Methodology 
The questions that drove this research (Chapter 2) required a rich understanding of the 
issues and processes involved.  From the outset a case study approach was  chosen because 
it provided a better opportunity to examine the complex nature of a CPR, and the processes 
of community empowerment, through direct observation than would alternative – post-hoc 
assessments or comparative studies based on more general criteria and statistically valid 
survey techniques (Yin, 2014).  The range of agreements and governance/management 
processes occurring (Chapter 1) made Lake Ellesmere and its management scheme a 
convenient (close to University) case that was also identified early on as particularly rich, 
with several layers of communities and governance frameworks, but unclear inter-
relationships and complex interactions.  To gain a more complete understanding of the case, 
several primarily qualitative methods were used in order to gain more perspectives, 
including; institutional analysis, document analysis, observations and interviews.  In such a 
complex case, qualitative methods were beneficial because they, “help provide rich 
descriptions of phenomena” and, “enhance understanding of the context of events as well 
as the events themselves” (Sofaer, 1999, p. 1102).  The case study was also an effective tool 
for contributing to general knowledge because, while each situation is unique, there are (as 
Ostrom (1990) has demonstrated) several common themes of successfully managed CPRs 
that can be drawn from comparing across other cases. 
3.1 Case Study Approach 
A case study was chosen rather than other research methods for several reasons.  Most 
importantly, in the case of CPR management, the issues involved cover so many disciplines 
that it would be difficult to combine all of those in an effort to analyse a CPR case without 
having to do many individual controlled experiments with purely quantitative data and 
whose very controls might invalidate their applicability to the practise of commons 
management.  CPR studies in the literature most often tend to be case studies, as breaking 
apart small pieces of a CPR study would mean not studying the CPR in its entirety at all.  Case 
studies in general can involve numerous levels of analysis and different data collection 
methods like interviews and observations (Eisenhardt, 1989).  Using only one data collection 
strategy or studying only one aspect of a CPR would leave out valuable information.  As 
complex as CPRs and their issues are, it is worth noting that, “The highest levels in the 
learning process, that is virtuosity and expertise, are reached only via a person’s own 
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experiences as practitioner of the relevant skills” (Flyvbjerg, 2006, p. 223).  Unless one is 
actively engaged in action research or in reflecting on one’s direct experience of being 
involved in the management of a CPR, one is largely left to less ideal mechanisms of data 
gathering and interpretation. In the context of the current research this meant interviews 
and participant observation became critical tools.   But the framing of the investigation drew 
on Ostrom’s (1990) design principles.  The extent to which the management relationships 
could be matched to her framework was expected to provide insights as to the nature of the 
transitions, if any, occurring.   
3.2 Ostrom’s Design Principles 
In seeking ways to develop successful management systems for CPRs  Ostrom (1990) offered 
a set of what she called, “Design principles illustrated by long-enduring CPR institutions”, 
which can be used as an analytic guideline for arranging management systems around CPRs.   
Her eight principles can provide the basis for a successful CPR management strategy because 
they had been found amongst several enduring CPRs in the past. Again, this is not a 
blueprint for a CPR as each situation differs, but it is a valid set of principles that can help 
guide the designing of CPR management plans that fit within Ostrom’s scope.  Each principle 
is briefly discussed below. 
Clearly Defined Boundaries - A CPR by nature must have boundaries, but it is 
important to make them clear.  These boundaries include both the physical aspects 
and appropriator rights.  If there are no boundaries, free riding becomes more likely 
and to have no boundaries at all would mean the CPR is actually an open-access 
resource. This would pose a much more difficult situation to manage and monitor. 
Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions – This 
principle is directed to the local level, so that rules about allocation, infrastructure, 
and environmental aspects are tailored to the specific localities instead of a larger 
region. 
Collective-choice arrangements – As a plan moves forward, the people most directly 
involved with the land and the decision making process must be able to use their 
vantage points to make changes or group decisions on their localities. 
Monitoring – Monitors must be accountable to appropriators, or must actually be 
appropriators involved in the process. 
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Graduated sanctions - Penalties for those people who break the rules of a CPR should 
be disciplined on a graduated scale depending on the offense.  These punishments 
must not be conducted by external monitors, but by those appropriators and 
producers involved internally. 
Conflict-resolution mechanisms – When conflict amongst appropriators arises, there 
must be a forum or plan to settle the differences in an effective way. 
Minimal recognition of rights to organize – The ability of appropriators to create their 
own institutions must not be challenged by external authorities or government.   
Nested enterprises - For CPRs that exist within a larger system of governance or 
environment, there must be a nested system which allows for such autonomy and 
discussion that does not clash or contradict other policies in the system. 
These principles are found to be aligned in sustainably managed CPRs whereas the, 
“difference in the particular rules take into account specific attributes of the related physical 
systems, cultural views of the  world, and economic and political relationships” (Ostrom, 
1990, p. 89).  The principles above provide a framework to examine the current situation 
surrounding the governance of Lake Ellesmere and its catchment.   
The principles do fall short in some instances in that they do not account for CPRs that have 
major differences in allocation rights, world views, ethnic backgrounds and major changes in 
behaviour, among others.  These parts of a CPR must be aligned, at least on an agreed 
baseline level before discussing the management plan.  An understanding must exist, 
especially in the case of Lake Ellesmere, which has two notably different world views 
involved amongst the community between the Maori and Pakeha (Maori name for a non-
native New Zealander), which is an issue driving the current research.  It is possible that 
more powerful interests can derail these principles by averting a consensus on different 
issues.  So, although differences do exist and competing ideas are common and healthy to 
the process, some basic standards must be assumed for Ostrom’s principles to be applied to 
a system. 
Assessing the situation against these principles is a form of institutional analysis. 
28 
 
3.2.1 Institutional Analysis 
The first step to evaluating the policy surrounding the governance and management of Lake 
Ellesmere was to recount a short history of the policies and understand the evolution from 
earlier plans to the current model.  It was also pertinent to explain to the reader the 
hierarchy, nesting, and role of each type of plan, policy, or agreement that applies to Lake 
Ellesmere.  This evaluation started broadly on a national level and moved closer to the case 
in an attempt to discuss the most relevant policy within the targeted scope at a more 
detailed level.   
In order to analyse the institutions surrounding the Lake and its policy context, Ostrom’s 
Design principles illustrated by long-enduring CPR institutions (1990) were used to assess the 
viability and possible lifespan of the current governance arrangement.  These principles are 
not a ‘cookie-cutter’ answer for every situation, but were used to provide insight by 
provoking questions about how the arrangements observed worked to address the 
principles found and if they differed, suggesting the need to explore why that might be the 
case.  As discussed in the previous section, these principles argue that clearly defined 
boundaries, congruence between appropriation rules, collective choice arrangements, 
monitoring, graduated sanctions, conflict-resolution mechanisms, minimal recognition of 
rights to organize and nested principles all are characteristic of a long-standing CPR 
institution (Ostrom, 1990).   
3.2.2 Document Analysis 
Included in a case study is the analysis of documents pertaining to the case.  Specifically for 
Lake Ellesmere this included government documents, informational hand-outs, 
presentations, and online material.  Specific documents were selected based on 
recommendations from participants that these were useful for the understanding of 
different institutional arrangements and scientific results and also for better understanding 
of participatory involvement, like relevant local focus group results.  This ranged from 
documents essential to the founding of New Zealand such as the Treaty of Waitangi, to 
current drafts of new implementation plans and policies.  Scope was a major factor and acts 
and other documents that were not directly involved with the current iteration of Lake 
management were not reviewed as in-depth as some of the newly released, more directly 
relevant documents such as the ZIP and new Water Conservation Order (WCO).  In the 
Results Chapter, several documents were analysed for this research (see Appendix E). 
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The document review was undertaken with three main goals in mind.  First, the review was 
performed in the interest of understanding the historical and current events, acts, policies 
and strategies that surround the management of the Lake.  Reviewing these documents also 
helped to identify the essential elements that more directly manage the Lake and that 
should be taken into consideration for further in-depth review in this thesis.  Second, the 
review sought to identify the presence of Ostrom’s design principles throughout the 
management scheme of the Lake.  Third, depending on the presence or lack of Ostrom’s 
principles, the review hoped to identify where the differences occurred and how the unique 
setting of the CPR changed the application and understanding of the principles.   
The document review served as a base on which to understand the management of the 
Lake, how it compared to other long-enduring CPRs as identified by Ostrom (1990) and 
provided material that helped to develop further methods such as interviews.  Document 
review also sought to identify policies that may inhibit or hinder the acceptance or 
implementation of Ostrom’s principles.  A document review was essential to the thesis as a 
substantial amount of historical information was needed to understand and elucidate legally 
binding portions of Lake management goals, policies, and strategies. 
Documents were analysed to locate and highlight specific issues (e.g. Ostrom’s Design 
Principles).  The strength of the document analysis was the availability of information in the 
public sphere and the ability to find official points of view, as well as that of individuals and 
stakeholders who had made their views known.  Limitations to the document analysis were 
mainly based on time constraints.  There was no digging for unofficial correspondences or 
the historical build up to the broader, older plans or policies surrounding the Lake that were 
not directly involved in its current management.  There was also a lack of information 
comparing other Zone Committees (ZC) in the region to Selwyn/Waihora, which could have 
added needed contrast and comparison, largely due to this catchment being somewhat 
ahead of most of the others in process and the lack of significant amounts of information or 
analyses of the highly contentious contemporary situation at the Hurunui River Catchment. 
3.2.3 Observation  
Observation was directed at the targeted governance transitions being employed by the 
stakeholders, mainly at Selwyn/Waihora Zone Committee meetings between March 6, 2012 
and November 6, 2012.  Structured observation was used when a specified subject was 
known because this had been found “invaluable in providing investigators with a direct 
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experience of the ways in which actors interact in a setting” (Sofaer, 1999, p. 1111).  The 
goal of the observations was two-fold.  First, there was an emphasis on the acceptance or 
rejection of Ostrom’s Design Principles as it applied to the management of the Lake and its 
catchment.  For example, if boundaries, a principle identified in the document review, were 
neglected or accepted in a meeting, it would help to further identify that principle’s 
presence in the management of the Lake.  Second, a strong emphasis was put on observing 
the relationships that the Treaty influenced.  For example, this may have been in the form of 
a cultural discrepancy, a side-effect of a Treaty-driven policy, a culturally-driven 
disagreement, or a situation where the cultural shift was beneficial to the process on a micro 
level between participants or in a macro level as it pertains to governing the Lake. Meeting 
notes were taken by the researcher and official minutes and hand-outs were evaluated 
against the same criteria.  Difficulties with observations often came down to the movement 
of the ZC into ‘in-committee’ time, which excluded the public from what seemed to be the 
more difficult to solve issues.  Time also played a role in meeting attendance, as only a short 
amount of time relative to the entire Zone process was observed, and only at the ZC level.  
Meetings observed were during 2012, where much of the discussion focused on limit-setting 
for the sub-regional chapter of the LWRP.  The Zone Committee was established in October 
of 2010, so observations must be taken in context and with an understanding of the scale 
involved. However, the limit setting process for the LWRP was the most significant process in 
terms of controlling what land and water uses would be allowed or controlled, and how, 
within the catchment.  They therefore focussed the ZC discussions to the nub of issues over 
rights and their management that are at the heart of this research.  
3.2.4 Interviews 
Interviews were also included in the study and focused on those located in different places 
both horizontally amongst stakeholders and vertically through public officials.  The 
interviewees were chosen based on their relationship to the Lake via the ZC or other 
involvement, and although an effort was made to have equal numbers of cultural 
representatives from both Maori and Pakeha, availability of ZC runanga (tribal units) 
representatives proved difficult.  Only two iwi members were interviewed, although several 
other interviewees tried to communicate iwi views.  The selection of interviewees was based 
mainly on involvement in the Selwyn/Waihora Zone Committee due to the ZC’s direct role in 
developing recommendations for the governance of the Zone and consequently, the Lake.  
Further, several interviewees were selected due to their historical involvement with the Lake 
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both professionally and personally.  Eight ZC members, one Lincoln University (LU) professor 
and two staff members of ECan (EC) were all selected based on the above criteria to be 
interviewed, for a total of eleven interviews (see Figure 2).   
Figure 2: Interviewee Categories 
 
The interviews asked questions surrounding the transitions between local groups and 
institutions to larger plans and policies.  The questioning was broken up into four main parts: 
an introduction of the subject’s involvement with the Lake; a set of questions designed to 
identify the presence of Ostrom’s design principles and with thought given to the 
relationship the Treaty and co-governance has had on the governance process.  The 
questions listed included follow-up questions if an answer was not sufficient. The full list of 
questions is located in Appendix D.  A selection concerning boundaries is shown below. 
- What is the geographical area that needs to be considered in developing a Lake 
  management plan? 
- What do you think about the conflicting/varying boundaries offered by different 
 policies? 
- How do those varying boundaries affect the policy or ZIP recommendations? 
 
Each interview was recorded using an Olympus Digital Voice Recorder and transcripts were 
transcribed to better evaluate the responses and provide a record of the interview.  Full 
names were not used, only an identification of the interviewee’s general relation to the 
 
*Eight Zone Committee Members (ZC): Included members 
and residents with ties to the dairy industry, agriculture, 
consulting, local government, academia, regional 
government and iwi. 
 
Two Environment Canterbury Staff (EC): Interviewees 
consisted of two ECan members; one administrator and 
one scientist, both familiar with the Lake and its environs. 
 
One Lincoln University Professor (LU): Professor with 
scientific and local knowledge of the physical and historical  
aspects of Lake Ellesmere. 
 
*In several cases, interviewees admittedly wore several ‘hats’ and 
went to a great effort to identify which hat (e.g. role) and perspective 
they were using to answer a question both in personal interviews for 
the research and during ZC meetings.  
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Lake, for example, ‘ZC1’, and quotes used only with the interviewee’s permission.  Answers 
to the questions have been weighed against the aforementioned design principles in an 
effort to complement the observations and document analysis. 
3.3 Conclusion 
A case study approach allowed the complex topic of Lake Ellesmere to act as a focal point for 
the theories and methods described above.  Without a case study, a broad range of 
information would not have been able to be captured and assessed in the designated time of 
research for the thesis.  Nor would information critical to the thesis that occurred before the 
research period have been captured.  Ostrom’s principles are applied to long-standing 
institutions that are also complex.  By using a more narrow point of research and not a case 
study, much of the proposed comparisons would have been invalid. 
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Chapter 4 - Case Study: Lake Ellesmere/Te Waihora 
Chapter 4 describes the historical, physical, social and legal environment of the Lake.  An 
overview of the bio-physical Lake helps provide a common understanding of its health and 
environs. Chapter 4 also describes the various national, regional, and local plans and 
programmes that have an impact on the Lake in outcomes, control and decision-making. 
Though much in-depth exploration of this overview was outside the direct scope of the 
thesis, it is necessary to provide an understanding of the context for the reader. 
4.1 The Bio-Physical Lake Ellesmere 
The Lake’s bio-physical aspects make it rare and unique in the world, and so the ecological 
history and trajectory must be in the minds of those who wish to protect and conserve it for 
the future.   
The Lake is situated just west of the volcanic Banks Peninsula on the South Island, and in its 
current form is much lower and takes up a smaller area than historically due to drainage for 
access to agricultural land.  The Lake was originally opened by Maori and later opened more 
frequently by Europeans to dry the rich, heavy soils previously inundated by water (Taylor, 
1996).  Currently, it covers approximately 20,000 hectares, nearly 7% of the total catchment 
area, but despite its size it has an average depth of only approximately 1m and an estimated 
maximum depth of 2m (Taylor, 1996, p. 29).  This means that the generally muddy bottom of 
the Lake is frequently disturbed by wind driven wave action, adding considerably to the 
turbidity (lack of clarity) of the water.  The anthropogenic opening of the Lake, at least once 
each year, is done in main to manage its depth (and related surface area), and if not 
completed the Lake could flood much of the surrounding Lake margins, threatening nearby 
farmland with negative economic consequences.  Notably the fluctuations in Lake level also 
adversely affect habitat for birds (including rare species such as the wrybill) when the Lake is 
higher than average.    
The biophysical status of the Lake at the time of the thesis varies between an enclosed body 
of predominantly fresh water or a brackish lagoon, although it is rarely naturally inundated 
by seawater without the help of the artificial openings.  Salinity is most directly a result of 
the mixing of sea water and outgoing freshwater (Hughey & Taylor, 2008).  The salinity can 
increase when there are more Lake openings, salt water incursion from rough seas, or 
drought, as evaporation of water leaves higher concentrations of salt in the Lake.   
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abstraction”.  This is in contrast to, “the last few thousand years at least, the lake has been 
largely fed by water that has spent much of its time underground-groundwater” (Williams, 
2008, p. 10).  Present water inflows to the Lake are variable (Figure 3) and are dominated by 
stream/river and direct rainfall rather than direct inflows of sea or groundwater. 
 
 
The management of both the groundwater and surface water within the catchment is 
essential to a healthy Lake.  Lack of rain and/or groundwater can cause streams to run low 
and lose habitat for both aquatic and terrestrial wildlife and create less of an input overall 
into the lake.  Although the, “dependency of the lake on the groundwater system in its 
catchment cannot be reduced,” Hughey and Taylor have argued that “the output from the 
system to the Lake will be maintained at a level that ensures protection of Te Waihora/Lake 
Ellesmere (Hughey & Taylor, 2008, p. 18).”  As Hughey is a Trustee on the Waihora Ellesmere 
Figure 3: Lake in-flows and out-flows (Horrell, 2011a) 
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Trust (WET), a community non-government organisation (discussed below) and Taylor is a 
senior manager in the Canterbury Regional Council (aka ECan) this view appears to represent 
both local government and community expectations.    
The quality of the water in the Lake is monitored by nine different monitoring stations in the 
nearby tributaries, including four major stations within the Lake boundaries (Hayward & 
Ward, 2008).  The major aspects of note are light, nutrient levels, phytoplankton biomass, 
clarity and salinity.  Typical results of nutrients like inorganic nitrogen and phosphorus which 
could lead to large algal blooms are often limited by the turbidity of the Lake and the 
resultant lack of light for photosynthesis.  It is possible however, on rare occasions where 
the Lake is calm and the clarity increases, that nitrogen becomes the limiting factor for algal 
growth (Hayward & Ward, 2008).   
Currently, the Lake is rated as hyper-eutrophic, meaning it has a very high concentration of 
nutrients, the highest on the eutrophic scale (Hayward & Ward, 2008).  Different nutrients 
enter the Lake through different means.  The two most relevant are nitrate, which is soluble 
in water and so can enter the Lake through either groundwater or surface water and 
phosphorus, which clings to other particles and enters the Lake through surface water.  As of 
the timing of this thesis and according to the Living Lake Symposium in 2009, the dissolved 
inorganic nitrogen (DIN) over the previous fourteen years was seen to be decreasing while 
dissolved reactive phosphorus (DRP) was increasing (Hayward & Ward, 2008).  The high 
nutrient presence and eutrophic rating however, have not resulted in major fish kills from 
toxic or oxygen depleting blooms that are often seen on similar hyper-eutrophic systems 
(Hayward & Ward, 2008).  The trophic load index (TLI) of the Lake also varies but stays 
steadily in the hyper-eutrophic category, as shown by Figure 4.  
Water clarity is one of the most difficult problems to solve in the Lake and can affect the 
feeding habitats of the wildlife and block sunlight from entering the lower levels of the water 
column.  Poor water clarity is also unattractive to most recreational users.  The Lake margin 
habitat has a major impact on the biophysical characteristics of Lake Ellesmere, especially 
the wading birds who migrate to and feed there.  As farmland often comes in contact with 
the lake edge, an adequate riparian strip is not always present.  The riparian zone, around 
tributaries as well as the Lake, provides filtration, shade, protection from harsh conditions 
and habitat.  Improving a riparian zone is often one of the first steps taken to improve an 
aquatic ecosystem, and groups like WET have organized volunteer plantings within the 
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catchment.  DoC has also been buying land in the Lake margins and so less is now privately 
held.  The vegetation is currently near 80% brackish wetland and 12% freshwater wetland, 
with a few other types mixed in (Grove & Pompei, 2008).   
 
 
In earlier years, macrophytes played a large role in the Lake’s ecology as they helped to 
provide habitat and secure sediments.  In 1968, many of these plants were damaged in a 
large storm known as the Wahine Storm, and have yet to recover (Gerbeaux, 1993).  The 
Lake is now dominated by algae and whether it is possible, and if so is it desirable, to re-
establish the macrophyte beds that were historically more prevalent is one of the issues 
under ongoing investigation by organisations with an interest in the Lake (e.g., Canterbury 
Regional Council).  Water levels and salinity have a high impact on these types of plants, as 
many of the brackish species require lower salinity to germinate (Gerbeaux, 1993).  
Historical Lake openings and the current shallow state of the Lake do not provide optimal 
habitat for the plants to grow and, “with no established populations of macrophytes left in 
the Lake, the assessment and understanding of regenerative strategies is essential in the 
planning of future lake management” (Gerbeaux, 1993, p. 126).  
The Lake is regarded as a Maori taonga, or treasure, because of their historical connection 
both spiritually to the Lake, its water, and as a source of ‘mahinga kai’, described as, “natural 
resources and the areas where they are located” (Taylor, 1996, p. 145).  Of the fish species in 
the Lake, three stand out as being significant.  First, the flounder fishery was commercialized 
Figure 4: “Water Quality Trends – TLI” (Meredith, 2011) 
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upon the arrival of the Europeans (Taylor, 1996), climaxing with thirty-five boats fishing the 
Lake (Jellyman 2008), and yet it now supports only eight fishers (Jellyman & Smith, 2008).  
This is due in part to the fishery being placed under a quota system in 1986 in response to 
dwindling stocks.  Second, long-finned and short-finned eel, or the Maori ‘tuna’, which was 
gathered for many years by Maori as a food source but also comprises an important 
commercial export industry survived only a short time as an open commercial fishery 
between the years 1970 and 1980, after which it also had to be controlled under the quota 
management system to ensure future stocks were available (Taylor, 1996).  Both species 
were also harvested recreationally.  An example of early eel harvesting and the size of eels 
then caught is shown in Plate 2. 
 
Plate 2: Lake Ellesmere/Te Waihora Eels, 1947 (Waihora Ellesmere Trust, 2013) 
Third, when the Europeans arrived they brought with them their own native brown trout 
(salmo trutta), which they introduced into the Lake Ellesmere system.  This originally was, 
and still remains a large source of recreation on the Lake and its tributaries, although the 
fishery itself has declined in recent decades along with the recreational activity (Taylor, 
1996).  According to Millichamp (2008, p. 49) “The Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere brown trout 
fishery is one of the most degraded in New Zealand”, and further, “Restoration of the fishery 
is possible given the will to do so, but the target for restoration needs to be carefully 
considered”.  Trout as a group are often referred to as an indicator species, meaning their 
presence or health is a good barometer for a body of water, in this case, the return of more 
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brown trout to the Lake and its tributaries could signal the arrival of potential native fish 
species, too (Millichamp, 2008). 
4.2 Plans and Policies Affecting Lake Ellesmere/Te Waihora 
Lake Ellesmere falls under the purview of many different statutory, recommended, and 
communal agreements all the way down to specific Lake opening resource consents.  To 
understand the specific and most important pieces of policy for this thesis, a basic 
understanding of the broader, national and regional governance is needed, especially that of 
the relationship between Maori, tangata whenua, and Pakeha (to be discussed in the 
following sections).  The interactions and relationships between many of these plans, 
policies and programmes are complex (Figure 5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Management tools of Lake Ellesmere/Te Waihora 
Coloured boxes = Statutory document 
Similar colour = Related plans, programmes, policies 
Straight arrow = Gives effect to, fulfils requirements of 
Dotted arrow = Stems from, is a result of 
 
(NT = Ngai Tahu; LGA = Local Government Act; CWMS = Canterbury Water 
Management Strategy; JMP = Joint Management Plan; WTW = Whakaora Te 
Waihora; WCO = Water Conservation Order; RPS = Regional Policy Statement; RIP = 
Regional Implementation Plan; ZIP = Zone Implementation Plan; LWRP = Land and 
Water Regional Plan; NPS = National Policy Statement)  
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4.2.1 National Policy Level 
The Treaty of Waitangi and the Ngai Tahu Claims Settlement Act 
New Zealand’s relationship with its indigenous population is unique among westernized 
countries.  Several documents and agreements have given Maori and/or tangata whenua 
different relationships with policy and rights than occurs in other countries, particularly in 
regards to natural resources.   
The major document that establishes the governance relationship between the Maori and 
the Pakeha is the Treaty of Waitangi (The Treaty), which was signed in 1840 by Maori chiefs 
and the Crown.  Effectively establishing New Zealand as a sovereign nation, the Treaty set 
out the rights surrounding land and resources between the indigenous Maori and the 
settling British Crown.  Mainly, it gives Maori, in general, the rights of citizens, cedes their 
sovereignty to the Crown, and retains certain natural resource rights to the tangata whenua.   
The interpretation of the Treaty as it applies to natural resources has been under debate for 
some time, but many settlements of alleged breaches of the Treaty by the Crown continue 
to be settled (Prystupa, 1998).  Directly relevant to this thesis has been the settlement of a 
number of Ngai Tahu (iwi) land and water claims to Lake Ellesmere and its Catchment (as 
well as most of the South Island).  The Ngai Tahu Claims Settlement Act of 1998 (the 
Settlement Act) set the stage for several other decisions surrounding the Lake, to be 
discussed later in this chapter.  
 Among other matters in the Settlement Act, Ngai Tahu; as tangata whenua (people of the 
land) with mana whenua (authority over land or territory) were granted ownership of the 
crown-owned portions of the lake bed and a few surrounding areas (Memon & Kirk, 2011).  
This settlement was based in large part on an earlier court decision on Lake Omapere, from 
1929.  According to the Interim Report on National Freshwater and Geothermal Resources 
(pg. 50, 2012) the decision was based on the idea that, “A lake is land covered by water, and 
it is part of the surface of the country in which it is situated, and in essentials it is as much a 
part of that surface and as capable as being occupied as is land covered by forest or land 
covered by a running stream”.  Although ownership of water is not currently granted to 
anyone, Maori or Pakeha, the rest of the decision provided the grounds for lake bed 
ownership at Lake Ellesmere to be vested in the iwi.   
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Ngai Tahu 
Ngai Tahu is a major player in the management of Lake Ellesmere.  Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu 
(TRONT) was created to administer the implementation of the aforementioned Settlement 
Act and represents the eighteen Maori runanga, several with historical connections to Lake 
Ellesmere in a politically and financially based way.  The Settlement Act awarded ownership 
of most of the lake bed to Ngai Tahu and all of the rights that go with that ownership.  This is 
not only a collection of Ngai Tahu interests; it has commercial and cultural ties to the Lake 
and its surrounding area, most of which now have statutory recognition.  TRONT’s 
commercial arm, Ngai Tahu Holdings Corporation Limited, controls several business ventures 
including Ngai Tahu Seafood, Property, and Tourism.  TRONT also deals with the social and 
statutory side of iwi management.  Ngai Tahu plays a major role in the governance of Lake 
Ellesmere largely as a consequence of the Settlement Act, Conservation Act and the 
Resource Management Act (RMA), but it has not always been this way.  
Maori beliefs in water stem from the idea of ‘mauri’ which allies water with having its own 
life-force (Williams, 2006).  This belief leads the Maori to see water and their resources in a 
different way from traditionally westernized cultures.  Mainly, this means that their natural 
resources ought not be altered to a state where the mauri is unrecognizable from the 
original natural state of the resource (Williams, 2006).  Mauri is interpreted in the English 
language as an essential life force or principle; a quality inherent in all things both animate 
and inanimate. This life force of water aligns with different flow levels that are associated 
with the management of streams and surface water. While relying on resources like Lake 
Ellesmere for food, the Maori have an inherent view of stewardship towards their resources.  
This is heightened even more by their spiritual connection to the water as a life-force.  
Culturally, this places a high value on the environment and the resources it provides for the 
Maori.  The Maori term ‘kaitiakitanga’, in its most simple sense considering it has no 
equivalent in the English language, represents the stewardship by locals of natural resources 
and is embedded in their attitudes towards water, including Lake Ellesmere/Te Waihora.   
The Resource Management Act 
The main act concerning the management of resources in New Zealand is the Resource 
Management Act (RMA) 1991. The purpose of the RMA is the sustainable management of 
natural and physical resources. This act, “was hailed as far sighted and distinctive in seeking 
to achieve sustainable management through regional governance” (Holley & Gunningham, 
2011, p. 316).  The RMA gave regional councils (e.g. ECan) direct authority to develop 
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regional plans and policy statements consistent with the RMA’s goal of promoting the 
“sustainable management of natural and physical resources” (RMA, s.5).  The regional 
councils’ authority is limited to addressing resource management issues relating to the use 
of commons such as water, air, biodiversity and marine areas, whereas district council rules 
address the use of land. The integration provided between regional and district councils is 
present due to an overlap between the effects that land use may have on water, air, and 
other regional issues. 
The RMA’s power sharing aspects are based on its goal to solve problems at the most local 
level of community where the resource is utilized (Memon, 1997).  Under the RMA, which 
includes amendments from 2005, district plans have to give effect to national and regional 
policy statements and not be inconsistent with regional plans. The same district plans also 
must take into account the provisions of any planning document prepared by an iwi 
authority (e.g. TRONT) that has been formally lodged with the council. 
Although the RMA led to some success under its regionally oriented plans (Fenemor et al., 
2011) it has also taken criticisms.  Fenemor et al. (2011, pp. 13-14), comment that “the 
legalistic statutory hearing processes imposed by the RMA and the time required to make 
plans operative have attracted criticism” and note the view that, “both planning and consent 
decision making is dominated by… a reliance on legal and statutory planning processes”.  
The RMA also poses some complications over consents which have been approved for 
extended periods of time, up to a maximum of 35 years, which, because they were 
approved, make it difficult to alter different aspects that may need adjusting, like water 
allocation (Fenemor et al., 2011).   
Figure 6 shows the framework around the RMA.  The RMA provides statutory backing for the 
Regional Policy Statements and Regional Plans as well as Water Conservation Orders (WCO) 
and Resource Consents.   
The Local Government Act 
The Local Government Act (LGA), originally passed in 1974 and substantially amended in 
2002, is to enable democratic representation through local government and facilitates the 
local, regional and district councils to participate and help to create policy together.  It also 
provides general powers to achieve community outcomes.  Figure 7 shows the district 
councils within the region of Canterbury and notably relevant to this research is that the 
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catchment of Lake Ellesmere, and the Lake itself, is split between Selwyn District and 
Christchurch City councils, but lies fully within the regional council’s boundaries.  
 
Figure 6: “Policy and Plan Framework under the RMA” ("Canterbury Regional Policy 
Statement," 2013) 
The LGA has short and long term planning mechanisms for the allocation and use of rates 
taken from land owners and these planning process require considerable public 
participation.  However, local government and businesses are subject to the RMA when 
seeking to carry out activities that affect the environment. Thus a council might decide 
through the public participation processes that drainage is an important issue for its 
community and allocate funding for drainage activities, but it would also need RMA 
permission (a “resource consent” or “permitted activity” status through relevant rules in 
RMA plans) to carry out those activities if there were to be adverse environmental effects of 
drainage (e.g., loss of habitat, natural character) or drainage activities (e.g., generation of 
dust or noise by machinery).   
The LGA does not include mandatory tangata whenua inclusion as does the RMA, it only calls 
for consultation with local Maori who may or may not be able to claim tangata whenua 
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status.  For example, although Maori refers to all members on both islands with the proper 
lineage, tangata whenua only includes those people, runanga, or iwi who can trace their 
genealogy to a specific area (e.g. Lake Ellesmere). 
 
Figure 7: Canterbury Territorial Councils (Environment Canterbury, 2013e) 
The interpretation of these requirements in this regard goes back to the Treaty of Waitangi.  
Article II of the Treaty asserts the inclusion of tangata whenua when dealing with those lands 
and resources which they have a right to, and Article III gives Maori in general the same 
status as citizens.  Though the Crown is bound by the Treaty, the LGA, as it is written, must 
meet its principles, and so the LGA does give Maori equal citizen rights and allows their 
participation but it does not give special rights or powers to tangata whenua.  The RMA, on 
the other hand, refers to the tangata whenua as partners in dealing with the 
aforementioned land and natural resources.  Current policy surrounding Lake Ellesmere, 
depending on whether or not it is enabled by the RMA or the LGA, may include a mandatory 
tangata whenua participation application.  This area remains grey in some instances because 
as discussed in the Introduction, the RMA and LGA both play a role in allowing and enabling 
the CWMS. 
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National Policy Statement for Freshwater Management 
The National Policy Statement for Freshwater Management (NPS), authorized on July 1, 2011 
by the Minister for the Environment and in effect at the time the empirical field work for this 
thesis was undertaken (2012), is narrow in coverage and requires regional councils to 
develop and set their own water limits. A revised NPS was released in 2014, but as that post-
dates the field research this thesis does not address that and all references to the freshwater 
NPS are to the 2011 version.  In the preamble, the NPS “sets out objectives and policies that 
direct local government to manage water in an integrated and sustainable way” and that, 
“Setting enforceable quality and quantity limits is a key purpose” (National Policy Statement 
for Freshwater Management (Ministry for the Environment, 2011) p. 3).  The RMA states 
that, “The purpose of national policy statements is to state objectives and policies for 
matters of national significance that are relevant to achieving the purpose of this Act” 
(Resource Management Act (Ministry for the Environment, 1991), s.45).  In its review, the 
NPS discusses the necessary steps to determine whether or not the limits have been met 
and whether or not the necessary values have been included.  The NPS focuses on water 
quality, water quantity, integrated management, tangata whenua roles and interest, and 
progressive implementation programmes.  The programme to complete these objectives 
must be completed by 2030.   
4.2.2 Regional Policy Level 
ECan is the main governing body surrounding resources in the region.  It has mandates to 
adhere to some acts and plans at the national level, but is often left some freedom in setting 
limits and implementing programmes.   
The Canterbury Regional Policy Statement 
The RMA sets out the purpose of a regional policy statement as “to achieve the purpose of 
the Act by providing an overview of the resource management issues of the region and 
policies and methods to achieve integrated management of the natural and physical 
resources of the whole region” (RMA 1991). The Canterbury Regional Policy Statement 
(CRPS) is a statutory instrument under the RMA and was developed by ECan.  As of January 
15, 2013, it had been officially revised and activated as a guiding statement for the region.  
In its Introduction, the CRPS says that it, 
“… gives an overview of significant resource management issues facing the region, 
including issues of resource management (of) significance to Ngai Tahu.  The purpose 
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of the CRPS is to set out objectives, policies and methods to resolve these resource 
management issues and to achieve the integrated management of the natural and 
physical resources of Canterbury” (Canterbury Regional Policy Statement 
(Environment Canterbury, 2013) p. 1).  
The previous CRPS, operative at least in part since 1998, “provides an overview of the 
resource management issues of the region.  It sets out how natural and physical resources 
are to be managed in an integrated way to promote sustainable management”(CRPS, 2013).  
The revised version notably incorporates Ngai Tahu issues. 
The NRRP and the Land and Water Regional Plan 
The Natural Resources Regional Plan (NRRP), was prepared by ECan pursuant to the RMA 
and provides for “the integrated management of the region’s natural and physical 
resources” (Natural Resources Regional Plan (Environment Canterbury, 2011) pp. 1-1).  
Much of the NRRP, Chapters 4-8, was being revised to form the new Canterbury Land and 
Water Regional Plan (LWRP) at the time of the field research.  As of the completion of the 
research for this thesis, the LWRP was in its ‘proposed’ stages.  It had been released for 
public submission and the hearing process for those submissions commenced on February 
25, 2013.  In its own words, 
“The purpose of the Canterbury Land and Water Regional Plan (“LWRP” or “the 
Plan”) is to identify the resource management outcomes or goals (objectives in this 
Plan) for managing land and water resources in Canterbury to achieve the purpose of 
the Resource Management Act 1991 (“RMA”).  It identifies the policies and rules 
needed to achieve the objectives, and provides direction in terms of the processing 
of resource consent applications”(Proposed Land and Water Resource Management 
Plan (PLWRP)(Environment Canterbury 2012, p. 13). 
The LWRP is the strategy for the Canterbury region for meeting the demands of the RMA 
which says, “The purpose of the preparation, implementation, and administration of 
regional plans is to assist a regional council to carry out any of its functions in order to 
achieve the purpose of this Act (RMA)” (RMA, 1991. s.64), and also must give effect to the 
NPS and the CRPS.  It includes  twenty-one objectives, and policies of two types; outcome-
based and process-based, which either help guide decision making in the case of the latter, 
or, “identify actions the CRC will take to help implement the objectives” ("Proposed Land 
and Water Regional Plan," 2012, p. 13).  The LWRP also includes statutory rules and limits 
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which are legally binding and any activity in the region must meet all the objectives, policies 
and rules to be allowed.  The plan also makes space for sub-regional sections to be inserted 
which deal at a smaller scale with individual catchments or zones, such as the Lake Ellesmere 
catchment (to be addressed in the Selwyn-Waihora Chapter of the LWRP).   
Canterbury Water Management Strategy (CWMS) 
The CWMS is the premier non-statutory document concerning the management of water in 
the Canterbury region, including the catchment that the Lake drains.  The success or failure 
of this strategy will, at least for this catchment, most likely echo the health and survival of 
the Lake.  As it sits within the framework of the LGA, the CWMS is designed along the 
principles of subsidiarity and community involvement.  As a largely non-statutory document 
the various components of the CWMS are implemented through other mechanisms (e.g., 
funds and statutory plans).  
The ECan Act (discussed in section 4.3.9) impacts on the CWMS by being the route to a 
statutory agreement. The Environment Canterbury (Temporary Commissioners and 
Improved Water Management) Act 2010 (ECan Act) (part 1, s.6) states, “the inclusion of the 
vision and principles of the CWMS in Part 1 of Schedule 1 does not accord to the CWMS or 
its vision or principles any status in law other than as provided in this Act.” Though this 
makes the CWMS primarily reliant on the ECan Act for implementation, the Commissioners 
must take heed of the vision and principles of the CWMS as discussed in the ECan Act (part 
3, s. 66) 
CRPS and the LWRP give statutory backing to the CWMS. Figure 8 displays the relationship 
between the CWMS and the RMA.  
 
Figure 8: Relationship between RMA and CWMS (Skelton, 2011) 
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The CWMS focuses on primary and secondary values that the community placed on issues 
related to water management in public focus groups before the CWMS was finalised.  The 
primary values were identified as: drinking water use, environmental use, customary use and 
stock water use.  These were tied with goals toward sustainable management, a regional 
approach, and tangata whenua.  Secondary values include irrigation, renewable electricity 
generation, and recreation and amenity.  Those values are mirrored by natural character, 
indigenous biodiversity, access, quality drinking water, recreational opportunities, 
community use and commercial use.  These values, seen in Figure 9, form a large range of 
topics that would become the main drivers of the CWMS.  This inclusion of the community 
and the identification of values is a good start for co-management, as the community that is 
in contact most with the resource plays a role in determining its future.   
The stated goal of the CWMS is, “To enable present and future generations to gain the 
greatest social, economic, recreational and cultural benefits from our water resources within 
an environmentally sustainable framework” ("Canterbury Water Management Strategy" 
(Canterbury Mayoral Forum, 2009)).  The CWMS was developed over six years through input 
from ECan, the ten territorial district councils in Canterbury, NGOs, other stakeholders, and 
Ngai Tahu.  The strategy identifies ten water management zones and drives the assembly of 
Zone Committees (ZC) and one Regional Committee to work developing implementation 
programmes for the strategy in a very community-oriented way, where a specific hierarchy 
is not present, but different complementary roles exist (Skelton, 2011). These committees 
provide recommendations (primarily to local governments in the region), and develop the 
Regional Implementation Programme (RIP) and Zone Implementation Programmes (ZIPs).  
The RIP and ZIPs are the committees’ official written recommendations and were the focus 
of all of these committee discussions during the fieldwork for this thesis.  Figure 10 shows 
the water management zones as designed by the CWMS. 
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Figure 9: CWMS Primary and Secondary Values (Environment Canterbury, 2013g) 
The committee for the Selwyn Waihora Zone (which includes Lake Ellesmere and its 
catchment) is supposed to facilitate community involvement.  During the preparation of its 
ZIP, the committee has achieved their involvement through local Zone focus group 
discussions which are organised, led and attended by or on behalf of those involved with the 
committee, as well as by people from a broader set of society and stakeholders (as discussed 
later in this thesis). 
This community input received through the focus groups is often discussed in committee 
meetings, as the minutes of the Selwyn/Waihora Zone Committee show.  The committees 
are required to take into account the work of other zones towards the larger more inclusive 
regional plans.  More importantly and perhaps more significantly for this thesis, the 
committees are to monitor ECan’s implementation of the entire programme (Skelton, 2011).  
The zone committees do this by monitoring the implementation of the RIPs and ZIPs by the 
regional council.   
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Figure 10: Water Zones, CWMS (Environment Canterbury, 2013e) 
The zone committees were established as an extension of the regional council, so can only 
act with delegated authority (Skelton, 2011).  But, they potentially play a large role in 
determining recommendations for statutory policy which, assuming the acceptance level of 
their recommendations is high, gives them considerable power for a non-elected body.  The 
final word on the actual ZIPs however, rests with the commissioners of ECan, who take the 
recommendations into consideration in their decision-making processes.  This consideration 
is supposedly based on the larger, regional scope and plan.  Elected ECan councillors at the 
regional level began the strategy and its implementation programme but were subsequently 
replaced by Central Government appointees (called “commissioners”).  At the time of this 
thesis the Central Government’s decision to extend the already appointed Commissioners’ 
contracts is still a source of controversy in the region.   
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On 23 November 2012 the final Te Waihora Co-Governance Agreement was signed between 
TWMB, TRONT and ECan in response to the CWMS, 
 “A formal co-governance arrangement (developed in partnership by Ngai Tahu, The 
Crown and Canterbury local government) for the active management of Te Waihora 
(Lake Ellesmere) and its catchment” ("Canterbury Water Management Strategy" 
(Canterbury Mayoral Forum, 2009)). 
We will return to this co-governance issue when discussing the relationship with iwi (below). 
The ECan Act 
The Environment Canterbury (Temporary Commissioners and Improved Water 
Management) Act 2010, commonly known as the ECan Act, was passed in 2010 and alters 
the leadership of the regional council and bestows upon it powers not previously allowed for 
other councils under other policies (Environment Canterbury (Temporary Commissioners 
and Improved Water Management) Act, 2010).  The ECan Act replaced elected ECan 
councillors with Ministerial appointed commissioners initially for three year terms (a single 
election cycle), but which have now been extended through to 2016.  The implementation of 
this Act in Canterbury was met with expected controversy, and stoked attitudes of 
unfairness and government overreach from the public’s point of view (Brower, 2010). 
The ECan Act gives the council extended powers in three main areas.  One of these powers 
concerns Water Conservation Orders in Canterbury, where there are two respective 
changes, “first, ECan has replaced the special tribunal which is provided for in the RMA to 
consider WCO applications; second, the only appeals of an ECan decision are on points of 
law and to the High Court” (Rennie, 2010, p. 20).  This change removes the Environment 
Court from any involvement in RMA plans and policy-making within the region.  The second 
main area that the ECan Act affects is regarding resource consents in the region.  ECan and 
its appointed commissioners were given, “the ability to impose a moratorium on ‘specified’ 
applications for water permits or discharge permits” (Rennie, 2010, p. 20).  Lastly, regional 
plans cannot be challenged on technical grounds in the Environment Court, which appears to 
give greater weight to the recommendations of the zone committees.  All of these changes 
within the region are significant to the management of Lake Ellesmere, even beyond the 
implications for WCO’s and resource consents.  Whereas outside the region a regional 
council’s RMA policies and plans can be appealed to the Environment Court on matters of 
52 
 
substance, within Canterbury, the ECan Commissioner’s decisions can be appealed only to 
the High Court and only on points of law. 
Regional Implementation Programme 
The CWMS leads to more specific implementation programmes, one for the entire 
Canterbury region and others for specific zones that deal with issues pertaining more to 
their respective catchments.  The RIP, as of March 1, 2013, was still in its draft form.  A 
selection from the Foreword of the Draft RIP (dRIP) reads, 
“The draft RIP has been produced under the CWMS and is a non-statutory document.  
It has been prepared by the Regional Committee through a collaborative process.  It 
is a collection of integrated actions and proposals to give effect to the CWMS at a 
regional level and to support the ZIPs at a local level.  It is a work in progress and will 
continue to develop” (Draft RIP (dRIP)(Canterbury Regional Water Management 
Committee (CRWMC) 2012) p. iii). 
The Regional Committee, responsible for the RIP, is made up of community members, 
representatives from the Zone Committees, District Council, Ngai Tahu Canterbury Runanga, 
two ECan commissioners, one Central Government observer, and one seat each for TRONT 
and Christchurch City.  The Regional Committee, like the Zone Committees, is selected 
through appointment and so those involved are not elected representatives, rather 
community members with area expertise.  The runanga members are seen more as 
representatives for their iwi.  Appointments on the Regional Committee, including the chair 
and two ECan appointed commissioners (among others) have been made by ECan under the 
ECan Act. 
There may also be specific people who often reside and act in one zone where they have 
accumulated knowledge, but these zones still interrelate and share borders.  The RIP allows 
for the sharing of ideas and management schemes amongst the zones in an integrated way, 
neither keeping local communities totally separate or withholding power in the form of a 
larger central government scheme.  The RIP is currently a work in progress, and not all of the 
zones have completed their respective ZIPs.  The RIP takes into consideration these ZIPs and 
includes them in its integrative process.   
The RIP has four main regional priority issues, which each have a focus group.  Kaitiakitanga, 
ecosystem health and biodiversity, land use and water quality and regional infrastructure 
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were all found to be priorities of the RIP (dRIP, 2012).  Each priority issue was aligned with 
outcomes and recommendations for the future.  One example is that of kaitiakitanga, which 
requests that district plans have a particular regard to the concept (dRIP, 2012).  Each 
priority follows suit in the form of figures and targets that act as goals and guidelines for 
continued policy.  The RIP is not hierarchically above the ZCs or respective ZIPs, though they 
do inform each other. 
Zone Implementation Programme 
The Selwyn/Waihora ZIP is the basis for recommendations concerning the Zone, many of 
which, where relevant, may later become part of the LWRP, in effect getting statutory 
backing.  However, this is not automatic.  Council planners work to turn the ZIPs into 
appropriate proposed wording in the relevant LWRP proposed chapter, but this does not 
mean this will be the final wording.  The ECan Commissioners may change the wording 
approved by the Zone Committee, and the Commissioners themselves could also make 
changes to the draft of the proposed plan (policy) before putting it out for public submission. 
The hearings, held by independent (non-ECan) Commissioners might result in a final version 
from the hearing process that is different again to that proposed by the Zone Committee or 
the ECan commissioners.     
The Selwyn/Waihora Zone and the other CWMS Zone boundaries are not fully delineated 
based on catchments, although the zones do provide a better governing area for Lake 
Ellesmere as they are larger and include more of the catchment than the original political 
district council boundaries.  Like the RIP, the ZIP is non-statutory and its main function is as a 
set of recommendations.  It can and will be altered in the future once progress towards its 
goals have been identified or found lacking depending on its three or ten year outcomes.  If 
there is a conflict between the ZIP and previous policies that affect the Zone, the committee 
must find a new way to accomplish their goal in a non-statutory way while understanding 
that the statutory plans might allow a different outcome than identified by the ZIP (Skelton, 
2011).  The Selwyn/Waihora ZC includes ECan and district council members and appointed 
community members, including six runanga representatives.  
The ZIP comprises recommendations and identifies key goals and limits for the zone.  The 
advisory role that the committee plays, combined with the input from scientists and other 
stakeholders, adds to the legitimacy of the document as, “the sharing of ecological 
knowledge by natural scientists can play a key role in legitimizing regulations, even when 
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those regulations are created by a local management authority” (Pinkerton & John, 2008, p. 
681).  If a non-statutory document is to succeed, it must be viewed legitimately by those 
who fall under its jurisdiction or concern.   
The Selwyn/Waihora ZIP (SWZIP) identifies nine priority outcomes for the area covered in 
the plan.  These outcomes include, “thriving communities and sustainable economies, high 
quality and secure supplies of drinking water, best practice management of nutrients and 
water, the integration of kaitiakitanga into water management, healthy lowland streams, a 
healthy Te Waihora ecosystem, hill-fed waterways that support aquatic life and recreation, 
protection of alpine rivers and high country values and enhanced indigenous biodiversity 
across the Zone” (Selwyn Waihora ZIP, 2011).  These priorities were examined and discussed 
in working group meetings and workshops with the general public.  The working groups 
were titled Water Supply, Te Waihora and the Lowlands, biodiversity, and voluntary 
approaches to water and nutrient management.  Due to its complexity, the issue of nutrient 
loads throughout the catchment was targeted as a 2012 project, was extended to 2013, and 
remained one of the major decisions facing the Committee at the conclusion of the thesis 
fieldwork.     
4.2.3 Lake-Specific Plans, Policies, and Programmes 
Plans, policies, groups and programmes surrounding Lake Ellesmere vary in their nature 
from Treaty rights to community-oriented groups.  Although some of these groups and/or 
programmes stem from national and regional level documents and initiatives, they are still 
oriented around the Lake. 
WET Community Strategy 
Before the Canterbury Water Management Strategy commenced, ECan undertook public 
consultation processes as part of preparing its NRRP. Part of that process led to several 
groups and/or individuals (e.g. Lake Settlers Association) involved with Lake Ellesmere 
meeting as a group to record their goals and vision for the Lake in the future.  The group 
focused on the Lake was called the Lake Ellesmere/Te Waihora Issues Group.  The Issues 
Group was made up of several interests including local landowners, TRONT, the Lake Settlers 
Association and DoC, among others. The Issues Group’s Community Plan would contribute to 
the parts that included Lake Ellesmere (Waihora EllesmereTrust, 2004).  According to the 
document, “Given the nature of the issues, the complexity of the lake and tributary system, 
and the number of targets identified, a co-operative approach has been identified as the 
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most efficient, effective and equitable solution to achieving long-lasting results” (WET, 2004, 
p. 2).  This approach resulted in the Waihora Ellesmere Trust (WET), led by fifteen founding 
Trust members from the Issues Group, being incorporated as a charitable trust in 2003.  WET 
served as a forum for local and community discussion mainly before the CWMS was 
developed and the Zone Committee established.  It is worth noting that this first assemblage 
of different interests into a shared forum for discussion was formed ten full years before the 
research for this thesis.  This is not to be forgotten when looking at the success or failure of 
the current nested design as there has been collaboration for some time now. 
The Trust was set up with several goals in mind.  First, it wanted to promote and sustain best 
management practices amongst local landowners as a way to help improve the Lake and its 
tributaries.  Second, WET hoped to raise awareness of the history of the Lake and its 
environs.  Third, and perhaps most importantly from the perspective of this thesis, the Trust 
wanted to provide an arena for dialogue amongst competing or interested factions 
surrounding the Lake.  It also wanted to share the values associated with the Lake with 
others, and finally, to “recognize the views and expectations of Mana Whenua” in regards to 
its responsibilities under the Treaty of Waitangi (Waihora Ellesemere Trust, 2004, p. 3).   
The Community Strategy itself had guiding principles, goals and strategic actions that all 
worked to achieve its vision for Lake Ellesmere.  On its most basic level, the vision for the 
Lake was to be healthy and productive, culturally and historically significant, a location 
where different interests were balanced, a “wide open place” for enjoyment of future 
generations and a location for, “contemplation and tranquillity” (Waihora Ellesmere Trust, 
2004).  These actions and targets were also deemed to fall under the responsibility of 
different groups, often including ECan, DoC, Ngai Tahu and other government and private 
interests.  WET is an important piece in the management network, as it provided a 
mechanism to facilitate and a forum for the different interests to discuss their ideas and find 
places for agreement on actions.  Many of the issues that are at the core of the Community 
Strategy and therefore of WET’s purpose, fall within the ambit of the more recently 
established Zone Committee and might be expected to find expression in its ZIP and in the 
LWRP. Other issues may lie beyond the mandate of these bodies. 
Among WET’s activities is its biennial Living Lake Symposiums, where new scientific data and 
management strategies are described and discussed.  This attracts many local scientists, 
policy makers, and those involved with the Lake in hopes of updating the community on the 
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bio-physical, social and management aspects of the Lake and the reports prepared for the 
symposium are often published.  WET has also released an Action Plan that describes its role 
and goals for the coming years.  The Action Plan reiterates WET’s catch phrase of, “Educate, 
Facilitate, Activate”.  Other WET activities have or do include: facilitating riparian 
restoration, scientific research, community engagement with the Lake and inter-
agency/stakeholder discussions and consultations.  It has employed up to five staff and at 
the time of the research had a fulltime manager and various contracted part-time staff.  It 
receives funding support from members, contracted work and grants from central and local 
governments and NGOs.  
Maori Co-Management/Governance: The JMP and Whakaora Te Waihora 
Following the return of much of the Lake’s bed through the Ngai Tahu Claims Settlement Act 
1998, the Te Waihora Management Board (TWMB) was established to represent Papatipu 
Runanga (the subtribes of Ngai Tahu with claims to mana whenua for the Lake) in developing 
with the Department of Conservation a joint management plan for the Lake.  The Board 
comprised three representatives appointed by Te Taumutu Rünanga; and one member from 
each of the remaining five Papatipu Rünanga (Te Ngäi Tüähuriri, Wairewa, Te Hapuo Ngäti 
Wheke, Koukourarata and Önuku (Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu 2008 “Terms of reference Te 
Waihora Management Board, February 2007). In 2005, the Te Waihora Joint Management 
Plan (JMP) was finalised between Ngai Tahu and DoC – Ngai Tahu as owners of much of the 
Lake’s bed and DoC through its ownership of some reserve lands adjacent to the Lake and 
responsibilities for managing various wildlife and non-commercial fisheries.  At the time it 
was the first such statutory co-management document addressing Lake Ellesmere between 
Maori (in this case, tangata whenua) and the Crown (Memon & Kirk, 2011; Prystupa (1998)).  
The JMP did not include ECan, who’s role was unaffected. The JMP merely provided a 
mechanism for DoC and Ngai Tahu to work cooperatively in the management of their 
respective land and other responsibilities. Technically, 
“The JMP contains long-term objectives and detailed policies and methods for 
effective integrated management of the JMP area and the natural and historic 
resources within the area. The plan represents a coming together of the 
rangatiratanga of Ngai Tahu and the Kawanatanga of the Crown for the enhancement 
and protection of this taonga (Maori treasure)”  ("Te Waihora Joint Management 
Plan," 2005). 
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This is somewhat of an overstatement as the JMP only affected the responsibilities that DoC 
had under the Conservation Act, not the broader Lake management responsibilities that 
were the responsibility of local governments or other central government bodies. It is yet to 
be seen how this interacts fully with the CWMS and ZIP.   The TWMB continues to act as an 
advisor to TRONT and Papatipu Runanga, and has considerable freedom to act 
independently in external fora.  
In August 2011, citing the direction given in the CWMS (noted above), Environment 
Canterbury announced: 
The restoration and rejuvenation of the mauri and ecosystem health of Te 
Waihora/Lake Ellesmere has been confirmed with the signing of Whakaora Te 
Waihora - a long-term relationship agreement and shared commitment 
between Environment Canterbury, Ngāi Tahu and Te Waihora Management 
Board. 
The parties have also signed an interim co-governance agreement which 
establishes an enduring co-governance framework for the active management 
of Te Waihora and its catchment.  
These agreements signal the start of a new approach to management of 
natural resources in the region, one which acknowledges and brings together 
the tikanga responsibilities of Ngāi Tahu and the statutory responsibilities of 
Environment Canterbury. 
 (http://ecan.govt.nz/news-and-notices/news/Pages/ngai-tahu-and-
ecan-confirm-restoration-te-waihora.aspx downloaded 13 January 2015) 
 
The Ministry for the Environment (MfE), ECan, and Ngai Tahu had signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding in relation to Whakaora Te Waihora (MoU), which established, “the 
commitment to a partnership… regarding the remediation and management of Te Waihora” 
(Memorandum of Understanding in relation to Whakaora Te Waihora, 2011) and TRONT 
TWMB and ECan had signed the ‘Te Waihora Interim Co-Governance Agreement and Terms 
of Reference, 2011’.   Both were non-statutory documents separate from the JMP (which is 
primarily implemented through DoC and TWMB). 
The MoU provides a written form of an agreement between the Parties to implement a co-
managed restoration programme for the Lake.   That restoration programme itself is 
Whakaora Te Waihora and is referred to as simply ‘the Project” in the MoU.  Despite 
retaining its statutory responsibilities under the Conservation Act and the existing JMP, DoC 
was not included as a party in the MoU.  
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The MoU required a set of tasks be accomplished before any funding would be released by 
MfE to support the restoration, and these tasks included a relationship agreement setting 
out “the on-going relationship between the two parties with regard to the management and 
governance of Te Waihora” (MoU Item 9).  On November 7th, 2012 ECan and the ten Ngai 
Tahu subtribes with mana whenua in the Canterbury Region made a partnership relationship 
agreement (named ‘Tuia’) to “create clear and consistent expectations for how the 
relationship” between the parties would operate. Particular provisions included protocols of 
engagement and ‘collaboration’, including providing a right for each runanga to be 
represented on ECan committees and regular consultation meetings with the runanga. The 
runanga were to be supported by TRONT.   
The National Water Conservation (Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere) Order 1990 
and Lake Opening Resource Consent 
The National Water Conservation (Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere) Order 1990 (The Order), 
signed on July 2nd, 1990, is a mechanism, provided for in the RMA (and before it the Water 
and Soil Conservation Act 1967) and provides an official order to protect the Lake and its 
habitat from certain activities that could cause further damage.  The WCO predates even the 
RMA and is a critical component of Lake management.  According to the Order, the Lake, 
“provides or contributes to an outstanding habitat for wildlife, indigenous wetland 
vegetation and fish, and significance in tikanga Maori in respect of Ngai Tahu history” 
leading to the provisions which protect the aforementioned qualities (Reeves, 1990).  This 
Order prevents the Lake from certain developments such as further drainage that could 
further degrade or alter its water quality, quantity, or habitat.   Essentially the Order 
prevents the Lake from being opened artificially to the sea unless it has risen to particular 
heights above mean annual sea level (1.05 m above in “summer” – August to March - 1.13m 
above in “winter” – April to July inclusive).  As long as the Order stands, it provides a certain 
level of protection for the physical integrity of the Lake.  In 2011, TRONT and DoC applied to 
amend the WCO to make several changes.  These changes included adding outstanding 
features of the Lake for fisheries and wetland vegetation, as well as the inclusion of 
kaitiakitanga and mahinga kai as significant cultural factors, and allowing the Lake to be 
opened at any level between April 1stand June 15th.  This change was to enable the Lake to 
be opened at opportune times for the out-migration of eels to spawn in accordance with 
Ngai Tahu wishes. These amendments passed in 2011.  
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The opening of the Lake requires a resource consent, which in turn requires some 
background about the current situation.  The Te Waihora Management Board was formed by 
runanga and TRONT, which makes it the lead Ngai Tahu body in interaction with DoC.  The 
Management Board also helped to develop the previously mentioned JMP.  The original 
resource consent to open the Lake was pre-RMA and in 2001, was based primarily on the 
need to limit inundation of surrounding farmland.  It was largely funded by a special rate 
collected from the Lake Settlers Association members, continuing a tradition established in 
the early 20th Century. The consent to open the Lake artificially was inherited by ECan from 
its predecessor, the North Canterbury Catchment Board along with the Board’s responsibility 
to minimise flooding.  When it was required to be renewed under the RMA, and therefore 
needed to meet different criteria related to sustainable management (not simply drainage), 
DoC and Ngai Tahu submitted in opposition.  As a result, an agreed research period was 
developed to take into consideration the entire Lake catchment, instead of just the opening 
that was previously considered for the consent.  An interim five year consent was granted in 
2006 to continue opening the Lake in the manner it had been previously, but included a 
requirement for the consent holder (ECan) to consult with Parties to the Protocol for 
Opening the Lake and the undertaking of a research programme to better inform the 
decision-makers when the interim consent expired.  These Parties were the Lake Settlers, 
Taumutu Runanga, Christchurch City Council, Selwyn District Council, Canterbury Regional 
Council, Ngai Tahu, WET, DoC, Fish and Game, and Commercial Fishers. The research 
programme involved ECan, with help and facilitation through a Statutory Agencies Group 
that was established and facilitated by WET.  The main results of this programme were 
regularly presented as part of the biennial symposia organised by WET and informed 
amendments to the WCO and various restoration programmes for the Lake and its 
Catchment (e.g., Whakaora Te Waihora).  
At the time of the empirical field work for this thesis, Ngai Tahu and ECan were in the 
process of preparing a joint new resource consent to open the Lake, one that would fit the 
new provisions within the recently amended WCO.   The current consent will remain until 
such time as Ngai Tahu and ECan move forward their new iteration, (it was eventually 
granted in 2014).  Plate 3 shows a successful lake opening.  
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Plate 3: Lake Opening (Waihora Ellesmere Trust, 2013) 
4.3 Conclusion 
The case of Lake Ellesmere provides a rich history, varying policies and some unclear 
relationships. Much of Chapter 4 provides the most pertinent information pertaining to the 
Lake and thesis that helps to promote a shared awareness for the reader. This existing 
framework and history is important to the Results Chapter as it gives a base on which to 
compare governance arrangements to Ostrom’s principles. Because long-enduring CPR 
institutions do not emerge overnight, following the evolution, side-tracking or progress of 
policies intended to manage a CPR are crucial to designing a system with Ostrom’s 
principles.  
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Chapter 5 - Results 
Results are organized in the following fashion:  First, results surrounding the comments 
about the Treaty are given to set the stage in which the management of Lake Ellesmere sits.  
Second, each of Ostrom’s principles is compared with the current and/or forthcoming 
governance framework surrounding the Lake.  To this end, document analysis, specific 
observations, and interview commentary are all used to analyse and discuss the presence or 
lack of the respective principle.  A summary of ZC observations can be seen in Appendix C.   
5.1 Broad Treaty Implications 
The Treaty and its resulting co-governance arrangements play a major role in the 
management of the Lake.  Interviews revealed mixed comments about the Treaty, some 
positive, though some interviewees opined that there were also negative results.   
The first theme that emerged was broad as interviewees spoke about what kind of an impact 
the Treaty has had on the Lake management process.  Several interviewees responded 
simply, like ZC5, “I think it’s had a big impact on it” and ZC6, “Enormous… I think the Treaty 
has had an enormous impact”.  ZC7 agreed, “A really, really big one”, and so too did EC1, 
“Huge. It’s about awareness raising”, and LU1, “Oh well clearly an enormous one”.  Some of 
the interview group said it made some things more difficult but would pan out positively in 
the long run.  ZC7 said, “…and not in the last two years, really, although it has in the change 
in the Conservation Order and things like that, but longer term, I think huge, absolutely 
massive”.  ZC2 also considered the time scale, “I think in the broader and long term it’s been 
positive.  I think in the short term there are those who have had to adjust their view of the 
world”.   
The interviewees were pressed to give more detailed responses or personal takes on the 
issues.  These responses were more direct, often citing the alleged outcomes for Maori.  EC1 
said, “It’s confirmed their sense of kind of, ownership, in the future of the Lake and without 
it I think their relationships would be completely different… The Treaty’s fundamentally 
important to it, to both the past and the future of the Lake”.  EC2 said basically, “Of course 
the Treaty is what our partnership is what it’s based on”.  ZC1 noticed a result too, “There’s a 
whole resurgence of iwi confidence in themselves and knowing their place as Treaty 
partners and you know, insisting on their rights”.   ZC8 was more critical,  
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the Treaty, in my view; we’re all New Zealanders now and I think the indigenous 
people have to be recognized, but sometimes I think the fact that they want all the 
benefits of their original race when a lot of them are 7/8 other race, so they want all 
the benefits of their own race but the responsibility of the other part of their race, 
they don’t take those as well.   
ZC3 also had a negative outlook, “I’m not sure that it’s benefitted the economic side of the 
equation.  It highlighted Maoris with chips on their shoulders.  But it’s done nothing to 
actually take them into getting jobs and education and doing more for themselves, 
becoming more skilled”.  ZC4 added, “The Treaty definitely makes things more difficult.  It 
definitely creates ambition and aspiration”.   
In the document analysis, the Treaty was seen to have an impact on many policies, plans and 
programmes, though on some occasions (e.g. RMA) only certain sections of the Treaty were 
cited. When an analyzed document covered co-management or co-governance, the Treaty 
was cited often (e.g. Whakaora Te Waihora) and the above responses were in reference to 
its impact on Lake management in general, not one specific plan or programme. 
Many interviewees mentioned the importance of the Treaty for relationships and 
governance, though the Treaty was, at times, not included in some documents. Interviewees 
were, however, prompted to respond to questions concerning the Treaty and its impact on 
the water management process. 
5.2 Responses to Ostrom’s Design Principles 
As noted in Chapter 3, each of Ostrom’s (1990) principles were used to guide the  document 
analysis, meeting observations and interviews.  The results are grouped in relation to her 
principles.   
5.2.1 Clearly Defined Boundaries  
Identifying clearly defined boundaries includes identifying who should be allowed to use the 
Lake as a resource and what the actual area is that needs to be considered to manage the 
Lake.  Clearly defined boundaries help to separate a CPR from an open-access resource and 
can prevent free-riders from taking advantage of the CPR.  
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Document Analysis 
Documents reviewed had varying political and physical boundaries concerning the Lake and 
its catchment.  For example, The LWRP (PLWRP 2012, p. vii) refers not to Catchments, but to 
“sub-regional sections” (s.2 of the PLWRP 2012, emphasis added) or “areas” that “generally 
reflect Canterbury Water Management Zone Committee boundaries, but have been aligned 
with surface water catchment or groundwater management boundaries”.  These are then 
considered to be ‘catchments’ (Figure 10). There is a chapter in the PLWRP where rules 
relate specifically to this area. Interviewees noted that there was considerable uncertainty as 
to where the actual boundaries of groundwater lay and that there was disagreement as to 
how much groundwater surfaced in the Lake itself or went beyond the Lake and entered the 
sea directly.  However, they were generally prepared to accept the map as presented in 
Figure 11.       
 
Figure 11: Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere Catchment (Environment Canterbury, 2013d) 
The second boundary map (Figure 12), shows the Selwyn/Waihora Zone as designed by the 
CWMS.  Note how it and the following figure extend further inland than the PLWRP map 
(Figure 11), which assigns those higher alpine regions and rivers their own catchment 
section. 
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Figure 12: Selwyn-Waihora Zone (Environment Canterbury, 2013f) 
The political boundaries of the Selwyn District are pictured in Figure 13; note the difference 
between the exclusion of land around the southeast corner of Lake Ellesmere and the 
western part of Banks Peninsula.  In fact, the boundary between Christchurch City and 
Selwyn District in one part is a straight line across part of the Lake and the area in which the 
Lake is artificially opened to the sea is largely within Christchurch City’s boundary. 
 
Figure 13: Selwyn District Council (Selwyn District Council) 
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These political boundaries vary from natural boundaries.  Figure 14 is a groundwater map of 
the same area.  Note delineations in the boundaries, which in the case of groundwater, have 
a few small special sections especially in the area around the Rakaia River.  The surface 
water catchment aligns most closely with the first map, Figure 11, of the LWRP.  
 
Figure 14: Groundwater for Selwyn (H.R. Williams, 2010, p. 2) 
Because of these different boundaries and associated legal mandates for local governments 
the Lake and catchment cannot be managed by one of these political or natural boundaries 
on their own.  Even respective runanga boundaries, as included in the Settlement Act, are 
not a direct match to the catchment of the Lake.   
Observations 
Direct observations of discussions regarding the issue of boundaries revealed that, broadly, 
boundaries in the catchment were accepted as “blurry” to begin with, as water is brought in 
from the boundaries of the large braided river systems (outside of the boundaries shown by 
document maps) and wildlife like fish were accepted as needing to be considered in context 
with not just the catchment, but the ocean, too.  There was, therefore, little to no discussion 
of the boundaries within the ZC because they were all working within those boundaries 
given to them by central or regional government.  It was also not the ZC’s role to decide the 
physical boundaries within which they worked. The boundaries were important for various 
discussions, especially those including water quality, but the actual shape of the boundaries 
was not in question, only the things that occur within those boundaries.  There was also no 
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discussion over boundaries for the implementation stages of the CWMS, but it is possible 
those talks could be had in the future, where boundaries could play a much more important 
role.  The implementation stages though, were outside the time scale and scope of this 
thesis’ fieldwork. 
Interviews 
For physical boundaries, interviewees were asked about the slight variations between those 
boundaries set up by the LWRP, the District Councils, and the Water Zones, shown in the 
maps above.  They were also asked what boundary they, specifically, thought should be 
considered when managing the Lake.  Most responses cited ‘the catchment’ as the main 
boundary necessary for management of the Lake, but these again appeared flexible, blurred 
and at times different to those in the maps.  ZC1 cited briefly, “ki uta ki tai, it’s the whole 
catchment” and ZC5 said, “I would like to say the whole catchment”.  ZC6 also saw the 
catchment as important, “I have no problem with the boundaries, I think it’s quite logical 
that the catchment is between the Waimak[ariri] and the Rakaia…”(emphasis added) and 
EC1 confirmed, “You’re going to have to think of the whole catchment”. 
The ‘natural’ catchment, although frequently cited as the best boundary, did vary slightly 
from the political lines drawn and there were several comments on that difference.  One 
interviewee, EC2, felt that when asked if there were issues with the slight clashes in 
boundaries, “Oh totally, I mean it’s only these last couple of years we’re actually sitting 
down [together].” Another non-committee member, LU1, had this to say, “Well yeah look, 
boundaries are an issue and that’s why we have a Statutory Agencies Group that reflects 
into and across boundary issues…” and later, “So it’s really only at the District Level, I think, 
where there are planning issues around boundaries that are at all problematic”.  Most 
interviewees however, felt that the variations in political boundaries were a minor issue.  
ZC2 defended the process and said, “I’m not sure that I would use the ‘conflict’ term in this 
situation yet,” and went on to say, “By and large people seem to try and be positive and 
cooperative and work with each other to address these issues”.    Another interviewee, ZC5, 
agreed, “I don’t see too many problems.  As far as working with statutory boundaries I can’t 
see there’s much difficulty there”.  
Two comments were unique in that they brought up rate-payers and funding.  ZC6 related 
the information back to the catchment saying, “Because once you start paying, then the 
wider the catchment the better” and also ZC3 said , “But Christchurch is [included and], from 
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a ratepayer, the real benefit is they’ve got this huge volume of people producing a majority 
of the rates to support what needs to be done”.  The issue of rate-payers connects to that of 
free-riding in a CPR, as well as funding to carry out zone-wide mitigations and monitoring.  If 
many users of the Lake do not pay to help maintain it, they are in effect free-riding.   The 
interviewees, documents and other readings indicated that fishing and water based 
recreational activities within Selwyn District Council, for instance, were often carried out by 
residents of Christchurch City, especially during weekends or vacation periods.  According to 
the interviewees, the varying boundaries seen in the documents did not translate to major 
issues within the community or the Lake management process.   
5.2.2 Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local 
conditions  
Ostrom’s second principle looks for appropriation and provision rules that match the unique 
setting of the CPR in question.  Although the Lake as a CPR contains many resources 
including fish and eels, this section is based mainly on the discussion surrounding water 
quality and quantity, as well as the management of the catchment as a whole, because these 
topics are the focus in the ZIP and CWMS.  Most of the rules are set and enforced by either 
ECan or the Selwyn District Council (SDC) and are instruments of the RMA.  Other entities 
like DoC and Fish and Game manage the wildlife and the Ministry of Primary Industry 
manages commercial fisheries and it is unknown whether or not they have congruence 
between their rules and local conditions because those organisations and that type of 
resource were not directly part of this study due to the focus on the CWMS and the ZC.  
However, those fisheries would certainly be included as an example of a local condition that 
would need to be considered for the ZC and management of the Lake (especially under the 
RMA), even if that inclusion did not work the other way around.  This section will focus on 
those rules relevant to the Zone process that the ZC was working towards recommending 
(e.g. nutrient limit-setting) during the field work period.  
Document Analysis 
Documents surrounding local conditions were provided at Zone meetings and reviewed for 
this section of the thesis. These documents included scientific reports, presentations, and 
potential recommendations surrounding relevant topics (e.g. nutrient loads) for the 
committee to consider. The large amount of scientific data given to the ZC is a testament to 
the amount of effort put into understanding the unique setting of Lake Ellesmere.  There 
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have been management focused scientific symposia held at Lincoln University since the 
1970’s and reports of these and other scientific studies help add to the knowledge 
concerning the Lake and what it means for those trying to live with and manage the 
resource.  ZC members were also selected because of their knowledge of certain issues 
relating to stakeholders in the catchment.  As shown in Figure 15, scientific reports were 
significant items on the ZC agenda.   
 
Figure 15: Example of a typical Agenda from the Selwyn/Waihora Zone Committee, 
(Environment Canterbury, 2012a) 
The ZC was given this information throughout the observational period and some of their 
monthly agendas would total over one hundred pages of background documents.  Sources 
for this information varied from external consulting companies like Golder Associates to 
ECan monitoring, individual experts and CRIs.  Formats ranged from power point 
presentations to statistical graphs and data and water issue coverage appears 
comprehensive.  Responses to questions raised at ZC meetings were addressed in 
subsequent meeting documents and can be seen in ZC agendas and/or online databases.  
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Observations 
It was apparent at meetings that most ZC member questions were passed to a perceived 
expert (an employee of one of the councils, usually ECan, or an ECan-hired consultant) who 
would either answer immediately or indicate that they would return with an answer at the 
next meeting, which they usually (always) did.  There was often confusion, albeit from 
different ZC members directed at different topics, towards different pieces of data or 
research.  This confusion most often required a minor confirmation or clarification by a 
perceived expert.  Members of ECan were often relied on to answer ZC members’ questions 
and appeared to play a critical role in informing the ZC members.  
It was apparent at times that the amount of scientific information was overwhelming for 
many of the ZC members if it did not touch on their expertise, particularly the interpretation 
of scientific tables and graphs as they pertained to nutrients and Trophic Level Index (TLI).  
Although they may have had expertise within their own professions, it was a difficult task to 
stay up-to-date with all of the information required to make a sound decision on some 
issues.  Expertise was hard to come by individually in this situation so the ZC relied heavily on 
those outside of the members to supplement their knowledge.  There was much time spent 
discussing the science behind scenarios and more time spent filling in one or more members 
of the ZC on scientific data.  At first, the meetings included a breakdown and explanation of 
this data but as time went on, the ZC was asked to go through the information and be up-to-
date beforehand.   
The amount and scientific nature of information often caused the ZC to spend considerable 
amounts of time during their meetings seeking explanations and a shared understanding of 
the material.   
Interviews 
Interviewees were asked about the Lake and its congruence and appropriation and if they 
were taken into account or paid heed to in the Zone process.   Most interviewees thought 
the unique aspects of the Lake were taken into account and that they were kept in mind 
during the ZC process that would help determine the rules.    
For instance, ZC2 said that, “Part of me says that Lake Ellesmere/Waihora has been studied 
to death,” and that, “there’s a massive academic and scientific papers produced about it”.  
ZC4 felt that previous management plans, “were purely based on lake level …whereas now 
we’ve got fish retention and those kinds of deals and opportunity”.  ZC5 was satisfied with 
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the information saying, “I think we’ve had all the information we need, yes, I think so”, and 
EC1 thought, “I think that’s [what’s] recognized”.  ZC5 also commented on the historical 
aspects of things, “Well I mean it’s considered, the fact that there was a historical opening at 
the site…”  Another interviewee had this to say, “Well, I’d probably say that until twenty-odd 
years ago, thirty-odd years ago, the environmental part of the Lake, there was not much 
thought given to it at all really” (ZC8).   
There were two interviewees who thought that the historical environmental setting could 
have been known, but was not fully discussed.  ZC6 thought it was a time related issue, “No, 
because we haven’t had the time.  And as time goes by I think that may be taken into 
account more”.   When asked about the Wahine Storm and Lake Openings as unique aspects 
of the Lake, ZC3 said, “Well it hasn’t really been discussed, it’s accepted that it’s happened”.   
Overall, most identified the cultural history through the Lake Openings as a major impact on 
the environmental history of the Lake.  These two interviewees both thought more could 
have been covered scientifically on the Lake, but as many others said, there are many 
reports and scientific studies done on the Lake, they cannot all be looked over during ZC 
time.  While sitting in on nine ZC meetings, there was enough scientific data to easily fill each 
meeting, if not many times that length.  Most interviewees felt that they paid heed to the 
specific factors of the catchment.   
5.2.3 Collective-choice arrangements  
Collective-choice agreements require that the rules surrounding a CPR be determined by 
those who interact with that CPR and, in effect, each other.  Following this principle is 
expected to most effectively implement the rules from the previous principle and Ostrom 
(1990, p. 93)  writes, “CPR institutions that use this principle are better able to tailor their 
rules to local circumstances” by using the knowledge and expertise of those closely involved 
with the CPR.   A major facet of collaborative governance, like that within the Zone process, 
is the idea that the local public are consulted and empowered when it comes to different 
issues and this lends itself to the collective-choice principle.  If these aspects of collaborative 
governance are met, then in turn they would help to meet the collective-choice ideals 
recognized by Ostrom. 
Document Analysis 
Identifying collective choice through document analysis came mostly through those involved 
with the Nutrient limit-setting Focus Groups and from presentations given at the ZC.  
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Appendix B shows the summaries of some Focus Group meetings.  The main issue of note for 
these Focus Groups was, logically, the limit-setting process. This topic was of such high 
importance because of its ramifications for land and water use in the entire catchment.   
Figure 16 shows the interaction of these different entities within the CWMS.   
 
Figure 16: Draft Engagement Plan, (Environment Canterbury, 2012b) 
Often, the groups were asked to assess different qualities, goals, or aspects within the 
catchment, and they responded by assigning corresponding red, blue, and green dots to 
each category depending on where they assessed each issue. The different groups could 
have widely differing views as illustrated by Figure 17 which shows the assessments made by 
various stakeholder focus groups of the likelihood of the current scenario in Canterbury 
achieving priority outcomes of the CWMS.  These viewpoints were presented and discussed 
within ZC meetings by those involved with the focus groups and several members of the ZC 
observed, but did not participate in, the focus group assessments. 
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Figure 17: Current Scenario Stakeholder Deliberation Results (Environment Canterbury, 
2012c) 
 
 
 
The ZC, although based on collaboration, did include several runanga representatives.  Their 
representative status is different than others on the ZC, and so within the ZC’s Terms of 
Reference, a 75% vote would be accepted if consensus could not be reached on the 
committee (Selwyn-Waihora Zone Water Management Committee: Terms of reference, 
2010).  Beyond that, external help would be required.  It is worth noting though, that there 
were not enough votes to advance anything when the cultural split was considered 
exclusively and this lent itself to collaboration.  No votes were held during the observation 
periods nor were any recorded during the period of the empirical fieldwork, so this thesis 
cannot judge the effectiveness of the cultural split and 75% requirement. 
Observations 
Within the ZC the Focus Groups were discussed at each meeting, attendance of ZC members 
at the Groups was noted, and the summaries and stakeholder responses were included in 
agendas and presented to the ZC to make sure there was a viable working relationship 
between the two entities.  Within the ZC, it was obvious that one group did have an 
opportunity to have much more input into the process; the runanga.  With six specific seats 
Key 
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 = Agree  
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on the ZC, they were the only representatives of an interest, officially, at the table.  No other 
interest, even that of dairy, or farming, or of New Zealand’s fishing community had even one 
specified representative seat. 
One group that seemed to be missing from the stakeholder groups used in the Focus Groups 
was that of young people, possibly those in college or university (under the age of 25) who 
would grow up with the sanctions designed by the current generation of decision makers.  
There was also little to no discussion of such interests within the ZC, although it was 
observed that several claims were made about doing things on behalf of young people, 
families and future generations.  It can be said, however, that most interests present 
through focus groups had a chance to have their thoughts shared.  The type of impact those 
thoughts would have on the final recommendations was unclear.  Throughout the 
observation period (nine meetings) it was rare to have the entire ZC present at any ZC 
meeting.   
Interviews 
The major theme of responses was that opportunities existed to participate but that 
different levels of involvement were present.  On the one hand, EC1 said, “I think a really 
good attempt has been made to incorporate all interests.  That being said, there will always 
be arguments about whether some interests get more air time than others” and on the 
other hand continued, “If you’ve got a ZC with twelve people it’s going to be bloody hard to 
be representative of everybody”.  ZC4 thought most people were given a chance to be 
heard, “Everyone’s had an opportunity to come in” and “I don’t believe anybody’s been shut 
out”.   ZC7 felt similarly, “I think that I’ve been impressed with the breadth of interests that 
have been involved through the Focus Group process.  There’s obviously an attempt by the 
Zone Committee to get a good breadth of representation.  With fifteen people, how well can 
you do?”  
When asked about who should be involved in managing the Lake, all interviewees 
mentioned that Ngai Tahu and/or tangata whenua should play a role in the management 
process as they own the lake bed and have significant cultural ties to the Lake.  The question 
was open-ended and some responses focused on the Lake and others on the catchment, or 
both.  ZC1 commented, “it’s quite clear that (Ngai Tahu) should be involved with 
management decisions” and ZC5 said that, “the ZC of course is an integral part of that and 
the iwi really needs to be an integral part of the ZC’s decisions” and later, “I guess the whole 
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of the community needs to be involved”.   ZC6 also added, “Te Waihora Management Board 
have a statutory right around the Lake” and also, “Look I think that the community in a 
whole needs to have a say on the Lake”.   
The issues over involvement were not over who should be involved but how much say those 
who are involved should have.  It was ZC4 who felt that, “If it was just around the Lake I 
would have no problems with the iwi group’s management boards having some control of 
the Lake.  Where I start to run into problems is the idea that because a group owns the Lake 
bed then every decision of the catchment right up to the top, is a material consent, which 
they shall have input to”.  ZC3 based their argument on the idea that, “Elected people from 
all these councils, now, have got no other business to fall back on, so I wouldn’t want [a] 
voted-on body dictating what farmers do.  I think you’d have to have some appointees from 
outside the region, probably”.  
Others felt that specific groups were either disenfranchised, or had poor representation 
within those opportunities for participation.  ZC7 looked to the younger generations, “where 
are the young people in this whole process?” ZC1 mentioned two groups, “the recreational 
interests have felt more difficult to have their say,” and, “I think you could say the same 
about ecosystem biodiversity. People who have that as their primary interest, their views 
have probably been less well-represented”.  Another interviewee, ZC5, had similar views, “I 
think the environmental and recreational groups were not always well represented and I 
think if they were there might have been one voice that perhaps dominated”.  Two 
interviewees used representation by location as something they felt was not complete, ZC6 
commented, “I think what they call the Land [Lake] Settlers organization have not been as 
accommodated as much as they should have been” and ZC3 thought, “Yes, I think they [Lake 
Settlers] have [been poorly represented].  From my point of view, the area above the Main 
South road, right through the Alps [have been poorly represented]”.  
DoC also came up in two interviews as being pushed aside or disenfranchised, especially as it 
related to their co-management agreement with Ngai Tahu in favor of another agreement 
with ECan.  LU1 said, “I do think that what potentially has happened is that, I would say at 
the moment that the DoC feels disenfranchised”.  ZC2 agreed, saying, “The one group that 
I’m a bit concerned about right now is DoC”.  It is possible that this strained relationship is a 
side effect of the Treaty.  One interviewee mentioned again the heavily weighted favour 
and/or impact of Ngai Tahu.  ZC8 said, “No, I think it’s virtually been focused on Ngai Tahu 
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interest and the people it’s close to” and ZC4 felt that, “I guess a wee bit of a concern for me 
is that in the whole Zone process there are people living in the Zone that are a minority on 
the Zone Committee”.  
 When queried about the inclusion and influence of external interests, there was varied 
response.  This was to identify any external entities, and highlight any that played a 
significant role in the rule-making process.  ZC7 was unsure, “We’ve relied on local people 
representing all sorts of interests but have we talked to interested parties who live beyond 
Selwyn and Christchurch and Banks Peninsula?  I don’t know that we have, no”.  ZC1 
mentioned a few entities other than central government; Agresearch, DairyNZ and 
Landcare” and ZC3 thought, “Only the agricultural. Whatever you call them”.  Central 
government was again included by ZC6 who added, “central government has certainly had a 
role and they have put money in…” and LU1 thought, “obviously Central Government, if you 
see those as external, they certainly play a role”.   
Interviews revealed that external interests did not play a major role in the Zone outside of 
scientific input from consulting firms (most often locally based), an acknowledged role for 
central government, and input from the regional committee.  The inclusion of these interests 
and their impacts was beyond the time and scope of this thesis to explore fully.  ZC members 
seemed to downplay them, though, and so those outside interests’ roles could have varied.  
5.2.4 Monitoring  
When considering monitoring as a design principle, Ostrom’s criteria is not very strict.  When 
studying CPR institutions, Ostrom (1990) found that those with monitors who are 
accountable to the appropriators were present in successful CPR situations.  This section 
hopes to identify the monitoring, find out who is doing the monitoring, and then determine 
whether or not those monitors/auditors are accountable to the appropriators. There are 
several types of monitoring this section will consider:  First is the Lake health, second is the 
impact of the Lake openings and third is on a catchment level.  There is also mention of 
institutional monitoring within the Zone.  Much of the monitoring is undertaken by different 
entities, so those pertaining to the ZC and water quantity and quality remain the focus. 
Document Analysis 
Much of the documentation for official monitoring is available online from ECan’s website.  
Three examples of monitoring in the area are shown in Figures 18-20.  First is an 
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environmental example, second is the location of groundwater wells and third is an auditing-
type map of allocation zones in the region. 
 
Figure 18: Recreational Water Quality Map (Environment Canterbury, 2013c)  
 
Figure 19: Groundwater Quality Monitoring Wells (Environment Canterbury, 2013b) 
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Figure 20: Groundwater Allocation Zones (Environment Canterbury, 2013a)  
Also included online are reports from various experts in regards to water quality/quantity 
and lake levels.  The variety, detail, and availability of monitoring as it applies to Lake 
environmental health at the time of this thesis varied within the Zone and around the Lake.  
Local universities and a joint effort between the University of Canterbury and Lincoln 
University called the Waterways Centre, also contribute to the overall knowledge.  
However, upon a search for accountability of the monitors, there arises a major difference 
between the existing framework and Ostrom’s principles.  The Environment Canterbury 
(Temporary Commissioners and Improved Water Management Act 2010) (ECan Act) alters 
the accountability of the regional council (ECan) which does the majority of monitoring and 
auditing within the catchment.  As a result of the ECan Act, the monitors in this CPR are not 
held accountable by the appropriators.  The ECan Act reads, 
“The purpose of this Act is to provide for the replacement of the elected members of 
the Canterbury Regional Council with commissioners who will act as the Council’s 
governing body until new elected members come into office following the next 
election; and provide the Council with certain powers that it does not otherwise have 
to address issues relevant to the efficient, effective, and sustainable management of 
fresh water in the Canterbury Region” (ECan Act, 2010). 
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Currently, the commissioners are accountable only to their Ministerial appointers.  There is a 
case to be made, however, that the commissioners are better suited and/or more 
knowledgeable when it comes to water management within the region and,  
“The responsible Ministers must appoint commissioners who collectively have 
knowledge of, and expertise in relation to, the following matters: organisational 
change; and freshwater management; and local authority governance and 
management; and tikanga Maori, as it applies in the Canterbury region; and the 
Canterbury region and its people” (ECan Act, 2010). 
That being said, even assuming momentarily that the appointed commissioners do well by 
the people of Canterbury, they are still not accountable to the people that they are 
monitoring or auditing.  After all, “A commissioner vacates office if he or she is removed by 
written notice given by the responsible Minister; or resigns” (ECan Act, 2010) not by votes in 
the region.  And in fact, to lessen the accountability of the commissioners even more, the 
ECan Act says, “A commissioner is not liable for any act done or omitted to be done by him 
or her in good faith in the performance or intended performance of his or her functions, 
responsibilities, or duties as a commissioner” (ECan Act, 2010).  Until the commissioners 
have been replaced by elected officials within the CPR area, this principle cannot be said to 
exist in the current framework, despite any failures or effective work by those appointed.  It 
is also important to note that although the runanga members of the ZC are all accountable 
to their runanga, the other members of the ZC were appointed by the three local councils 
and it is a committee of the regional council, technically answerable only to the non-elected 
ECan commissioners.   However, the members of the ZC are almost all people who own or 
have property or live within the zone. 
It needs to be noted that all monitoring does not have to be specifically scientific and the ZC 
does play a role in politically monitoring the Water Executive at the regional level and with 
that, the implementation of the programmes (Selwyn-Waihora Zone Water Management 
Committee: Terms of reference, 2010).  This does not help to add to the accountability of 
ECan commissioners, but it does give the institutions involved a path to adaptive 
management in the future.  It also gives some accountability in relation to the institutions 
surrounding the Lake as a CPR, but not elsewhere. 
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Observations 
Observations of the accountability of the monitors echoed that of the document analysis.  
Existing scientific monitoring by councils was not questioned at meetings and appeared 
accepted as reliable and is freely accessible, however updating information on water takes 
was often recommended by interviewees as a voluntary decision for farmers.  Within the ZC, 
the issues revolved more around the limits being set and the actions that were to be taken 
to meet different monitoring goals.   
Interviews 
Most interviewees confirmed the responsibility for monitoring was ECan’s while 
acknowledging a couple of other groups (e.g. universities) who perform monitoring duties 
but do not have the ability to sanction. Comments on monitoring varied between the three 
main types.  Some interviewees talked exclusively about Lake environmental health, others 
on the opening, and others on a holistic catchment approach. ZC1 said, “ECan largely for the 
chemical and the water quality and quantity.  DoC largely, for the bird life and I’m not too 
sure, a combination of DoC and Fish and Game, probably Fish and Game for the exotic 
species.  And now there’s COMAR4 for cultural evaluations”.  Several others gave similar 
answers citing ECan; ZC5 said, “Yea, ECan is pretty much involved in that,” and EC6 perhaps 
summed it up most accurately, “ECan do most of the monitoring but there are other 
organizations that do bits and pieces”.  Some of those bits and pieces were handled by DoC, 
Fish and Game or The Ministry of Primary Industry, as previously noted, who did different 
monitoring toward fish or birdlife.  COMAR was mentioned twice as it is the cultural 
monitoring by the iwi of the Lake.  The possibility of non-Maori cultural relationships and 
associated monitoring indices were not mentioned. 
Some differences did appear, though, when prompted to speak on what the interviewees 
thought were the most important aspects of Lake monitoring.  It was left to the interviewees 
whether or not to include the catchment in their monitoring commentary.  ZC1 spoke about 
the chemical status as one major factor, “We need to know the chemical status of both the 
Lake and the inflows”.  Another interviewee, ZC6, thought that, “clearly the lake openings 
are critical to the Lake”.  ZC4 thought it a combination of the two previous comments, 
“Reduction, nutrient levels are the important one.  After that, it’s really about lake level”.   
LU1 wanted to base monitoring on outcomes, “Well I think you need to be aware of what 
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your desired outcomes are and once  you define those you need to make sure that you’ve 
got some indicators for each of those and you monitor those over time”.  EC1 looked 
holistically, “I think we have to be looking at a, a kind of a, a more ecosystem-health sort of 
approach to measuring the Lake”.  These all relate to either the ecosystem as a whole, or to 
the water quality and quantity.  No one mentioned flounder or some other individual species 
as the most important factor.  A holistic approach can be seen in the scenarios that target 
different TLIs or irrigation needs that are discussed with the limit-setting. 
Lacking in the monitoring was acknowledged by LU1 when speaking of the bird-life, “In 
terms of duck numbers, that’s a Fish and Game/Council responsibility, they would 
acknowledge they don’t do a very good job”5.  So too was recreation monitoring, which was 
also mentioned as being important by ZC7, “…the health of the Lake and the use of the Lake 
would be a really good thing to be measured for me.  That’s a really good indicator”.  
Another commented on recreation, ZC1, who said, “We have found it difficult to get good 
numbers on recreational usage”.   
5.2.5 Graduated sanctions 
Penalties and sanctions were analysed to gauge their progressivity, harshness, or lack 
thereof and also for the accountability of those who apply the sanctions.  The relationship 
between those who carry out the sanctions and those who can alter them was also of note.  
The presence of graduated sanctions was mentioned by several interviewees as it pertained 
to water quantity but was not as strict when it came to water quality, as is discussed below.  
Again, fisheries were mentioned for contrast but the thesis focus remains on quantity and 
quality of water.  The sanctions for those individual CPRs like the trout fishery or the eel 
fishery have separate sanctions not directly part of the sanctions surrounding water quality 
and quantity in the Zone.  
Document Analysis 
Monitoring and sanctioning water use in Canterbury is done through resource consents and 
Environmental Protection Officers through ECan.  Figure 21 shows the types of infractions 
against those consents and the consequences associated with each. 
The different actions allow for not just graduated sanctions for severity but also for repeat 
offenders, which may cause a jump in a grade.  The first warning is also very minimal if the 
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offense is not a large environmental threat.  The sanctions also allow leeway for smaller 
infractions. 
 
Figure 21(a): Non-Compliance Description and Associated Sanctions (Environment 
Canterbury, 2009)  
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Figure 21(b): Non-Compliance Description and Associated Sanctions (Environment 
Canterbury, 2009) 
Observations 
ZC observations in this case were minimal.  Although there was talk about water quality in 
the form of TLI limits and also of land use surrounding different scenarios, there was little 
discussion surrounding the actual sanctions.  There was one meeting where water 
allocations were discussed but this focused more on trading those rights and not on the 
breaches of consent.  Of much more import were the interviews, discussed below, where 
direct questions about the monitoring could be asked. 
Interviews 
Existing penalties were described by ZC2, “When people don’t conform with us, we’ve got a 
whole series of steps as to, how we will handle that; notices, talking to people and so on.  
But at the bottom of that list is if people insist on not following the rules, we’ll take them to 
court”.  In terms of water allocation and quantity, ZC6 said, “The first one’s really just, what’s 
going on? Second one’s like, hang on, you’ve got a problem and you haven’t fixed it.  After 
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that you can be fined, for another breach, and then if you have, I believe that you have the 
ability to lose your consent”.  ZC1 discussed the current water abstraction rules, “Well, 
progress is sometimes very sudden.  If a person is not complying with the conditions of their 
resource consent, they can just have their well shut down”. 
Also discussed were the different entities that enforced different sanctions for different 
aspects of the CPR.  LU1 gave a couple of examples, “If it’s a fisheries matter, nothing to do 
with the Zone Committee,” and later, “If it’s a wildlife matter then it falls under the 
Conservation Act and DoC, Fish and Game would deal with that” furthermore, “the Zone has 
a goal but there is another agency that would seek to implement through both compliance, 
law enforcement, habitat management and the like”.  ZC4 had more to say on fisheries, 
“fisheries management is absolutely hammered if you go over your quota.  So there’ll be 
major fines, loss of vehicles, loss of quota…” Although the ZC is determining much of the 
water quantity and quality recommendations, ECan does not carry out much of the wildlife 
and fisheries monitoring or sanctions.  Those types of sanctions were outside the scope of 
this thesis.   
ECan fell under some criticism for some non-sanctioning incidents.  ZC7 felt, “Well I guess a 
frustration for me is the lack of prosecution of blatant abuses of the rules”.  EC2 described 
the controversy surrounding a local location near the Lake where, “It’s acknowledged it’s 
non-compliant but ECan’s too scared to do anything about it because it’s a group of, 
consortium of farmers who take advantage of [ECan’s reluctance to prosecute]. A similar 
thought was expressed by ZC8, “Yea ECan, I’m not being critical it’s just the way they 
operated, that were aware, did nothing virtually very early on”.  One interviewee, EC1, made 
a comment in defence of ECan’s work, “An agency like ours always tries to take a very, take a 
measured approach and tries to be as effective as it possibly can.  In other words it’s not like 
a, you know, all of them have to be prosecuted if someone breaks a rule” and went on, 
“there is certainly a perception that the law is kind of uphill, not necessarily in a completely 
uniform sort of way.  I think it’s a perception rather than a reality, we apply the same tests to 
everybody whether we prosecute them or not”.   It was also mentioned that monitoring 
requires funding and so some monetary barriers may play a role.  It is important to note that 
ECan does not prosecute every case and it is to their discretion whether they do or do not.   
A few people commented on how things should or could be done in the future. These 
comments were helpful as the observations revealed little on this topic.  ZC8 felt attitude 
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was important, “they actually need a change of attitude of people.  You can’t have a lot of 
inspectors running around checking on them, it’s actually getting people’s mind changed”.  
ZC5 said, “And I guess the consequences, there needs to be some sort of penalty or fines or 
whatever”.  ZC1 had a more in-depth answer,  “I guess it’s been an attitude of the Zone 
Committee, which I endorse, that you always try to work with the people first and it’s only if 
there’s an unwillingness to comply after things have been explained, that you have to go 
from the carrot to the stick”.  They went on, “And again, the direction we’re headed in now 
is to encourage things like audited self-management… But then that has to be to an agreed 
set of rules and it has to be audited by independent and capable auditors”.  After describing 
the sanctions surrounding water quantity, ZC6 said, “in the future, I would imagine that 
there will be similar constraints around nutrients.  That you’ll live within caps and limits…”  
Until the final sub-regional chapter is submitted via the ZC, it is difficult to predict exactly 
where the future compliance and monitoring scheme will differ from the previous set of 
rules.  As of this thesis, the approach to enforcing compliance with maintaining any specified 
water quality and quantity requirements was to use graduated sanctions, although it 
seemed some situations were treated differently than others.  
5.2.6 Conflict-resolution mechanisms  
Quick access to a local forum as a means of conflict-resolution is an important principle in 
Ostrom’s work.  Or, better yet,  “Although the presence of conflict-resolution mechanisms 
does not guarantee that appropriators will be able to maintain enduring institutions, it is 
difficult to imagine how any complex system of rules could be maintained over time without 
such mechanisms” (Ostrom, 1990, p. 101).  The type of conflict-resolution is not specific in 
Ostrom’s work, although she does mention that, “the potential for conflict over a very scarce 
resource is so high that well-developed court mechanisms have been in place for 
centuries”(1990, p. 101).   Because of this lack of specificity, it is difficult to tell what, exactly, 
Ostrom would prefer.  One word does stand out somewhat: ‘local’.  The idea of a local forum 
for conflict resolution is an important one to Ostrom and also to the ZC.   
Document Analysis 
The ZC’s preferred style of conflict resolution can be seen in the ZIP, where it states, “The 
Zone Committee operates through a collaborative consensus approach and reflects the 
agreed commitment by all members to seek the outcomes outlined in this ZIP.” And 
furthermore, “It was agreed that the whole committee would address nutrient limit setting 
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due to the complexity and importance of this strand of work” (SWZIP pg. 7, 2011).  These 
types of collaborative governance strategies, however, are not always present.  Currently, 
they exist to solve issues in the zone and will again in the future.  They do not offer a day-to-
day solution for conflict resolution.  
To help achieve these goals of collaboration, the ZC implemented Decision Cards that could 
be placed in different categories depending on the ZC’s level of agreement.  These 
categories were as follows: Decision area/element must be included and is acceptable as 
described in Strawman 1; …must be included but more discussion/information required; … 
possibly should be included but a lot more discussion/information required; …should NOT be 
included but more information and/or discussion needed; …must NOT be included. Topics for 
Decision Cards would be issues that target the ZIP outcomes.  These topics ranged from 
‘Managed Recharge of water to Groundwater for environmental benefit’ to ‘Water Storage’ 
and ‘Protection of wahi tapu and wahi taonga sites’, to name a few.  ZC members would 
offer their view on the topic and then categorize them as discussed.  In this way, topics that 
were agreed upon could be approved and set-aside and more difficult issues could be 
singled out and focused on in later meetings.   
The courts (adjudication) are seen in the CWMS as a last resort in most cases and it would be 
difficult to consider them ‘local’.  The CWMS even states, “allocation decisions will be 
resolved in most cases without resorting to the courts” (CWMS, 2009).  Although non-
statutory, this bullet point in the CWMS alludes to conflict resolution strategies within the 
region. 
Observations 
There was an overall clash of views on the ZC based mainly on the split between those who 
were involved with farming (most often dairying) and those who were recognized as tangata 
whenua and in effect, a part of Ngai Tahu.  It is notable that Ngai Tahu does have some 
holdings in dairy and owns farms, but their identification on the committee was mainly as 
tangata whenua first, then other considerations (whatever the topic may have been) second. 
The seating arrangement also echoed this ideological split, as runanga representatives most 
often all sat on one side of the table, across from the other ZC members.   Some members 
would also go as far as to categorize the Committee by saying, ‘on this side of the table’.   It 
is however, important to note that these types of splits happened within the ZC, highlighting 
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it as a forum for disputes. Within these disputes and discussions, several tactics were used to 
solve issues and reach consensus. 
Along with the previously mentioned Decision Cards, a ‘blue card’ was implemented by the 
Facilitator and handed out to all members of the ZC, including public observers.  The blue 
card represented an ad-hominid argument or disagreement which could be taken personally 
or was found to be culturally offensive.  The card could be implemented in a ‘Time Out’ sort 
of way to cool the situation and remind the committee of their previously agreed upon 
cooperative approach.  Confrontations that required the use of the blue-card were often left 
to be discussed later during in-committee time or would be circled back to in a later 
meeting.  The blue card, although rarely used, was a good way to tell a Committee member 
that they were ‘toeing the line’ on an issue, whether they knew it or not.   
One example of the blue card was the discussion of the use of alum in the Lake to help 
neutralize phosphorus loads.  The idea was discussed within ECan before it was brought to 
the runanga and brought up in a public ZC meeting.  In doing so, the runanga representatives 
were very frustrated that they had not been consulted first (as owners of the Lake bed) and 
refused to talk about the topic until it had been discussed amongst the runanga.  The 
episode seemed a backward, or at least a side-step away from what had been a good build-
up of relations in the previous couple of months at the Committee meetings.  This was the 
most intense disagreement during the observational period and yet did not seem to cause 
much damage to the process of deciding load limits; it only delayed the discussion on in-lake 
mitigations. Where Pakeha could have a full discussion at the ZC table, runanga 
representatives often had to withdraw to their specific groups to discuss first, then return to 
the ZC table.   
Often, at least half of the meetings were spent educating members on different industries, 
scientific data, or other issues that they were lacking in expertise.  A presentation by Donald 
Couch on kaitiakitanga was timely, but it was surprising to see this concept not understood 
by others so late in the Zone process.  There were also presentations done by various 
industries at that same meeting, at the Wairewa Marae.  Also, there was considerable time 
spent discussing the TLI or options that were not obviously viable.  It seemed they were 
going through the motions on some of these issues just to cover them when it was obvious 
well before the end of the discussion, that the scenario in question was not the solution. 
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In the June 5th ZC meeting, in-committee time was requested and approved for after the 
normal meeting hours.  During in-committee time the public was asked to leave and the ZC 
would apparently have arguments or discussions on their own.  Toward the end of the 
observation period, this private time was worked into the meeting agendas so that the 
observational period was much shorter.  It is unclear exactly what was discussed during 
these times but it was apparent the ZC preferred them for the more difficult issues.  It is also 
unclear what type of conflict-resolution was used during these private meetings. 
Interviews 
The questions pertaining to this topic were designed to find whether the forum for 
resolution was the ZC, somewhere else, or at the least, if in fact it did exist and most 
importantly, if it was effective.  There were also a range of answers from the interviewees 
about the major disagreements surrounding the Lake. 
 Interviewees discussed the larger conflicts ranging from TLI to cultural history and 
commented on what appeared from observation to be ‘disagreements’, or as ZC6 said, “I 
don’t know if you’d call it… [disagreements] I think people disagree.  I think it’s a matter of 
the extent to which they believe something”.  Belief and world-view, as discussed before, 
play a large role in this resolution process as most issues stem from those cultural beliefs.  
ZC1 spoke to this belief and world-view difference, “probably the major community 
disagreement is between those whose conservation interests tend toward the preservation 
end of things and others whose development interests tend towards maximum profit at any 
cost to the environment”.  On the cultural front, ZC1 also added, “But the point of view of 
iwi, Ngai Tahu in particular, is that resources are things which have their own mauri, spirit, 
life essence… whereas resource management in the Pakeha sense is more about this balance 
between ecosystem health and development opportunity”.  ZC5 thought that of most 
importance was, “The alum and the opening” although also brought up cultural beliefs, 
“Well I think there are a lot of cultural issues that haven’t yet been resolved”.  The cultural 
theme was brought up repeatedly by different interviewees.  ZC3 drew similar figurative 
lines across the table as the physical seating arrangement in the ZC meetings; 
“Maori/Pakeha, Maori/Farmer, Maori versus farmer”. Whether the interviewee was 
including all Maori in his assessment or just the involved tangata whenua was unclear.  ZC8 
had a similar view, “Ngai Tahu obviously are very strong that their view is the only view and 
that’s what we should do or not”. One interviewee, a Maori, put it bluntly, “You know I 
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would automatically talk back in the Maori sense; they’re crapping [i.e., ‘defecating’] all over 
our whakapapa [family lineage]”. 
Aside from the cultural and world-view differences, there were a few more science-oriented 
answers.   LU1 said, “Well the Lake Opening regime is probably, in my view, issue one, two 
and three… I guess the second biggest issue is around water quality in the Lake… If there was 
a third one, it’s probably the need for and how to manage the restoration of the macrophyte 
beds in the Lake”.  Second, EC1 mentioned, “Well historically it’s been about whether you 
manage it as a fishery or do you manage it as a drainage system”.  Another similar response 
came from  ZC2 who said, “… the crunch thing, I think, the real differences will be, what is 
doing most of the, what is contributing most to the degradation of the Lake and what are we 
going to do about it?”   
Asked next to explain the forum for resolving such disputes and whether or not it had been 
successful, answers varied.  ZC1 had this to say, “So they’re not fully resolved.  How should 
they, will they be resolved? I think that’s up to leadership”.  ZC2 separated different topics 
from one another, “the whole Ngai Tahu, Waihora Management Board, Whakaora, all of 
those things are in one bag. …The other one about nutrients, setting limits, that’s really 
tough”.  ZC8 also saw different locations for resolution, “Well I think you’ve got the Zone 
Committee doing some, you’ve got the co-governance agreement with ECan and Ngai Tahu 
and I think in the end we will get up to a workable scheme that people will agree with”.  
“Not really,” said ZC3 plainly, as to whether things had been resolved.  ZC7 agreed, “No it 
[forum for disputes] hasn’t been discussed”.  
EC1 and LU1 both said that the ZC was a focus for airing disagreements and resolving them, 
LU1 said, “I would say most of those issues have been discussed through the ZIP or the 
CWMS” but went on to separate other topics out, too, “I don’t think the management 
regime, per se, in terms of Ngai Tahu and ECan is really being discussed in that (ZC) forum. 
That’s sort of a governance decision at the highest level… the community’s probably starting 
to get some feelings of being disenfranchised”.   EC1 said, “I think the Zone has been the 
forum for that, it’s probably the best forum for all of these debates, actually”.  Those who 
were not on the ZC seemed to think the ZC was the best place, as was exhibited by EC1 and 
LU1, while those on the ZC felt that issues were split as to where they were being worked on 
to be resolved. 
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5.2.7 Minimal recognition of rights to organize  
In an effort to find whether or not there was recognition of the rights to organize, it was 
pertinent to ask whether or not the recommendations put forward by the ZC would even be 
accepted by regional government.   If the Focus Groups and ZC reach a consensus and put 
forth a community-driven set of recommendations to the regional council, if it is not 
accepted then the efforts of the inclusions of all these groups would be for naught.  They 
would also not fit Ostrom’s principle of the rights to organize.   
Document Analysis 
Without full approval from the ECan commissioners over the recommendations forthcoming 
from the ZIP, documents can only show their written intent.  One example is in the ZIP, 
where “The Implementation Programmes, although not statutory, provide a very clear 
pathway, expectation and commitment for the programmes to be implemented and 
resourced as proposed” (SWZIP, 2011, p. 7). This quote suggests the ZIP will be followed by 
other authorities when complete.  The CWMS also suggests the same, “Existing powers 
and/or new legislation will be used to ensure the implementation programmes are given 
appropriate legal status under the LGA and the RMA, and effectively provide a link between 
the two Acts” (CWMS, 2011, p. 15). The acceptance and inclusion of the ZIPs and RIP within 
statutory regional plans seems to be encouraged through these documents. 
Observations 
Observations within the ZC concerning the expectation of acceptance of the ZIP were based 
mainly on three events/moments.  The first involved ECan Commissioner Caygill’s somewhat 
emotional and seemingly genuine appreciation speech to the ZC, commending them on their 
work and encouraging them forward during the difficult-to-solve limit-setting process.  This 
suggested a willingness to support the Zone’s recommendations.  The second was the 
acceptance by the Selwyn District Council of the ZIP, which it will implement as long as funds 
are available.  The last, which is common amongst all ZCs, is the presence of an ECan 
commissioner, in this case, Donald Couch, on the Selwyn/Waihora ZC.  The involvement of 
the commissioner provides incentive for approval and clarification on challenging issues.  It is 
highly unlikely the ZC would put forward something that its resident commissioner thought 
was bound to be turned down by ECan.  This also begs the question of whether or not 
central government is allowing the community the rights to organize, considering they have 
stepped in with the appointed commissioners. 
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Interviews 
When asked, interviewees mostly felt that the majority of the ZIP would be accepted with 
some small alterations depending on funding and regional scale issues. ZC3 said about the 
recommendations, “well they’ll go through the CWMS in ECan I’m not sure how much 
policing they’ll get.  It’s not something that the general public can see”.  Again, ZC7 echoed 
the main feeling of the interviews, “So we’ll make a recommendation to the Commissioners 
and there’s absolutely no guarantee that they will, that they will put in place what we’ve 
recommended.  And I don’t expect that it’ll be exactly as we recommend it, but how much of 
it is?”  From ZC8, referring to the recommendation’s acceptance, “They will have to be, yea”.  
ZC6 mentioned the weight of the ZIP recommendations, “Yea.  So much so that it scares me.  
Because, you know it’s a huge responsibility for a bunch of people who are not qualified 
planners.  To be putting into place recommendations that will be written into a regulatory 
framework”.  EC2 said, “If the central government through the regional, don’t take parts of it 
well, what the hell have we been doing the last three years?  It’s a monumental waste of 
time”.  ZC2 summed it up, “I think by and large they’ll be supported.  If there’s something 
that’s really just not possible, then, you know, there’ll be some questions”. 
5.2.8 Nested enterprises  
Nesting, according to Ostrom, is included only for CPRs of a larger size, which is why it is 
included on this list.  Subsidiarity is a major principle when designing and reviewing nested 
systems, and so some, not all of the management of the Lake can fall under this style of 
management.  Earlier questions regarding central government’s involvement touch on this 
subject, as well as on commentary surrounding a topic that distorted the nesting within the 
Zone; co-governance.   
Document Analysis 
The CWMS describes the nesting of the process best, “Planning activities will be carried out 
in a ‘nested’ zone/regional/national level for consideration while ensuring coherence 
between the levels” (CWMS, 2011 p. 15).  Figure 22 also describes the arrangements in two 
presentation slides that discuss nesting in governance (B. Jenkins, personal communication, 
2013).   
These slides also allude to a shift in the governance of the region to a more collaborative, 
nested style. This is supported by the wording of the documents establishing relationships 
between Ngai Tahu and the regional council (e.g. Whakaora Te Waihora). Co-governance, 
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and the associated agreements, is part of that nesting, done at a higher level than the more 
operational level of the ZC. 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Presentation Slides from: Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere: A hidden treasure on our 
doorstep (B. Jenkins, personal communication, 2013)  
Observations 
Observations during the ZC concerning nesting were limited.  Occasional clarification of the 
statutory nature and implementation of different programmes was provided by ECan.  A 
sense of equality amongst ZC and the regional zone committee was present.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Material removed due to copyright compliance 
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Interviews 
Interviews on nested governance touched on two major topics; central government and co-
governance within the Zone.  ZC2 mentioned central government in a more opinionated 
way, “there’s a view that government departments in Wellington want to run things all the 
time.  Fair amount of truth in that.  But in the case of Waihora, and I’ve been involved with 
some of the discussion about… …the Ministry for the Environment, they’ve been pretty 
supportive, actually”.  EC1 also commented, “government is well-represented, whether the 
government plays, plays the sort of role it should play in this sort of thing is another matter”.  
Comments surrounding central government’s involvement involve the idea of nested 
governance.  In a nested system, subsidiarity would warrant an issue be dealt with on the 
smallest effective scale possible.  For example, central government is not deciding the details 
over the lake opening.   There is a role for central government to play especially when it 
comes to funding, support, and recognition of recommendations but it should not be their 
role in a nested system to micro-manage, at least inside of the ZC.   
Several comments were made about nesting indirectly, through the views and functions of 
co-governance within the Zone.  Although ZC1 thought the agreements to be a help, they 
also said, “On the positive side, I see that it has obliged people to look at those other points 
of view very carefully and see that as a positive thing.  On the other hand, like cheese, good 
things take time”.  EC1 said that, “Co-governance is kind of yet to be proven,” and 
continued, “There’s that interesting kind of interaction between co-governance and the 
CWMS and the ZC that hasn’t really been tested yet”.  ZC2 said simply, “I think its early 
days,” and ZC6 added, “I think as time goes by they may be a help, but there may be a period 
where they’re viewed with suspicion by general public”.  ZC8 was vague, “I wouldn’t say 
they’ve been a hindrance,” and ZC3 didn’t see much impact at all, “I think it’s business as 
usual and over time it will just slide into significance”.  LU1 said, “At that time, they were 
necessary, absolutely necessary, so from that perspective they are good.  But I’m not sure 
they’ve been implemented in an integrated sort of way as they could be”.   
Two comments from opposite sides of the spectrum help to frame the impact of co-
governance on nested systems the best.  It was ZC4, who said, “I think at this point they’re a 
hindrance,” and explained their point, “They provide, I, to me, very negatively.  Because I 
sort of believe right from the beginning that there were two tiers.  So we could sit at a table 
and have a discussion, and I always felt I could win a debate at the table, knowing that the 
folk could get up from the other side of the table and go back up at that level, go up three 
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tiers, and say, actually, this is what we’re going to do anyway”.  On the contrary, EC2, 
mentioned a longer-term goal for the co-governance agreements, “in my mind I hope it 
personally it leads to more Maori seats on the… ECan.  Now we can actually be a part of the 
policy making process”.  
5.3 Conclusion 
Results varied depending on the principle in question, though the different types of results 
(e.g. document analysis, observations, interviews) did not always align. One example was the 
principle for clearly defined boundaries. After document review and observations, the 
boundaries did not look to be defined for much of the CPR in question. There were three or 
more different maps showing the catchment and changing physical boundaries relating to 
the Lake. It was through the interviews that it was revealed the ZC members and others (e.g. 
iwi, researchers) all had a shared understanding of the boundaries. This result speaks to 
understanding each principle through the various lenses of the research to create a more 
informed output. No single result can work to define the presence or lack of a principle. 
Interviewees, though not necessarily familiar with Ostrom, had an understanding of the 
principles in question even though they were not asked directly; some via their experiences 
monitoring, some via policy and some via opinion and local government involvement. 
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Chapter 6 - Discussion  
This Chapter presents a discussion of the results from the previous Chapter within the 
context of the theoretical literature reviewed in Chapter 2.  In particular, the findings in 
relation to each of the Ostrom’s Principles are drawn together in a discussion of community 
empowerment, the role of effective practical operational procedures, and the difficult 
nature of the challenges faced in this particular catchment.   
The impacts of the Treaty cannot be emphasized enough in this thesis.  Within New Zealand, 
the Treaty is a founding document and has a set aside holiday to recognize its historical 
signing.  It is clear from the interviews that to analyse any type of resource management in 
New Zealand without considering the Treaty would leave much unexplored and not 
understood.  Aside from the Treaty, its manifestations of the Settlement Act and both co-
governance/management agreements play a major role surrounding the management of 
Lake Ellesmere, and are discussed as appropriate relating to the following topics.  
Without input from various members of the Zone Committee who may have been absent by 
not having a specific seat on the ZC, there is a chance some groups could miss out on certain 
conversations or chances to be heard. 
 This issue poses questions about the jurisdiction of those at the bottom of the catchment 
and the extrapolation of their involvement and decision making abilities up the catchment to 
areas where they do not live or where they do not have a history.  It may be that these 
abilities are enhanced because of location specifically, or potentially because of the Treaty 
and iwi recognition.  It is unclear whether these should be viable reasons to have an 
enhanced role in the management of the Lake.  
6.1 Ostrom’s Design Principles Discussion 
The principles used from the literature (discussed in Chapter 3) provide a context to examine 
the existing framework surrounding the governance of Lake Ellesmere and provide a 
background with which to answer the research questions. First, the principles are discussed 
and later, other research questions are explored. As has been found by others in relation to 
this Lake (e.g., Varona 2013), it was difficult to represent the entirety of the community 
surrounding the Lake given the uncertain nature of both biophysical, political and social 
boundaries, making it difficult to gain a sense of exactly who comprises ‘the community’ in 
relation to the CPR.  
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6.1.1 Clearly Defined Boundaries 
Overall, the political and physical boundaries were believed to be effective and close enough 
to the existing catchment boundaries to warrant no large complaints about free riders or the 
wrong area being managed.  The small difference between the political boundaries and 
groundwater/surface water was not seen as a problem (see Figure 7 and Figure 10).  There 
was an overall acceptance that people just dealt with those slight differences in a way that 
did not negatively affect the management process. 
In terms of a clearly defined boundary as described by Ostrom, this situation shows that it is 
not always necessary to have one clearly defined boundary to manage a CPR.  In this case, 
political boundaries varied, physical boundaries like groundwater could change slightly over 
time, and appropriators might move in or out of the Zone.  Ostrom writes that, “So long as 
the boundaries of the resource remain uncertain, no one knows what is being managed or 
for whom” (1990, p. 91).  In this case, there was no doubt as to what was being managed 
(e.g. water quality and quantity) and that it was being managed for not only those within the 
Zone but also anyone who may use the Lake as a CPR. 
For Lake Ellesmere, because it can delineate the what and who, the exact (clearly defined) 
boundary of the CPR may not be necessary. This does not, however, make the boundaries 
uncertain.   It would be a stretch to consider a CPR with close to five different boundaries 
surrounding it as ‘clearly defined’.  Through the mixture of boundaries, especially as it 
applies to the ZC and water quality and quantity, the ability of, “some set of appropriators 
must (be able) to exclude others from access and appropriation rights” (Ostrom, 1990) is still 
intact.  Although the multiple boundaries of the Lake as a CPR cannot necessarily be 
considered ‘clearly defined’, they can be described as ‘agreed and understood’.  This 
agreement and understanding from those interviewed (not necessarily everyone who uses 
the CPR) of the boundaries allows for the likely successful management of the CPR. 
6.1.2 Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local 
conditions 
There certainly appeared to be enough information on the unique aspects of the CPR to 
have congruent rules about provisions.  However, it is not enough, according to Ostrom 
(1990), to have the information; it must be used in the correct way.   
Current rules have been designed based on then-available information on the local 
conditions. Some rules have become outdated or new knowledge has called them into 
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question, like concerns over social and physical changes in the catchment. But a major 
reason for even having the ZC is to help solve these issues in light of current knowledge and 
expectations.  For example, if additional irrigation is needed, or more water is added to the 
catchment, the rules may change.  Based on the interviews and observations from the 
document analysis, considerable effort is being put into trying to attain congruence between 
the local conditions and the appropriation and provision rules moving forward.  The key 
decisions, however, were not made by the end of this research period.  
6.1.3 Collective Choice Arrangements 
The overall theme of this principle was that the opportunity existed for most to participate 
and play a role in altering the operational rules of the CPR, albeit some had much more 
involvement than others.  The range of those involved with the CPR is not in question; it is 
the amount of involvement and more importantly, the weight given to certain groups within 
that public that has been shown to be a concern.  In this way, participation through Focus 
Groups or ZC presentations may be present, but the effect of that participation could vary, 
possibly acting to ruin the collective-choice arrangement that is seen by Ostrom to allow, 
“individuals who directly interact with one another and with the physical world (to) modify 
the rules over time so as to better fit them to the specific characteristics of their setting” 
(Ostrom, 1990, p. 93).   
One of the possible explanations for this uneven participation is offered in Ostrom’s work, 
“None of these situations involves participants who vary greatly in regard to ownership of 
assets, skills, knowledge, ethnicity, race, or other variables that could strongly divide a group 
of individuals” (Ostrom, 1990, p. 93).  Clearly, this is not the case for the Zone process and 
heterogeneity of the group members could work to alter the participation input in favor of 
larger, more robust institutions and interests.  Most of those attributes vary amongst Focus 
Group Stakeholders and even within the ZC.   
The Treaty plays an interesting role in the discussion surrounding who is involved with the 
management of the Lake and its catchment and how much power those interests have.  It 
does play a part in altering that relationship.  On the one hand, the Treaty helps to include 
Maori and/or tangata whenua beliefs and interests, but it also elevates their status above 
other citizens when plans and policies are developed under the Treaty.  The tangata whenua 
have a much stronger say than any other group because they have six specific seats at the ZC 
table as well as co-governance agreements with DoC and ECan.  No other interest has such a 
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direct influence.  Some may argue that Dairy plays a prominent role, and that is not being 
denied here, but Dairy interests do not have specific seats at the ZC table, even if some 
members are dairy farmers. Six specific dairy seats on the ZC could surely cause community 
uproar.  The ZC, outside of the runanga representatives and elected officials, are there first 
as individuals.  For example, there is no Treaty agreement for recreational users or for 
families who have lived around the area for generations.  Those who may use the Lake very 
often and are part of the CPR community in a different way, must act through Focus Groups 
or hope that someone on the ZC can pass along their views (including the tangata whenua, if 
such is the case).  In this way, the Treaty causes disruption in the balance of interests within 
the ZC in a way that could inhibit collective-choice. 
As well as including the public, the ZC tried to include its own members in the rule-
recommendation discussions.  To ignore a member or to overwhelm another’s position 
would jeopardize the collective-choice arrangement between CPR appropriators because it 
would effectively leave out their point of view or input.  It is impossible to include every 
possible interest in the process but if the actual rule-making is hijacked by one group, then 
the collective-choice arrangement fails, and so too would Ostrom’s principle of collective-
choice because ‘most’ people affected by the rules would not be working to alter them.  
Ostrom does use the term ‘most individuals’ and not ‘all’ but surely one group dominating 
others would not fit for this principle.  
At first glance, this may seem enough to void the presence of the principle within this CPR.  
However, just because Ostrom’s (1990) work surrounding her principles does not include a 
CPR with such a conglomeration of different interests does not mean this principle is 
automatically void.  And it even seems that this is not the case, as the collaborative 
governance design has given a range of participants from large dairy interests and local 
runanga to recreational users and rural women a chance to have their voice heard and taken 
into account.  Ostrom’s (1990) principle requires there be a way for most individuals to 
participate, and in this case, that way or opportunity does exist.  Granted, there are no rural 
men or urban women stakeholder group, so those interests either have been assumed to 
exist in other representations or were left out of the stakeholder groups.  However, as long 
as runanga interests do not drown out others due to their advantageous Treaty 
arrangements surrounding natural resources, collective choice is still possible.   
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6.1.4 Monitoring 
The comments about a lack of monitoring focused on secondary issues to the Lake like 
birdlife and fisheries but also on larger-scale considerations at the catchment level.  The 
focus on water quality and quantity in the Lake and catchment for this thesis also matches 
the focus of the institutions that monitor those same topics and who provided excellent 
data.  Calls for more holistic monitoring and monitoring based on possible recreation days 
may be beneficial to the management of the Lake.  They have been included in this analysis 
for future zone committee work or general consideration.  Although the monitoring of the 
Water Executive, statutory agencies responsible for quality and quantity of water, does add 
some accountability to the institutional arrangement, it does not fully satisfy the principle. 
While water seems reasonably well monitored in terms of quality it is not so well for 
quantity (the government has recently introduced regulations requiring all irrigation water 
takes to be real time reported to regional councils using telemetry and automatic, tamper 
proof recorders on consented takes), also more holistic measures of the quality of the Lake 
and the stress and pressures on it are not well monitored, including the actual numbers and 
types of users. 
The monitoring of the environmental aspects pertaining to the Lake opening seemed to be 
effective and it was clear who carried them out.  It was also clear that as long as ECan 
remains under the control of appointed commissioners, their accountability to those 
appropriators within the catchment is too indirect to be considered as fulfilling the principle.  
For some issues there may be voluntary monitoring in which case, the principle could be 
fulfilled, but this is not the case for the major issues in the catchment.  When elections are 
held again at the regional level, accountability can return and with it, the fulfilment of this 
design principle.   
6.1.5 Graduated Sanctions 
As a principle of long enduring CPRs, this is only partially complete within the management 
of the Lake.  On the one hand, there are graduated sanctions pertaining to water quantity 
that increase with the intensity of the breach or infraction.  On the other, like the monitors, 
those who apply the sanctions are not accountable to the people they are sanctioning.  In its 
current iteration, the sanctioning also leaves space open for interpretation which, as 
highlighted by the interviews, can cause variation in the decision of ECan to take someone to 
court.   
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In the examples used in Governing the Commons, “In these robust institutions, monitoring 
and sanctioning are undertaken not by external authorities but by the participants 
themselves” (Ostrom, 1990, p. 94).  When compared to this ideal, the sanctioning within the 
Zone is still not there.  There is not an external authority per se, as ECan has not been 
considered external at any point in this thesis but ECan can also not be considered an 
appropriator or an official that is accountable to the appropriators.  The Environment Court 
though, where some sanctions may end up, can be considered external.  
The principle requires merely an either/or of appropriators-as-monitors or monitors who are 
accountable to the appropriators.  The former is less likely, although the public can alert 
ECan to possible breaches of consents.  The latter can be solved by implementing elections 
for the ECan commissioners.  At present however, this principle is only partially fulfilled. 
6.1.6 Conflict-resolution mechanisms 
There are several main conclusions from the analysis that can be highlighted.   
Although The Treaty plays a role in almost every aspect of New Zealand and especially that 
of resource management in Canterbury, of special note is the relationship that the Treaty 
manifestations of co-governance and co-management had with two principles: Collective-
Choice Arrangements and Conflict Resolution Mechanisms.  It is within these sections that 
the impact of those agreements has been the most significant and so will be discussed, 
respectively, there, and not in the following “Broad Treaty Implications” section.  
First, cultural disagreements were more difficult to resolve than strategic or scientific 
agreements, although they are a necessary part of the collaborative process.   
Second, the ZC was as much an informative and educational experience as it was a decision-
making and conflict management forum.  Agendas often included large amounts of detailed 
scientific information that was originally reviewed during ZC meeting time but was later 
asked to be read beforehand.  In the interest of time, this was often problematic for conflict 
resolution issues requiring more time and thorough discussion. 
Third, the in-committee time stands out as a major point of interest.  What topics would the 
public not be in a place to hear or what disagreements should the public not witness?  What 
are the benefits of in-committee time for the committee?  Most importantly, how effective 
is this time as a conflict-resolution forum or a place for decisions?  What kind of conflict 
resolution is being used and is it still collaborative?  As the ZC meetings went on, more 
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private time was called for until it was a built-in part of the meetings that did not exist in 
earlier agendas. This may aid conflict resolution but the increasing lack of transparency 
starts to bring into question the ability of the community to independently monitor decision-
making processes and hence the legitimacy of the decisions may be lessened. 
The presence and persistence of the ZC within the CWMS (which hopes to solve issues out of 
the courts) and into the future provides appropriators with a forum for collaborative 
conflict-resolution. It brings together different interests in a setting where they must reach 
consensus in a collaborative, cooperative style of conflict management.  Cooperation 
requires recognizing, “the concerns of disputing parties as components in their common 
interest.  Rather than just examining the facts of the current dispute considerable effort is 
spent in learning the underlying basis of the conflict” (Jenkins, 1983, p. 61).   
The blue card, as used in the ZC, is a tool for better understanding.  To add even more 
confirmation of the committee’s actions towards cooperative conflict resolution is the effort 
spent discussing cultural ideals and social goals surrounding the issues that at times slowed 
down the process.  Jenkins (1983, p. 61) writes, “A broader analysis of the social system in 
which the conflicting parties are a part, is made in the interest of the basic resolution of the 
forces in conflict or of some system value such as growth or stability”.  
The ZC as a forum however, is not as focused as some of the examples in Ostrom’s work 
where small, singular disputes could be resolved on a local level.  These smaller disputes (or 
more difficult ones) could still, if necessary, make their way to external adjudication, the 
Environment Court, an example of conflict resolution that is not consistent with 
collaborative governance (Jenkins, 1983) or with Ostrom’s localized forum. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, the CWMS states, “allocation decisions will be resolved in most cases without 
resorting to the courts” ("Canterbury Water Management Strategy," 2011, p. 6). However, as 
was the feeling by at least one interviewee, there are times when free-riders (e.g. non-
compliant resource users) are not taken to court. The exact reason for this specific case was 
outside the scope of this thesis. However, if this perception is wide-spread, it may act to hurt 
the legitimacy of a management scheme even if the goal of the CWMS is to avoid external 
adjudication, encouraging local solutions concurrent with Ostrom’s principles. Special 
favours and/or lack of sanctions against a known violation is not a principle seen in long 
standing CPR management as Ostrom (1990) suggests. This might be different if the dispute 
was being resolved on a local level, but in this case, the interviewees could not solve the 
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issue in the ZC (local) format and the monitor, ECan, was not taking the proper steps to bring 
adjudication to the external Environment Court to ensure sanctions or rulings were brought 
against those who were shown to have made violations. Although this case has not been 
settled and this thesis makes no judgement on the alleged infraction or outcome, the lack of 
enforced rules, even if those rules fall outside of Ostrom’s principles, may impact other 
aspects of a successfully managed CPR such as cooperation and graduated sanctions. The 
closer the zone remains to collaborative style conflict resolution, the closer it will match 
Ostrom’s principle.   
6.1.7 Minimal recognition of rights to organize 
The theme that emerged from the interviews was that it is expected that provided the 
funding existed, a majority of the ZIP will be accepted.  There were some who thought that 
some minor changes would be made but the Commissioners were aware of the process and 
involved in it so it is unlikely they would let something completely at odds with their vision 
for the region make it all the way to the end of the process; in contradiction to the CWMS in 
which they are so involved.  As to Ostrom’s principle, given the ZIP is accepted in a way 
similar to what participants think it will be and what documents say it should be, that part of 
the principle is certainly present.  There are also other rules through districts and groups like 
WET who have been allowed to form and have been recognized as contributors to the 
process.  Barring a complete disregard for the process and written programmes by the ECan 
commissioners, this principle is present.  
It may be for further discussion and research, though, that the option to accept the ZC input 
could sway the presence of this principle. If the ZC rules were accepted, then yes, the 
principle is present. If the rules were not accepted, then no, the principle is not present. The 
key question, though, then becomes one of the impact of the threat of not accepting the ZC 
recommendations. It is possible the recommendations could be altered or unauthentic in 
some way due to the overarching threat of not being accepted. It is also possible that the 
perception that a majority of the recommendations will be accepted due to mutual 
understanding or other local relationships can overcome the overarching threat of 
unacceptance, therefore confirming Ostrom’s (1990) minimal recognition of rights to 
organize. Further, the research period for this thesis did not see any recommendations 
presented for acceptance and so the results of those local inputs into the statutory policy is 
yet to be seen (even if anticipated by statutory proposed planning documents like the 
LWRP). 
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6.1.8 Nested enterprises 
The nesting of the management of the Lake has been dramatically improved through the 
CWMS and its resultant RIP and ZIPs.  The question of commissioners looms large again 
though, as an extension of the central government they can be seen as the government not 
relying on that level of nested governance.  This could be construed as central government 
not willing to cede power once the strategy was in place, and in essence, dislodging the 
subsidiarity of the programmes.  Nesting relies heavily on subsidiarity and if central 
government manages each level, there is no nesting involved.  The rest of the governance is 
nested, however, and as long as central government does not solve problems small enough 
for the region then the principle can be considered present. 
Although the principle is present through the nesting of the CWMS and other documents 
and forums, there is a distortion as highlighted by the analysis.   Co-governance was shown 
to occupy a role outside most of the nesting, possibly allowing for some community 
members to circumvent the figurative ‘nest’.  This scatters subsidiarity, and if taken too far, 
could jeopardize the nesting of the system and its alignment with to Ostrom’s principle. 
6.2 How do current arrangements surrounding the governance of Lake 
Ellesmere compare to Ostrom’s Design principles?  
As indicated in the Results section, the governance system surrounding Lake Ellesmere has 
much in common with Ostrom’s principles.  The presence of each principle varies and (as 
discussed in detail in Section 6.1) some are more complete than others. However, in 
summary:   
Clearly Defined Boundaries – Not present, but seemingly not necessary 
Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local conditions – Enough 
scientific information, rules have yet to be finalized 
Collective-choice arrangements – Large opportunity for participation, varying degrees 
of weight and influence amongst those participating 
Monitoring – Sufficient monitoring, but some lack of monitor accountability 
Graduated sanctions – Sufficient graduated sanctions, but lack of sanctioning body 
accountability 
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Conflict-resolution mechanisms – Current strategies within ZC sufficient, future 
conflict surrounding implementation is not as collaborative 
Minimal recognition of rights to organize – Sufficient, but depends on the acceptance 
of the Zone’s recommendations by ECan 
Nested enterprises – Sufficient arrangement, but relationship altered due to co-
governance agreement between the Crown and tangata whenua 
Although it is too early to declare whether or not the current scheme is successful when it 
comes to long-term managing of a resource, some conclusions can still be drawn. 
Based on Ostrom’s (1990) Design Principles, Lake Ellesmere’s management is not set up to 
be a long-enduring CPR institution.  Although some principles are present, and the issue of 
boundaries has not been shown to be problematic, several other principles were absent 
from the management of the CPR at the time of this thesis.  The lack of these principles is a 
result of two major differences that are unique to the Canterbury region.  The first is the co-
governance agreement stemming from Treaty rights between ECan and Ngai Tahu, which 
can alter the nested properties and collective-choice arrangements if handled incorrectly.  
The second difference is the ECan Act of 2010, which replaced elected officials who were 
accountable to appropriators in the region with appointed commissioners who are 
accountable only to their respective ministerial appointers.  The ECan Act plays a large part 
in the accountability issues surrounding monitoring, graduated sanctions, and conflict-
resolution mechanisms that Ostrom (1990) has seen in long-enduring CPR institutions, 
despite the ZC’s ability to monitor the Water Executive. 
The ECan Act has an expiry date by which time the commissioners are supposed to have 
presented to the national government recommendations for the future structure of local 
government in Canterbury.  The expiry of the ECan Act has, however, already been extended 
once and there is no guarantee that a future regional council may be elected or whether 
Selwyn District Council or Christchurch City Council will continue to exist.  If this comes about 
and depending on its nature, more of Ostrom’s principles may be seen in the management 
regime.  The co-governance issue within the region has some integration, as the CWMS calls 
for, “a formal co-governance arrangement (developed in partnership by Ngai Tahu, the 
Crown and Canterbury local government)” ("Canterbury Water Management Strategy," 
2011, p. 114).  If the agreement can somehow be integrated into the nesting more 
effectively than the current voting mechanism within the ZC, its negative impacts can be 
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mitigated.  If both of these changes were to occur, only a few small differences from 
Ostrom’s principles would be present, boding well for the future of the Lake. 
6.3 How does co-governance and community involvement affect CPR 
management? 
6.3.1 Co-Governance and CPR Management 
Co-governance, and to a lesser extent for this case, co-management, play a pivotal role in 
the management of Lake Ellesmere and so could play a similar role in other CPR 
management situations.  The co-governance agreement between ECan and Ngai Tahu has 
been shown to take precedence over the co-management agreement between DoC and Ngai 
Tahu. DoC does not make specific statutory policy, per se, on the major issues in the region, 
whereas ECan does.  It would be much more beneficial to Ngai Tahu to be heavily involved 
with policy making rather than just planning and carrying out lake restoration.  On this level, 
co-governance/management relationships can take precedence over one another, possibly 
moving the relevance of one below the other.  If a Treaty partner can ‘go over the head’ of 
one of their co-management partners, there is less incentive to focus their efforts at the 
management level.  
This is consistent with the definitions explored in the Theoretical Context, as co-governance 
involves the sharing of power, with which much more can be achieved for the non-
governmental partner than through an agreement to merely work together on a 
management strategy not contingent on power sharing, like the JMP.   
The weight of the co-governance agreement draws with it several other factors.  One major 
issue within the CPR is that of entitlement, which was addressed by the Settlement Act and 
handed partial ownership of the lake bed to Ngai Tahu.  This ownership, in the western 
sense, provides further entitlements to the runanga surrounding the Lake that other 
stakeholders do not have, nor could they obtain. These entitlements put Ngai Tahu in a 
strategic position to influence policy surrounding the Lake.  However, the entitlement 
awarded to Ngai Tahu does come with the responsibility of being a producer within the CPR 
and to add to the resource and maintain it.  This could come in different forms.  Ngai Tahu 
and its runanga also have more to lose than others who may not share their entitlement 
advantages because of their ownership and responsibility surrounding the lake bed.  It also 
puts them more at risk to the effects of free-riders in the CPR like those non-point source 
polluters who may be taking advantage of the resource.  DoC also owns lands along the Lake 
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margins, although their entitlements are different from Ngai Tahu’s.  The awarding of 
entitlements within a CPR is a defining characteristic and like a unique environment, will 
often result in a unique management scheme. 
Institutions within a CPR, especially as Agrawal (2003) discusses their ability to benefit from 
a changed social setting, are also affected by co-governance.  This effect comes in the form 
of acknowledgement through the government side involved in the co-governance (or co-
management) agreement.  Co-governance plays a part in favouring one group over the 
others within a CPR.  In the case of Lake Ellesmere, the acknowledgement and awarding of 
governance rights to the tangata whenua placed their institutions in a better position to 
have an impact, for better or worse, on the Lake and its environs.  This is not to say that 
other institutions surrounding dairying or fisheries, for example, do not play a role. They 
must come about their influence in a different way than the tangata whenua because they 
do not have a co-governance agreement, nor in this situation, is there a Treaty-like or LGA 
requirement to develop one on their behalf.  Without such an agreement, groups other than 
the tangata whenua must come by their influence in other ways. 
The reasons for the difference in influence come in two forms.  The Selwyn/Waihora Zone is 
uniquely affected by the Treaty in a way that is not present in other zones.  First, the number 
of runanga in the area translates to a larger presence on the ZC.  Although it is a consensus 
approach based on collaboration, the number of runanga representatives, as well as the 
presence of a commissioner with runanga ties, certainly puts this Zone in a unique place of a 
majority of ZC members being Ngai Tahu.  On top, or more to the side, of that 
representation, sits the actual co-governance agreement between ECan and Ngai Tahu.  This 
agreement has shown through interviews especially, but so too in document analysis and 
observation, to operate outside of the Zone Committee process even though it is called for 
in the CWMS.  The figurative location and autonomy of the agreement affects the nesting of 
the management scheme that exists within Canterbury. 
In this way, and as previously seen in the Nested Governance principle, co-governance also 
affects CPR management strategies that include a nested governance system.  Furthermore, 
in the case of Lake Ellesmere, though presumably not in all cases, the nesting of different 
governance levels is disturbed by the presence of a co-governance agreement.   
A co-management agreement with the necessary amounts of power sharing could also act in 
a similar way.  This is not a result of the agreement in and of itself, rather a lack of full 
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inclusion of that agreement into the nested system.  This lack of inclusion allows the co-
governance agreement to operate often on its own terms (or sometimes, unknown terms) 
and as interviews offered, the relationship with the ZC is still not fully understood.  If the co-
governance was included in the nesting in a more integrated fashion, or a better nesting of 
Maori water governance was included within the region, its role would be better understood 
and its power could be checked in a similar way that Zone Committees are expected to act as 
a check on the Water Executive.   
The multiple ‘co-agreements’ in which Ngai Tahu are engaged provide Ngai Tahu with 
different advantages.  Currently, the agreement with ECan seems to be favoured as feelings 
of disenfranchisement from DoC have been mentioned in interviews.  Previously, it seemed 
that the JMP was given more attention when it came to opposing the Lake Opening consent.  
This suggests strategic manoeuvring when it comes to such partnership relationships, all 
aimed at enhancing, or recovering, indigenous power.  However, there may be a point where 
multiple agreements concerning the management of the Lake become too many. 
Disenfranchising a Treaty partner could cause a negative effect on the management of a 
CPR. Moreover, Marshall (2008) has previously  critiqued the inefficiencies and confusion 
created by a nested governance regime that resulted in repetitiveness and multiple plans 
directed at the same issue. Those concerns may well apply here unless there is consolidation 
and better integration. 
Revisiting Berkes’ (1994) figure of co-management hierarchy, we can see in Figure 23 that 
both Ngai Tahu agreements fall in different places on the scale.  Although this is designed as 
a co-management scale, it can be applied with co-governance in this sense to compare the 
two agreements.  The JMP agreement has little power sharing and yet remains a joint effort.  
This falls squarely above the ‘joint action’ hierarchy as described by Berkes.  The co-
governance agreement involves regional government and in effect, removes some of the 
community from participating, while elevating one sector to near-governmental status.  For 
this reason, it is lower on the actual co-management scale.  If Ngai Tahu were the entire 
community, then the agreement would be on the opposite end of the spectrum. 
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Figure 23: A hierarchy of co-management arrangements surrounding Lake Ellesmere/Te 
Waihora, adapted from Berkes (1994) 
6.3.2 Community Involvement in CPR Management 
The calls for community involvement in CPR management within the literature discuss the 
relationship with the CPR as the defining communal requirement (Agrawal, 1999).  Ostrom 
(1990) also discussed the difficulty of communities with varied cultural backgrounds, wealth, 
and lifestyles in managing CPRs and in fact, her research was based mainly on culturally 
similar communities.  The case of Lake Ellesmere certainly provides a community with a 
relationship to the CPR within the catchment, but it also includes at least two very different 
culturally-based worldviews and different levels of involvement and wealth within that 
community.   
A major factor of involving a CPR community is the ability for most people in the community 
to have their say and participate in the process regardless of differing worldviews.  This case 
has shown that this can be done in a diverse setting through mechanisms like the ZC and 
Focus Groups.  Agrawal et. al (1999) saw a place for differentiated communities to move in 
the direction of sustainable management, and this is a first step.  
 
  = JMP Co-mgmt. 
 
 = ECan/Ngai Tahu Co-gov 
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Significantly differing worldviews based on culture and a post-colonial rebalancing of 
relationships, though, may require a greater use of a cross-cultural conflict-resolution 
mechanism.  For instance, a conflict management style like confrontation or compromise, 
which can rely on majorities and is not consistent with collaboration (Jenkins, 1983), could 
give a larger advantage to a majority or large lobbying group.  On the other hand, 
cooperation and collaboration where consensus is the goal would mean that even if 
worldview numbers were lopsided within a CPR community, the minority would still have 
their views expressed in the policies.  
Within communities, the legitimacy of a policy or programme can play a big part in their 
success.  Pinkerton’s (2008) claims as to the benefits of co-management to legitimacy (in 
that it could help to make rules seem effective and fairly enforced) may be true in some 
instances. However, the results here suggest that a more co-governance style, as epitomized 
by the ECan and Ngai Tahu agreement, can work to hurt the legitimacy of a programme due 
to the exclusion of other users of the resource.  Co-governance requires power-sharing 
where co-management does not, however there may be some instances when co-
management does involve power sharing.  A name does not always define an agreement; 
rather it is the substance that shapes it.  Here, the substance matters. 
The case of Lake Ellesmere has shown that allowing a power-sharing management or 
governance scheme to exist outside the collaborative framework can delegitimize the 
developing plans.  If the power-sharing arrangement can circumvent or operate outside the 
nested system which is used to manage the CPR, then it can absolutely cause questions over 
fairness and acceptance of rules.  This is shown through the interviews, where interviewees 
expressed concerns over the rights of iwi to have a say in resource consents throughout the 
catchment, and again in frustrations over using the co-governance agreements to get around 
the ZC.   
These negatives, however, do not necessarily mean the CPR cannot survive; they only act to 
make it more difficult to manage.  This case has shown that communities can play a major 
role in the management of CPRs to the point of writing their own recommendations and 
rules for their respective catchments.  The benefits to including the community, as described 
by Ostrom (1990) and discussed in the results are often on full display in this case, as the 
unique setting and community make-up add much to the management scheme (e.g. local 
knowledge and expertise).  With collaborative governance comes co-management, whether 
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there is a signed separate agreement or not.  This also bodes well for legitimacy and 
acceptance of the programmes and plans put in place. 
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Chapter 7 – Conclusions 
This research set out to explore questions related to the sustainable management of 
common property resources (CPRs) and the process of moving from a largely hierarchical 
approach to a more community-based collaborative model of a large common property 
resource; in this case a lower catchment lake that held multiple significant values for a 
variety of different stakeholders. To sustainably manage such a lake required an integrated 
catchment management approach that included an effective relationship between the 
indigenous iwi and pakeha, as well as a successful relationship between different levels of 
governance from Central Government to local landowners and stakeholders. The case 
chosen, Lake Ellesmere, has been the focus of considerable management attention over the 
last decade for its biophysical health and its significance in the settlement of colonial 
injustices. The implications of these contextual issues on the mechanisms that have been 
used by those involved in decision-making for the Lake have been examined through eleven 
interviews with people directly involved in decision-making, coupled with observations of 
interactions and use of material and advisors at meetings, and reflective reading and analysis 
of relevant documents.  The research has drawn on Ostrom’s design principles as its primary 
organising and analytical framework, supported by Pomeroy and Berkes’s conceptual model 
of the relationship between government and community empowerment in decision-making.  
The analysis and detailed discussion of the resultant data enables the three key focusing 
questions raised at the outset to be addressed in the following sections. The thesis closes 
with a brief comment on its limitations, and identifies some key areas for future research. 
7.1 How does co-governance and community involvement affect CPR 
management?  
The research presented here has shown that co-governance has a direct impact on CPR 
management, though it is not clear whether that impact is always beneficial or always 
detrimental. In the case of Lake Ellesmere, community involvement is key to the proposed 
programme (e.g. ZIP) being accepted into statutory documents and amongst local peoples 
who could then monitor, enforce and adjust accordingly. The community involvement hinges 
largely on the acceptance of the ZC recommendations, and without a seemingly fair level of 
statutory incorporation, the community involvement may have been for naught. In such a 
case, it is not the involvement of the community per se, that matters, but rather it is the 
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adoption or incorporation of the community decision making recommendations into the 
management of the CPR that is the crucial element. 
If any of the above stemmed from co-governance between the Crown and Ngai Tahu, then 
certainly those impacts have been positive as it relates to this thesis. However, the Treaty 
and the Settlement Act, though beneficial for several reasons (such as empowerment and 
associated resource rights for indigenous people), also posed a problem when the 
agreements were able to usurp or operate outside the design of the CWMS and associated 
plans. Even at the community level, co-governance of the Lake was weighted in favour of 
one interest group due to the rights of tangata whenua surrounding natural resources.  
This is not to say that there is not a potential imbalance in other aspects of policy or 
management. If half of the ZC were specifically dairy farmers, or commercial fishers, it could 
have had the same distortive qualities as was apparent when specific seats were allocated 
for a group stemming from the co-governance regime. There are certainly advantages to co-
governance, but as it applies to Ostrom’s principles, it can be disruptive. This disruption, if 
not balanced, could lead to different allocations and entitlements which may cause friction 
amongst appropriators. To avoid possible friction, the co-governance arrangement must be 
incorporated into the lattice and nesting of management strategies in a way that gives 
appropriators the opportunity to participate in the same ways in regards to the CPR, without 
special standing. It could be argued, that once special standing or a certain amount of rights 
are amassed by one group in a CPR, that it ceases to be a true CPR and converts to either a 
private resource, a public resource, or other. If this is the case, then applying Ostrom’s 
principles could be out of place. 
7.2 Is the new framework surrounding the management of Lake Ellesmere 
designed in a way that is consistent with relevant literature on long-enduring 
CPRs? 
When compared to Ostrom’s (1990) principles there is substantial evidence to say that the 
new arrangements surrounding Lake Ellesmere are mostly consistent with those of long-
enduring CPRs. One principle concerning boundaries differs from the literature but it does 
not void the principle overall due to a common understanding of participants of the 
understood boundaries. Though there is some difference in conflict resolution mechanisms 
and further research is needed to understand minimal recognition of rights to organize, the 
research suggests that in the context of Lake Ellesmere these are the critical principles. The 
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way in which they operate potentially render other principles irrelevant.   If, for example, the 
ZC local inputs are not adopted by higher levels of government, many of the advantages 
offered by any similarities between Ostrom’s remaining principles and the new framework 
will be minimized. The Treaty similarly distorts the framework surrounding the Lake by 
creating unequal rights, access, and governance amongst appropriators of the CPR.  
Finally, the ECan Act also distorted the principles due to the presence of central government 
that has altered the nesting of subsidiary governance levels and impacted on monitoring and 
sanctions. Restoring the ECan Commissioners to elected positions would alleviate this 
distortion, though it is unclear if any negative outcomes from this supposedly temporary 
Commissioner arrangement would carry over to a regime in which local democracy had been 
restored. Though it is possible to gauge the likely success of a CPR based on Ostrom’s 
principles, this thesis cannot say whether the presence of only some of those principles is 
enough to support a CPR in the long run. Further research on the outcomes of ZIP 
implementation and other policies is needed. 
7.3 To what extent does the origin of government rules affect the level of 
community involvement? 
The origin of the rules for CPR management, when viewed through the case study of Lake 
Ellesmere, is an imperative part of designing a long enduring CPR institution and 
management plan. Much of the ZC process was based on a local setting (e.g. 
Selwyn/Waihora ZC) and the effort was expected by participants to be accepted or at least, 
weighted heavily in the application of statutory rules. It may be that the origin of the rules is 
more important than those who enforce them (e.g. ZC rules enforced by ECan), though 
external monitoring would impact on a CPR in other ways, as discussed in Chapter 6.  
7.4 Research Limitations and Future Research 
Limitations surrounding this thesis mainly concerned scope and time.  The Lake was chosen 
as a focus of the case study but it was clear early on that attending every meeting that 
stemmed from the CWMS was impractical.  With so many facets to this issue, and to CPR 
management in general, the research was limited to those that could be practically 
addressed within the timeframe and resources available.  This led to a perhaps narrow focus 
on the transitions occurring in a particular year that must not be seen as necessarily holding 
in the longer term. 
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Finding runanga representatives prepared to be interviewed was also difficult and I was 
fortunate to find two iwi members who would share their thoughts. Approaching the thesis 
through the lens of a Maori traditional world view was not possible given the time and scope 
of this thesis.  
Future research could usefully expand the research undertaken here both longitudinally for 
the same catchment, and with greater attention to a Maori cultural perspective, or to 
compare the situation described with similar transitions in other catchments within the 
regions or elsewhere. The major limiting factor, time and timing of research, could be 
addressed with a longer period of study both for the implementation portions of the new 
water framework in the region and also a follow-up study monitoring the changes and 
impacts of the new framework on the catchment. Both of these future research options 
would take considerable time and would do well to balance better the input from both 
pakeha and iwi involved with the Lake. Further interviews of those not directly involved 
professionally or with the governance of the Lake would add a needed point of view for such 
explorations.  The level of influence exerted by people wearing particular ‘hats’ within the 
process and those worn outside it, and the effects of changes in personnel should also be 
examined to understand the critical pathways to new CPR management regimes.  
As Ostrom’s principles can be applied to many situations throughout the world, further 
research could overcome the case study limitations and expand similar research to other 
CPRs, particularly those where indigenous rights differ from other citizens. The success of 
Ostrom’s principles in such situations could form a reflection of the benefits and drawbacks 
of such differentiation of rights in natural resource management situations and/or add to a 
better understanding of how to utilize nesting and co-governance in such situations. 
7.5 Conclusion 
Overall, the research presented here has demonstrated the importance of exploring the 
implementing mechanisms during the transition to co-management of a major common pool 
resource.  In doing so it has particularly highlighted the influence of post-colonial rebalancing 
of power relationships on such co-management attempts and suggests a need for greater 
attention to be paid to transition processes and nesting of co-management and co-
governance arrangements. 
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Appendix C – Zone Committee Observations Summary 
Date of 
Meeting 
Agenda/Topics 
Discussed 
Points of 
Interest/Note 
March 6, 2012 -Arable Farming Brief 
-Limit Setting (FG, Scen. 1) 
-LWRP Briefing 
-Election of Chair 
-Discussed Water Transfers 
-New leadership format: 
Meeting Chair, Deputy Chair, 
Regional Comm. Rep., Liaison 
Role 
-Pat McEvedy is new Chair 
April 3, 2012 -CPW Briefing 
-Limit Setting (Technical 
analysis, FG, Managing) 
 
-Discussed Selwyn/Waihora 
Sub regional chapter and 
LWRP 
-Transfer of unused water 
allocation options 
May 1, 2012 -Dryland Biodiversity Brief 
-Limit Setting (LWRP Brief, 
Statutory and Policy toolkit) 
-ECan update 
-SDC Response to ZIP 
-ZC members begin attending 
FG  
-SDC advises majority of ZIP 
will be accepted with funding 
June 5, 2012 -Limit Setting (Scen. 1, 2, FG) 
-ZC discussion of Limit Setting 
-Immediate Steps Decisions 
-Waimakariri Workshop 
- Wybrow requests In-
Committee time, McEvedy 
agrees to ‘Public Excluded’ 
meeting times/extensions 
-Clare Williams expressed 
Tangata Whenua concerns 
July 3, 2012 -Limit Setting (Bolt-ons, Scen. 
3, Discussion on Scen.3) 
-WTW Briefing 
-Choose to look at 3 scenarios 
for Limit Setting with bolt-ons 
-Discussion of Lake Opening  
-WTW focus is on habitat not 
TLI 
August 7, 2012 -Limit Setting (Scen. 2 + bolt-
ons, Thinking Space 
-V5 Presentation 
-Implementation Work 
Schedule 
-Note differences in Overseer 
versions 5.4 and 6 
 
September 4, 
2012 
-ECan Commissioner David 
Caygill acknowledges ZC’s 
work 
-Potential Solution Package 
1,2,3,4,5 
-Alum idea not run by 
Runangas; frustration on both 
sides 
 
October 2, 2012 -Kaitiakitanga Presentation 
-Sub-Regional Chapter and 
ZIP addendum Sessions 
-Pig Farmer presentation 
-Meeting held at Wairewa  
-Noted tensions of farmers on 
‘grandfathering’ N-loads 
-Donald Couch frustrated by 
discussion topics 
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November 6, 
2012 
-Sub-regional Chapter and ZIP 
addendum Sessions (water 
quality, quantity 
-In-committee time now 
taking up about half of 
meetings 
-Charles Crofts vents 
frustration on ecological flows 
instead of what is consented 
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Appendix D – Interview Questions 
Introduction 
 
- What is your involvement with the lake? 
- What are your goals for the lake? 
 
Ostrom’s Design Principles 
 
- Who should be and who is involved in making decisions about the management of the 
 lake? 
- What is the geographical area that needs to be considered in developing a lake 
 management plan? 
- What do you think about the conflicting/varying boundaries offered by different policies? 
 - How do those varying boundaries affect the policy or ZIP recommendations? 
 
- How has the unique environmental setting been taken into account? 
- How has the historical situation affected the current and future management scheme? 
 
- Have there been interests left out or poorly represented in the process? 
- Who? How have those interests responded? 
 - Have external actors played a significant role? 
 
- What aspects of the lake, most importantly, need to be monitored for effective 
 management of the lake? 
- Are you familiar with any monitoring programmes for these aspects of its 
 management? 
- Who is involved in monitoring the recommendations of the ZIP?  
 
- What are the consequences for resource users if they break the rules within the 
 boundaries?  
 - How do (how will) those consequences progress for repeat offenders? 
 
- What have been the major areas of disagreement surrounding the Lake?  
 - Any specific examples that have had a significant impact? 
 - Have these disagreements been discussed sufficiently? In what forum have they 
 been discussed? 
 - How have these disagreements been resolved, if at all? 
 
- Are the results of the ZIP recognized by the regional government and territorial 
authorities? 
 - Are there policies or recommendations that do not have the support or backing 
 they require? 
 
 
Thesis Focus 
  
- What kind of an impact has the Treaty had on the process? 
- How have the co-governance arrangements between Ngai Tahu, ECan and the DOC 
  affected the process?  
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- Are those agreements a help or hindrance to lake management? 
- How do they help? How do they hinder? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
132 
 
Appendix E – Documents Reviewed 
Bio-Physical Lake Ellesmere 
 Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere: State of the Lake and Future Management 
National Policy Level 
 The Treaty of Waitangi 
 The Ngai Tahu Claims Settlement Act 
 The Resource Management Act 
 The Local Government Act 
 National Policy Statement for Freshwater Management 
Regional Policy Level 
 The Canterbury Regional Policy Statement 
 The National Resources Regional Plan 
 The Land and Water Regional Plan 
 Canterbury Water Management Strategy 
 The Temporary Commissioners and Improved Water Management Act (ECan Act) 
 Regional Implementation Programme 
 Zone Implementation Programme 
Lake-Specific Plans, Policies and Programmes 
 WET Community Strategy 
 The Joint Management Plan 
 Whakaora Te Waihora 
 The National Water Conservation (Te Waihora/Lake Ellesmere) Order 1990 
 Lake Opening Resource Consent 
 
